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Challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa



works!

Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers No. 11

INSTITUT FÜR AFRIKASTUDIEN

Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers

The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” report on ongoing projects, the results of current research and matters related to the focus on African Studies at the University of Bayreuth. There are no specific requirements as to the language of publication and the length of the articles.

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Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive 'Excellence Initiative' by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and non-African scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research. On 15 June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded 'Centres of Excellence' which were granted support for the next 5 years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African, American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research environment based upon three clearly defined general Research Areas which are:

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B. Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion

C. Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development

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BIGSAS

BIGSAS*works!*

With BIGSAS*works!* we aim at offering Junior Fellows at the Graduate School of African Studies a platform for publishing research-related articles. This new online-journal provides an excellent platform for representing and promoting the idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for showcasing on-going research, creating transparency of the work carried out by Junior Fellows and providing a space for trying out articles and working jointly on them towards further publication. Each issue focuses on a certain thematic field or theoretical concept and Junior Fellows from any discipline are invited to submit papers, enabling common interests beyond the predetermined BIGSAS research areas to flourish. At the same time BIGSAS*works!* offers its workgroup participants deeper insights into and practical experience of what it means to be an editor. Last but not least BIGSAS*works!* makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), (i.e. us!), visible before our theses are published.

The name BIGSAS*works!* had various implications. First and foremost it is an abbreviation of 'BIGSAS Working Papers!'. Second, it is meant to show the work of our BIGSAS 'works groups', so indeed it is the works that are resulting from a structure like BIGSAS. Third, taking 'works' as a verb, it demonstrates the work that we as BIGSAS Fellows carry out, with BIGSAS*works!* guaranteeing us a visible output in addition to our theses.

The editors of this issue

Girum Getachew Alemu has earned his B.A in Sociology and Social Anthropology and his Master's degree in Development studies from Addis Ababa University. Currently, he is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Germany. In his PhD research he interrogates the international climate change adaptation agenda and the associated concept of vulnerability by zooming-in at the local level and locating climate change adaptation in broader 'social' context in dry land parts of upper Awash valley in Ethiopia. Girum's research focuses on the constellation of development, environmental governance, and local livelihoods. Particularly, he explores how these interconnections influence the constitution of human-environment ruptures like disasters, climate change, and their aftermath. In his research Girum also targets applied audience in the sphere of policy making by unearthing the agency of local resource users in pursuing novel responses and adaptations to both disaster and climate change.

Peter Narh specializes in the field of Development Studies, particularly in academic and applied work on sustainable environment and growth. He is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in development studies at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth, Germany. In his doctoral dissertation on Ghana, he explores environmental governance regime synergies, conflicts and community environmental responsibility. Between 1999 and 2007 he studied at the University of Ghana (UG) and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), both in Ghana. He had also been a Programmes coordinator at the Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung from October 2008 to April 2009.

Acknowledging reviewers of this issue

The editors of this issue, on behalf of all contributors, express sincerest gratitude to the five University professors who reviewed the contributing papers. In their schedules, they found time to read and offer valuable suggestions on the papers, which eventually culminated in the issue we have now. Indeed, for those who are not members of the University of Bayreuth, we are especially thankful. We also owe Professor Dr. Dieter Neubert of the University of Bayreuth appreciation for rechecking the content of the papers, as well as writing the foreword to this issue.

The five reviewers are:

Prof. Dr. Kurt Beck	University of Bayreuth
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Müller	University of Bayreuth
Dr. Wolfram Laube	University of Bonn
Prof. Dr. Elisio Macamo	University of Basel
Prof. Dr. Georg Klute	University of Bayreuth

Foreword

By Prof. Dr. Dieter Neubert

After the post-development debate of the 1990s (Escobar 1995; Rahnema 1997) analysed the concept of development as a construction imposed on the global South to subordinate its people, talking about development seemed to be outdated. Especially in the humanities, post-colonial studies gained interest. The new debates showed that concepts that were for a long time taken for granted needed to be revisited from a critical perspective. But despite radical deconstruction of the concept of development, the notion of development is still alive. This holds true not only at the level of the development institutions whose institutional survival is closely linked to the promises of development co-operation, but also at a local level where people claim their right to development. The intellectual deconstruction of development did not solve the challenges of survival and change in everyday life. Therefore, the presence of ideas of development in the everyday life of the global South cannot be ignored. Against the background of the post-development debate and the work of critics of development practice (e.g. Mosse 2005; Rottenburg 2009), notions of development and change cannot be taken as given, but are topics requiring empirical research. Produced by development institutions, notions of development are challenged from an everyday life perspective. The tensions and processes of negotiation between development and state institutions on the one hand, and people's understandings and needs on the other hand are the topic of this publication.

As the editors show in their introduction we should not misunderstand these tensions as representing a dichotomy between the local and the global. The term development itself with its local interpretation shows that it is not possible to separate local from global processes. They are interconnected and the notions of development to which this publication refers are negotiated between different global and local actors. This underlines not only the agency of the people involved, but also that concepts used in the

negotiations, such as urban improvement in a Sudanese shanty town, economic development in South Africa, or environment protection in Ghana, have been appropriated by the local communities according to their own terms. With their studies of this topic, the contributors link up with earlier studies carried out at the Bayreuth Institute of African Studies on local action in the context of globalisation (Probst/Spittler 2005; Loimer et al. 2005) and make a big step forward with their empirical analyses.

This fourth volume of BIGSAS*works!* represents main features of BIGSAS in a remarkable way. The articles underline the interdisciplinary approach of BIGSAS and show that studies from Social Anthropology, Geography, Media Studies, Political Sciences and Sociology share a common research focus and together present a multi-perspective, comprehensive picture of the common topic. At the same time, the Junior Fellows, who come from all three BIGSAS research areas,[1] document in an impressive way that the different research areas are deeply interlinked. In the research area "Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion", the media studies paper (Irina Turner), with its focus on new media, adds an important new twist to the analysis of economic policy. The paper grounded in social anthropology (Mohamed A.G. Bakhit), from the research area "Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in Africa", uses the notion of competing orders to analyse the negotiation of change. And the papers in the research area "Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development", from geography (Girum Getachew, Peter Narh), political sciences (Felix Brinkmann) and sociology (Julia Boger), refer to situations of uncertainty and processes of innovation. This publication, developed and presented by BIGSAS Junior Fellows, demonstrates the lively und highly productive discussion in BIGSAS, which transcends borders between disciplines and research areas.

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Challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa

Introduction

By Girum Getachew Alemu and Peter Narh (editors)

Research on the processes of globalisation and development in Africa takes two apparently opposing views. On the one hand, globalisation and development are depicted as processes with their roots in the global North and travel to the global South (Mazrui 2005; Mudimbe 1988; Grillo and Stirrat 1997, Rostow 1971). On the other hand, studies on local level values and knowledge systems accentuate the capability of local actors to pursue their own everyday life independent of global forces (Bruijn et al. 2007; Binsbergen et al. 2004; Arce and Long 1992). However, in this highly interconnected world, the dichotomy of the local and the global do not capture the full picture of grounded realities in Africa. Rather, the global and local are constitutive with one another (Long 2001) and their manifestations in the various everyday spheres of social life - environment, media, migration, development interventions, and resource utilisations - are characterised by attempts of co-habitation, resistance, innovation, and appropriation to mention a few.

Against this backdrop, research on the interaction of broader socio-political and environmental forces with that of local level actors and how the two influence each other have been approached from various disciplinary perspectives. In some strands of social science disciplines the unprecedented influence of structural barriers on local actors is magnified whereas in others the mechanisms through which local actors use their agency to resist, subvert or go along with structural forces is celebrated. However, throughout this series we show that these seemingly polar opposite understanding of global structural forces and local everyday practices are mutually constitutive. Accordingly, contributions to the series have taken up the interdependence of global development paradigms and local contexts in the spheres of migration, communication platforms, environmental governance, and politics of resource utilisation, in order to further elucidate the understanding of ‘development’ in the African context.

This issue of BIGSAS*works!* seeks to present this interdependence of paradigms and practices in global, national, and local spheres from different disciplinary perspectives and foci. The contributing papers present various ways in which the daily livelihood activities of community people in different parts of sub-Saharan Africa represent this interdependence. Together but in different ways, the authors address the question of how global development paradigms affect people's lives, what meanings are there in the everyday things people do to live that may synchronise with or be at variance with these global paradigms. Indeed, global paradigms may conflict with or hamper values people place in things that affect their lives. But at the same time they may also provide new opportunities for the livelihoods of many. The papers in this issue of *BIGASworks!* in respective ways challenge us all to take another look at our approach to development in Africa and its entanglements with broader forces.

Mohammed Bakhit and Irina Turner present to readers the manifest conflicts and negotiations between national level development policies and the citizenry. With a case study research in Anthropology in Sudan, Mohammed investigates the living conditions of the shantytown of Elbaraka around Khartoum since the 1960-70 rural-urban migrations. The gist of his paper is that in pursuing urban development, ideology is pitched against practice in Elbaraka. The author attempts to analyse how the ideologies and practices of three main actors in Elbaraka – the local people, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the central government - mix, negotiate, and share practices of development and power to achieve respective objectives. Whiles all three actors share a common urgency to improve living conditions in the shantytown, they however support different practices to attain this improvement. Notwithstanding cooperation in some instances between the state actors, NGOs, and local people, struggles between their different ideologies strongly manifest in others. There are core contestations among the three actors in the way they see their role in the development of the shantytown. Government and NGOs relate to each other as 'outsiders' with power, perceiving local people as unable to provide critical urban services for themselves. The author makes the point that such perception of the central government and the NGOs fails to recognise the agency of local people to self-govern their own lives. The author concludes that in view of these contestations over the meaning of local development in the shantytown, support from the state and the NGOs is often at variance with local practical needs, and seems rather to advance the peculiar objectives of the state and NGOs, whiles the needs and interests of the local people remain unmet.

As in Sudan, contestations over state development policy between national actors and local people is the substance of Irina Turner's paper on the Republic of South Africa. In this country, government economic policies clearly are not in favour with majority of local people. Irina's paper, with a focus on media and economy, discusses internet resources such as social networks and blogs as media for South Africans to engage with their country's macroeconomic policies. The discussions in her paper seek to sketch answers for the currently pressing question of whether social media are politically used by South Africans to challenge hegemonic and mainstream notions of development and whether online platforms can provide a tool for maintaining or even expanding on the current level of freedom of expression in the country. Macroeconomic policies in the Republic of South Africa, founded on the New Growth Path (NGP) national development strategy, are reflected in the annual state of the nation address. The strategy seeks to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in post-apartheid South Africa by finding solutions to the needs of the poor, based on a developmental state agenda. Basing her work on the social media platform *ThoughtLeader*, Facebook, as well as a complimentary offline survey, the author traces the evolution of public notion of the developmental South African state and contrasts the country's official government version of the developmental state and its vision brand, with people's real-life experiences uttered online. She contends that though state economic policy contained in the 'state of the nation' address, seeks to speak on behalf of the nation from a political perspective, official mainstream solutions cannot reflect subjectively experienced perceptions of individual citizens.

From Development Studies and Social Geography backgrounds, Peter Narh and Girum Getachew focus the contestations between competing notions of development on natural resource governance. Both authors bring to the fore ways in which state regimes on environmental resources interfere with customary property rights and traditional livelihood strategies in Ghana and Ethiopia respectively. In Peter's paper, he presents results from empirical research he conducted in Dormaa, Ghana to show that community people, conscious of their customary property rights regime, hold values of their natural environment that derive largely from the communal property rights regime. These values in many instances come in conflict with those held by the public regulatory regimes, which promote tree planting to reclaim so-called degraded forests on the basis of individual rights to trees and incentives to plant these trees. For the public regimes, tree planting is promoted as though land belongs to an individual in perpetuity. In view of the hold on people of the communality of values in natural resources in Dormaa, individual

landowners and land users eventually are constrained to utilise incentives from public regimes for tree planting. Thus, Peter's paper shows that national level notions of environmental governance, which are carried from global discourses, and translating into tree planting do not conform to values and conceptions of local people about their natural environment. In other words, Peter found in his research that the protection of the natural environment as a resource in the discourse of public environmental governance policies and programmes, through mainly individual property rights approaches is inconsistent with the communal values local people hold in their natural environments. Indeed, it is these communal values that shape their everyday livelihood activities.

Girum takes the divergence between broader and local notions of development off from the perspective of politics of resource utilisation. In his contribution to the series, Girum notes how politics of resource utilisation leads to entitlement failure for the local people in the upper Awash valley in Ethiopia. He approaches this from a historical vantage point of interaction between broader structural sources of vulnerability and the local strategies of dealing with these structural barriers. By approaching the problem through political ecology that emphasises on local agency, he attempts to show us how the locals, even under the most severe social and political conditions, try to navigate their own way and make use of scarce resources. He further shows that the local pastoral community in upper Awash have managed to bring-in new forms of resource arrangement so as to deal with social as well as climate related sources of vulnerability. According to Girum, this is a clear instance of how local people in rural areas use their agency to deal with structural barriers than becoming simply passive victims of processes that are rooted in broader and misinformed (under)development interventions.

Julia Boger and Felix Brinkmann, a Sociologists and a Political Scientist respectively, highlight how people utilise their agency and knowledge to negotiate global and development intervention and practice at the local level. Julia Boger explores ways German-trained returned skilled migrants negotiate between professional knowledge on the 'Green economy', which is a concept in global development discourse, and unfavourable local working conditions in Ghana. In her paper, returned migrants with environmental and resource development skills are often willing to lend the knowledge they acquire in their studies abroad to contribute to environmental sustainability and eco-industrial development in Ghana while making a living. Julia notes that highly skilled migrants, particularly in their working age, return to Ghana after their graduation from specific

environmental programmes. Subsequently, many of them become important drivers of change, primarily through transfer of new ideas and knowledge to shaping environmental policies and implementing programmes at the local level. Julia shows however that though the returned experts hold potentials to contribute to environmental policy making and implementation at the micro, meso, and macro levels in Ghana, they also face challenges in lending their skills to use, and to find their feet in the local economy. The experts face inadequate jobs in the formal sector, poor remuneration, poor working equipments, and job opportunities being blocked to migrants by non-migrants. To overcome these challenges, they network and make use of programmes such the Returning Expert Programme (REP) and the Reintegrationprogramme (RE) established and implemented in Germany and Ghana to encourage trained experts to return home to congenial working conditions.

Felix Brinkmann adds to the utility of agency in negotiating between national and local conditions. His paper shows how small-scale entrepreneurs manoeuvre weak national institutions to promote their trade. In a study in the Kitwe copper belt of Zambia, Felix finds that the economy of Zambia depends heavily on copper and therefore volatile copper prices on the world market pose a challenge to the Zambian economy. Coupled with weak a national institutional framework for their business, local copper dealers put in place all manner of informal and what Felix sees as illegal institutions to deal with the erratic prices of copper. In the Chisokone-Market, the second biggest market in Zambia, central governmental authorities have not been able to provide adequate institutional and logistic support for the SMEs to operate effectively. In consequence, local market association leaders with power and information take advantage of the weak national institutions to promote their SMEs, and assume control of all activities of the market, managing it to suit their personal and respective associational interests. Usually, the less powerful entrepreneurs are the losers. Felix suggests in his contribution that the kind of strategies successful SMEs employ to overcome the challenges the erratic copper prices pose to their businesses, in the face of the weaknesses of the central state, are still to expend in future. How this expansion unfolds to impact on SMEs as well as on copper prices remain issues for further research. Suffice it to say that local entrepreneurs have been able to manage the weaknesses of the state to provide conducive conditions for their own trade. Thus, Felix's paper affirms that local people have their own ways of life, and may draw on global forces to enhance their livelihoods.

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From illegal squatter settlement towards legal shantytowns: negotiations of power and responsibilities in Khartoum shantytowns

Mohamed A.G. Bakhit[2]

Abstract

The article intends to investigate how social services and development programmes in shantytown areas have been designed and implemented in a very specific way by the three actors involved (local people, NGOs and local government). Also, it examines the perceptions and ideologies behind the particular selection of social services and who actually determines the priorities and takes on the responsibilities involved. The discussion in the paper uses Elbaraka shantytown (located in the south-east of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan) as an example to uncover this complicated process.

Keywords: shantytowns, local community, government, NGOs, agency.

Introduction

Despite its richness in resources, Sudan like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed many years of political instability and civil wars since its independence in 1956. The country has also suffered from many other prolonged problems like ethnic conflicts, high rates of poverty, vast population displacement, the unequal distribution of social services, immense levels of immigration, many kinds of environmental disasters and poor quality of government services (education, healthcare, as well as low achievements in governmentality and rule of law).

Indeed about 13.5 per cent[3]of the total populations of Sudan currently live in the capital Khartoum. Migrants to the capital city of Khartoum come from all parts of Sudan, due to its concentration of services and economic growth. The first waves of migrants arrived in the capital in the period from1960-70. These were economic

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[3] Statistical Year Book for the Year 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics, Republic of Sudan.

migrants, and the majority of them originated from the northern parts of the country, searching for employment in the newly established commercial and industrial sectors in the capital. Moreover the majority were educated, as only 23 per cent of all migrants to Khartoum aged 20-24 years in 1971 lacked any form of education (Galal-aldin 1980). The majority chose to live at the periphery, or in small villages near the city's boundaries, until these were gradually swallowed up by the urban area. But the statistics show that a small number also came from areas in western and southern Sudan (between 5 and 8 per cent) to work as unskilled workers, and they lived near the industrial zones in illegal squatter settlements. Later on the government, under pressure from local residents, evacuated them and planned new, legal fourth-class settlements on the outskirts of the city. These formed the nuclei of the present shantytowns.

The second wave of migrants arrived during 1980-2000, pushed by the civil war in the south and ethnic conflicts in Darfur, and drought and desertification in western Sudan. About two million people were displaced from their original areas and relocated in the capital city. They lived in different areas, some on any vacant land inside the city, others preferred to settle at the periphery of the city, near old legal shantytowns, but the majority of them inhabited squatter settlements. One study estimates the number of illegal squatter settlements in Khartoum in 1991 as more than fifty settlements, occupied by about 1.5 million IDPs (Banaga 2001).

Agency and power in shantytowns

In the shantytown areas there are three agents (i.e. local people, government and NGOs) acting in the same sphere. Although ultimately their obvious purpose is to serve the local people of shantytowns and provide them with the services and development programmes they require, each agent has its own unique character and specific ideology, which means that they act differently in order to achieve their respective priorities. Furthermore, to be successful they are obliged to negotiate and share their power and responsibility. Moreover, each one of the three agents has specific course of historical development and resources; therefore clashes and disputes are likely to happen as unilateral successes and achievements occur.

'Agency' in this paper stands for the *freedom of the contingently acting subject over and against the constraints that are thought to derive from enduring social structures* (Loyal and Barry 2001). Human beings have agency, i.e. they act independently of, and in opposition to, structural constraints, and thus are able to re-construct social structure through their freely chosen actions. This concept of

an agent ties agency directly to power. An 'acting against the constraints' (Loyal and Barry 2001) pre-supposes being able to intervene in your community, or to refrain from such intervention, with the anticipated effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. Action depends largely upon the capability of the individual/group to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of structures or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he/she or they lose the ability to 'make a difference', i.e. exercise some sort of power.

Mike Davis's book *Planet of Slums* is considered one of the most important references in slum studies. It reviewed the most significant approaches and policies dealing with the three actors: slum population, governments, and the international donors. He concludes his book by asserting that 'the root cause of urban slumming seems to lie not in urban poverty but in urban wealth' (Davis 2006). He starts with blaming the role of the IMF and the World Bank in imposing financial regulation upon the Third World countries, which led to agricultural deregulation and financial discipline, which in turn pushed huge numbers of rural labour to urban slums even as cities ceased to create new jobs. He also blames the new approach of the late 1970s and early 1980s mandate that the state depend upon international donors, then, NGOs. This approach influenced by the ideas of the English architect John Turner, stressed a sites-and-services provision of basic infrastructure to help rationalize and upgrade self-help housing. The purpose was to make housing affordable to low-income households without the payments of subsidies in contrast to the heavily subsidised public-housing approach, amidst great propaganda about 'helping the poor help themselves' (Davis 2006). However, Mike Davis criticised this approach as it paves the way for a withdrawal of state and local government intervention and support for slum dwellers, and puts them at the risk to market fluctuations.

The author also criticised the recent approach of Hernando de Soto (Davis 2006), a Peruvian businessman who became an expert in the neo-liberalism approach in the 1990s. De Soto asserted that Third World cities are not so much in need of investment and jobs as suffering from the shortage of property rights. The slum dwellers, he argues, are in fact wealthy, but they are unable to access their wealth, because they do not have improved real estate in the informal sector, or could not turn real estate into liquid capital because they do not possess formal property titles. Titling, de Soto claims, would instantly create massive equity with little or no cost to government. Part of this new wealth, he suggests, would supply capital to credit-starved micro-entrepreneurs to create new jobs in the slums, and shantytowns would then become 'acres of diamonds'.

But Mike Davis also made an important critique here by pointing to the fact that titling accelerates social differentiation in the slums and does nothing to aid renters, the actual majority of the poor in many cities. It even risks creating a large underclass population that is denied access to any form of affordable or acceptable housing.

Finally, he criticised the national elites for creating patterns of land use and population density which recapitulated the older logic of colonial oppression and racial dominance. He noticed that throughout Third World cities, postcolonial elites have inherited and greedily reproduced the physical footprints of segregated colonial cities. Despite the rhetoric of national liberation and social justice, national elites have aggressively adapted the racial zoning of the colonial periods to defend their own class privileges and spatial exclusivity, the poor rural population replacing the former natives of the colonies.
In general, the position of local people in the shantytowns is a very critical one; they are the subjects of the services and development, but still an agent responsible for providing them. Indeed, this double role is sometimes confusing even for local people themselves. Contributing to this is the existence of other agents also participating in this endeavour, sharing in the decision-making and the allocation of resources. Local people are often obliged to act differently in specific situations as decisions makers and providers, when they depend on their resources, in other situations as recipients and dependents, when the government or NGOs design and provide the services and developmental projects in question. In order to investigate the relations between the three agents and the provision of services and development programmes, it is necessary to explore the stages of development and change which have taken place in the Elbaraka shantytown in an historical order.

The stage of squatter settlement

The first stage of Elbaraka squatter settlement extended from the late 1970s until the planning of the area in 1992. People lived on the basis of ethnic enclaves; every ethnic group having its neighbourhood ruled by an ethnic group leader (sultan), some of them appointed by local people and approved by their chiefs in the areas of origin, others appointed by themselves or only by their close relatives.[4] It depended on whether the system of the respective ethnic group was centralised (e.g.Shilluk) or segmentary (e.g. Dinka). At that time, relations between ethnic enclaves were characterised by tensions and clashes, which were solved partially after the formation of a tribal leaders' council. This council also dealt with disputes

[4] Interview with Sultan William, Elbaraka shantytown, Khartoum, 15 August 2010.

between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds. Services and security were provided by the NGOs and the people themselves. Health centres, water wells and food assistance were provided by many international NGOs. Meanwhile, security was organised by the people themselves, albeit in a rather chaotic way, which gave the area its reputation for criminality. Kartun Kassala – the former name of the area – was associated with drug dealing, illegal local alcohol distribution, prostitution, and theft. That might have been one reason for the eagerness of the local people to plan and legalise their settlement. To make matters worse, the government took on a destructive role in the squatter settlement, considering it an illegal form of settlement, and indeed on several occasions destroying whole areas, in pursuing what can be called its 'demolish-legalise' policy. This policy always tended toward legalising some settlements by planning or upgrading them, usually in remote areas, and toward demolishing the squatter settlements located near the centre, or in real estate areas of high value.

In 1988, the capital Khartoum was inundated by floods and heavy rains, causing the wholesale destruction of the shantytowns, since they were constructed of only mud and cardboard. As is usual under such disaster circumstances the poorer sections of society suffered most. Such people tended to live in mud houses and 82 per cent (Davies and Walsh 1997) of the damaged and destroyed houses were built using these materials. Those affected moved to a nearby new market and took shelter in its empty shops. Meanwhile the government represented by the Prime Minister refused to visit the area,[5] unlike other nearby legal shantytowns, because it was not legally considered a part of the city.

The stage of planning

Initial contact between local people and the government was established during this phase, implying recognition by the government of shantytown settlers as part of the capital city. Local people agreed to participate effectively in the planning measures, because they had observed the benefit of planning in neighbouring areas. This participation included the selection of experts (ereef), local individuals who helped the planning bureaucrats directly, and local committees who contributed by informing the whole community about the procedure of legalising their homes. In fact, the bureaucratic procedures of legalising land ownership included several steps such as registration, investigation, providing documents, and paying the fees. It was very complicated for the

[5] Interview with Saymon Ushan Ding, in 21 March 2009, Elbaraka.

majority of people, but it represented a first step towards integrating them in city life, a style of life characterised by placing more trust in ‘paperwork’ than ‘informal (verbal) agreements’.

Prolonged negotiations took place between local committees and the government about how many families had the right to settle in the area, and consequently about the size of each house in the area. Today differences still exist between the size of houses in the various quarters, for example, quarter No.2 has the smallest allocated space per house (217 m²) because the majority of inhabitants were from the same ethnic group (Fur). They wanted as many people as possible to settle together, and did not want members of their ethnic group to disperse to other quarters. As for the planning authority, it was obvious that they were concerned mainly with re-structuring the area to be more organised physically, meaning that in the negotiations they did not intervene on the makeup of the population or its distribution. Instead, they left all those issues in the hands of the local committees and the people, which gave the local population a sense of being participants, and local committees the feeling of being decision makers rather than merely recipients.

The stage of planning extended to about two years (1992-1994). It included opening new streets, creating new open spaces, evacuating ‘non-eligible’ inhabitants forced to leave, and re-locating other eligible settlers to new houses. All of those things happened with the participation of experts and local committees together with planning officials. It was the first real interaction between the two agents, interaction that included negotiations and sharing of responsibilities; it was the first time the local people felt that their collective agency could make a difference.

Again the planning stage does represent the inclusion of shantytown people in the formal city boundaries in official or legal terms; however it is clear that the balance of power remained in favour of the government. In effect, planning gave legality to shantytown settlements but preserved the status quo hierarchy of the urban setting. In fact, the planning stage gave the low status of shantytown settlers its legitimacy and institutional dimension.

The stage of planned settlement

When the planning stage was over, a new reality began to emerge. The local committees became the official representatives of local people, not only because of their role in planning, but also in providing the most needed services such as water, electricity, etc. Conversely, the position of tribal leaders was weakened; it was

restricted only to personal issues and even this depended on the acquiescence of the individuals.

The population in Elbaraka stands at about 38,580 people (National Census 2008), which represents about 75.5 per cent of the total population of Elbaraka in 1993 according to the National Census (1993). This decline is a direct result of the upgrading of the area in 1994. However, shantytowns are still the most densely populated areas in the capital city, largely because the average house size in third class areas – the lowest grade for the middle class areas – is about 360-400 m². In addition, shantytowns generally accommodate more than one family per house as a result of the low-income jobs available to inhabitants.

The role of the NGOs also diminished considerably under the pressure of the government, which accused NGOs of implementing foreign agendas. This was largely a product of the Arabic-Islamic ideology of the government after the Islamic movement party took power in 1989. Remarkably, the first action initiated by the government after planning was to change the name of the area to 'Elbaraka',[6] an Islamic name denoting clearly the government's vision for the area. People meanwhile established more relations with other shantytowns, especially their 'core area'; impressive permanent houses appeared and shops packed with diverse goods. A huge change came with the introduction of electricity (2007). Although before that people used private generators for lighting at night, with electricity connection, people had their first taste of a different urban life with an enormous array of electronic devices becoming accessible.

All schools were transferred into the management of the government (i.e. 10 schools), except for one belonging to the Catholic Church. Besides these, a growing number of private schools sprang up, run by the educated young generation. Other members of this young generation born and raised in the area started to engage in lucrative economic activities inside and outside the area, such as driving rickshaws. Meanwhile, large numbers of their peers were working in government institutions in the lower ranks, in the police service and the army. The NGOs also continued their efforts in the field of healthcare, as there was no medical centre in the area funded by the government, while some NGOs supported small developmental programmes through local partners.

[6] Holy blessing in Arabic, generally used in religious contexts.

Different perceptions of services and responsibilities

The three agents differ in the manner and purpose in which they provide services to the shantytown's people. These differences are the result of the diverse perceptions and understanding of the character of local people and the nature of the area. Meanwhile, local people's perception is heavily influenced by their backgrounds and ideology, specifically by their rural background and urban aspirations, which shape their perceptions and priorities toward services. At the same time the government officials have been motivated by a different perception, again arising from their middle class background and their living in other parts of the city, so their priorities diverge from those of the other two agents. NGOs' concerns are motivated by their western experiences of humanitarian works, which influences their designs and funding of services and development projects.

The issue of government-local people relations in worldwide slums was the focus of an important report written by one of the UN-agencies. The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, represents the first global assessment of slums by an international NGO. The report proves that slum dwellers increased substantially during the 1990s (UN 2003). It is further projected that in the next 30 years, the global number of slum dwellers will increase to about 2 billion, while urban population in less developed regions has increased by 36 per cent in the last decade.

Adapting an optimistic attitude, the report praises governmental approaches to dealing with slums, describing them as a shift from negative policies such as forced eviction, neglect and involuntary resettlement, to more positive policies such as self-help and upgrading, facilitating and rights-based policies. The report suggested that informal settlements, where most of the urban poor in developing countries live, are increasingly seen by public decision-makers as places of opportunity, as 'slums of hope' rather than 'slums of despair'. Furthermore, the report stressed that to encounter the challenge of slums, urban development policies should address the issue of livelihoods of slum dwellers and urban poverty in general, thus going beyond traditional approaches that have tended to concentrate on improvement of housing, infrastructure and physical environmental conditions.

The report also discussed approaches for dealing with slums, and considered that slum upgrading is among the most important strategies, receiving greater emphasis in recent years, though upgrading is only one solution among several others. The failure of past slum upgrading and low-income housing development has, to a large extent, been a result of inadequate allocation of resources, the

report stressed, accompanied by ineffective cost-recovery strategies. The report also suggested that there is great potential for enhancing the effectiveness of slum policies by fully involving the urban poor and those traditionally responsible for investment in housing development. In addition, the report claimed that it has long been recognised that the poor play a key role in the improvement of their own living conditions and that their participation in decision-making is not only a right, thus an end in itself, but is also instrumental in achieving greater effectiveness in the implementation of public policies. Indeed, it is vital here to deal in detail with the respective background of each agent, to understand their ways of dealing with services, and to analyse their respective priorities.

Local people's perception of services

The perception of local people has been shaped by their desire to become a part of an urban community, and thus have access to the same services as other parts of the city. Nonetheless, there are different social groups settled in the shantytown, meaning different perceptions can co-exist in this environment. Namely, there are traditional people of the first generation of immigrants, the second generation, and the educated middle class – the latter having a louder voice in many cases. They understandably assume that their view represents the whole area, especially because they tend to form the local committees. Yet, for other groups the desire for more urban services is fundamental, as all of them have the desire to stay in the shantytowns at least for the foreseeable future.

With the background of these strong motivations, people of shantytowns wanted services that create links between them and the other parts of the city, like planning and electricity. Planning is important for it gives them recognition and the ownership of their houses. Electricity is vital because it represents the visible difference between the rural and urban lifestyle, in the sense that people cannot imagine living in an urban area without having electricity. Then law and order, education and water appear on the list of services for the people. A consequence of these priorities is that perhaps most of the local resources at people's disposal have been directed toward the demand for planning and electricity. In fact, the procedures of gaining ownership of the houses during the legalisation of settlements were very expensive; it included acquiring many documents. Moreover, there were fees for registering the ownership of the house. It was not possible to exempt any owner of house unless by permission from the Minister of urban planning, which was difficult to obtain.

People began using electricity even before planning, connecting to small private generators. In fact, investing in generating and selling

electricity was one of the most lucrative economic activities before the area was connected to the public network. Even connection to this network is very expensive, being provided by private companies that currently charge SD83[7] (about US$28)[8] per month in fees and SD1,500 (about US$500) in total for connecting one house, forcing many neighbours to share electricity. However, very few homes go entirely without electricity, which means that most of the economic resources of local people are directed toward obtaining this service. While water is not as much of a priority for the people, it is nevertheless in insufficient supply. Most of the wells were dug by NGOs, but are still administered by the local committees, and many local people are dissatisfied with their management.

With respect to education, although the government has opened 10 primary schools in the area since planning and all of them have Islamic names, these still are outnumbered by private schools. This reflects the fact that many local people are ready to pay the monthly fees (about US$3 per child) for their children to attend private schools, as opposed to the semi-free public schools, because they expect access to higher qualification for their children at the end of the primary level.

Health institutions are run mostly by NGOs. Some are international and some are local NGOs. There is no governmental health institution, and even private clinics are located outside the area. People need more medical institutions but seem to be waiting for the NGOs to provide these services as they used to. For example, I attended a 'health day'[9] in the Elbaraka area, where hundreds of people came to receive free medical treatment, at which doctors and assistant staff who agreed to work voluntarily were not able to examine all of the people waiting in the queue.

Government perception of services and responsibilities

Obviously, the ideology of government is driven by the way of life of the urban middle class. On the one hand it intends to physically change the shantytown to comply with the standards of a modern city, in line with the educated modern character of the northern Sudanese middle class. Consequently, government often transforms

[7] Sudanese pound.

[8] According to the exchange rate at the fieldwork period (US$1= SD3).

[9] The health day was organized by a local NGOs founded by members of the educated youth, in cooperation with medical staff from heath centre located outside the area. The day included also health education lectures about major health problems in the area such as malaria, HIV and circumcision.

the shantytowns into fourth class areas, which means changing them from illegal squatter settlements to poor urban areas. On the other hand middle class identity in Sudan has had an Arabic-Islamic character over the last two decades, which determines all the policies and activities of the government and is promoted by the government (Beck 1998). Furthermore, shifting shantytown dwellers identity to be an Arabic-Islamic identity serves as a mechanism for keeping them under control, and perpetuating their low status, since acquiring a high position in the Islamic-Arabic hierarchy is difficult if not impossible as it depends largely on genealogy (i.e. having Arab origins).

Meanwhile, it is still important to distinguish between government and the northern middle class groups who dominate the city and the country as a whole. Although the government consistently claims representation of the middle class groups, in fact not all members of these groups share this view even if they are employed by the government. At the same time the government is trying hard to win over the northern middle class by adopting part of their ideology and vernacular, especially the Arabic-Islamic base.

For all these reasons, the priorities of the government in providing services to shantytowns tend to focus on urban planning of the area without much concern about which groups or individuals are going to live in the area. The second priority is law and order, since the area before planning was considered a source of criminal activities. Indeed, the police use more violence and assume more authority in the shantytowns than is common elsewhere. Besides that, I also noticed that most members of the young educated class aspire to become law students, and those students who drop out of formal education prefer to work for the police departments or army.

The third priority is education. For the purposes of making the identity of the shantytown residents conform more closely to Arabic-Islamic culture, schools were considered an ideal device through control of the curriculum. Consequently, the government prohibited NGOs from working directly in the shantytowns and closed all their schools, before introducing ten primary schools, some of them supported by Islamic NGOs.

The fourth priority is mobilising political support for the government. The local committees have been used as a means to achieve this, along with civil society organisations such as youth organisations, and also some religious institutions like the Zakat institute (Islamic tax collector). The aim here is clearly to make political affiliation with the government the only way for shantytown people to participate in

and influence the provision of government services. As a result, the majority of local committee members are also members of the National Congress Party (NCP), which is the ruling party in the country. Indeed to be qualified for membership in a local committee, candidates must show that they embrace the Arabic-Islamic culture even if they are not Muslims.

NGOs perception of services and development projects

The main ideology behind the efforts of the NGOs in the shantytowns comes down to a humanitarian perspective. Originally local people were perceived as IDPs suffering from war and natural disasters in their home regions, and all programmes and services were planned to provide basic humanitarian relief. Following the planning stage, these humanitarian programmes were followed by several 'development programmes'. When we examine the nature of services and aid currently provided by NGOs, it is easy to conclude that they provide poor quality and quantity of services. However, one important reason for this is the policy of government towards the work of the NGOs, especially in placing obstacles in their way and in preventing their activities in general. On the ground there are surprisingly few projects and services offered by the NGOs – mostly medical services – and even these are small in scope when compared to the number of potential beneficiaries.

I attended a course offered by the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) at the Elbaraka community police station. It concentrated on the psychological needs of people affected by disasters, strangely enough with the lecturers wearing army fatigues and speaking English through a translator. But what struck me most was the lunch provided. While the lecturers and UN staff enjoyed catering from what appeared to be one of the most expensive restaurants in Khartoum, the participants received sandwiches. It was clear that they considered themselves outsiders. As a matter of fact, they told me that they had held the same course for the police officers, which they considered had been received successfully as well.

The incorporation of local people in services and projects provided by the NGOs is very limited, because NGOs staff patronisingly assume the people to be needy and without the resources or ability to determine their own priorities. NGOs come to the area with ready-made programmes and policies, which leave very little room for locals to direct the projects towards what they need. Thus in the end, local people look on what is offered by the NGOs as extra free services; they benefit from them but they are not necessarily what they need.

Although NGOs and government are considered to be opposing powers in the context of shantytowns, in fact they have much in common. They both engage with shantytowns as outsiders, and although they have differing ideologies, they impose them in the same way on the ground, from similar views of the beneficiaries. They both look on the locals as not being able to choose what they want. Perhaps their common falling is their inability to acknowledge the free agency of local people.

What do the people want? What do the people get?

Regarding all of the above, the discussion revolves around what the local people want, and whether they are able to get what they want. As I mentioned earlier, there are at least three distinct groups living in Elbaraka shantytown. The first generation's perception is derived from their rural life experiences, and consequent urban life experiences. Their needs are a mixture of the two lifestyles, but the decision makers in the shantytown are the local committee members, characterised by education and a middle class lifestyle. Beyond this, other providers of services are urban-based institutions (i.e. NGOs, the government); therefore they work to fulfil the needs of the urban side and neglect the rural-based needs of the first generation population.

One example of this is the use of local alcohol (marisa) in the area by different ethnic groups, whether Muslims or Christians. The local beer is considered an integral part of social life and communal activities in different rural areas in Sudan (Manger 1987). However, according to the standards of urban middle northern class, using alcohol is against the Islamic law and thus considered to be uncivilised behaviour. It is often possible to observe police raids on the places known for making and drinking alcoholic beverages. In order to fulfil these needs, local people are driven to a life under threat of punishment or being accused by the others in the city as having less urban qualities. Apparently, many local people choose to use their agency by opting to fulfil their needs at the largest open space in their area. Every afternoon these open spaces are used as temporal market places for alcohol and other complementary products (e.g. roasted meats).

Many scholars have recently suggested that ideology and not objective science or a genuine desire to promote development is at the root of development policies in African countries. As examples of this, Nojoh identified and discussed four ideologies (Njoh 2009): indigenous elitism (pre-colonial era – 1884); European racism (colonial era, 1884–1960s); modernism (1960–1980s); and globalism (1990s–present); these have been at the root of public health

elements of town planning in Africa since the pre-colonial era. The article argued that with the exception of indigenous elitism, all the ideologies are alien to Africa. Furthermore, the author asserted that the problems associated with ideology as the basis of development policy are magnified when the ideology is of the imported variety than when it is native.

The article employed the case of public health elements of town planning schemes to argue that development policies in sub-Saharan Africa often fail because they are typically driven by ideology rather than objective science or a genuine desire to promote meaningful development. But, in fact, ideologically-based policies are also implemented in many other aspects of town planning, e.g. physical planning, and the same failed results are likely to occur, as we have seen from the example of NGOs and government policies in the Elbaraka shantytown.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it might be clear that the alternatives of local people to satisfy their needs are limited by the efforts and ideologies of the agents providing the respective services. Also, the urban-rural differences in lifestyles work to widen the differences between the local people. However, it is the mutual understanding of the three agents, and their recognition of the equal stands of the other agents, which lead to the co-operative design and establishment of public services and developmental programmes. Above all, recognising the local differences between the three local groups (i.e. first generation, educated, and youth) remains the key for developing success stories in the world of the shantytowns in Sudan.

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Opposing the Developmental State online: how do South Africans make use of online platforms to challenge government's macroeconomic strategies?

Irina Turner[10]

Abstract

The performance of a nation is measured by financial indices like the gross national product (GNP) and development statistics like the Human Development Index (HDI) taking dimensions like mortality rate, standard of education or income per capita into account. Whether the development of these figures is positive or negative is determined in comparison to other nations. However, well-being in terms of spirituality, social relationships, ethical values etc. is not considered. In global discourse (Fairclough 2006) it assumed that material wealth makes for happier people and therefore economic growth is the most important feature to foster development. A nation's official self-assessment and interpretation of these figures is collectively uttered by politicians channelled to the outside world through the president as the epitome of official nation's representation. State-of-the-nation speeches serve as a condensed peak of a nation's self-evaluation. This mainstreamed generalization however, cannot reflect the qualitative or subjectively experienced perception of changing life for individual citizens. The new social media Facebook and Twitter as well as the possibility for online citizens to post their comments on blogs is a way of expression deviating opinions from the collective voice of government. On the example of South Africa's recent history, this article contrasts the official government's version of development evident in the-state- of-the-nation speeches with people's real-life experiences uttered online. A critical discourse analysis (Blommaert 2006) of four state-of-the-nation speeches by South African president Jacob Zuma (2009-2012) compared to selected postings on Facebook, Twitter

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and Newspaper-Comment-Blogs, allows for an assessment of the gap between official rhetoric and people's real life experiences.

Keywords: new media, contestations, development policy, South Africa.

Is South African democracy escaping to the internet?

The annual State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA)[11] delivered at the Opening of Parliament holds a pivotal position in communicating the South African government's macroeconomic agenda and political vision to the media and the public. The current SoNA discourse is dominated by transforming South Africa into a so-called Developmental State via the vision of the New Growth Path (NGP), which tries to rectify the ever increasing disparity between rich and poor through strategic state intervention in the economy. Although the speech represents the 'State of the Nation' and speaks on behalf of it from a political perspective, the official government version does not necessarily reflect the perceptions and experiences of individual citizens. The SoNA is traditionally a suitable occasion to respond to and challenge the official mainstreamed version of the 'State of the Nation'.

Compared to the apartheid era, South Africans seemingly enjoy great freedoms – online and offline – in expressing their opinions and directing their views about and towards government. Upon closer inspection, however, the country is currently experiencing a presidency that appears to open avenues for public participation via social media and other platforms,[12] while at the same time legally restricting the dissemination of information,[13] suppressing freedom of speech and sometimes violently repressing oppositional voices of protesters (cf. Duncan 20 August 2012; see also Van Rensburg 2012: 96).

The possibility to post views and comments on New Media platforms like blogs, social networks or in comment sections of online newspapers opens relatively safe ways of exchanging and

[11] The South African State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA) is held by the President at the Opening of Parliament in Cape Town in February each year to a joint sitting of Parliament and 'marks the formal beginning of the parliamentary term' (Parliament of RSA 2004: 97).

[12] For instance, a presidential hotline receiving service delivery complaints (GCIS 2 May 2013).

[13] For instance, the Protection of Information Bill, also called 'Secrecy Bill' enables government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. *Mail & Guardian Online* 14 June 2012; also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013).

expressing deviating opinions from the collective voice of government for recipients of news with content producers and peer-audiences.

In an application of Critical Discourse Analysis (Blommaert 2006), this article contrasts South Africa's official government version of the Developmental State and its vision brand the New Growth Path with people's views expressed online. It seeks to sketch answers to the currently pressing question of whether social media outlets are used politically by South Africans in order to challenge hegemonic notions of development and whether online platforms can provide a tool for maintaining or even expanding on the current level of freedom of expression in South Africa.

After outlining the relationship between media use and democracy with a focus on South Africa, the South African notion of the Developmental State is explored from various perspectives. Examples from three different online formats responding to the 2012 SoNA and the notion of the Developmental State give insight into the gap between official rhetoric and people's experiences: first, comments to an online newspaper article *(Mail & Guardian Online* 9 February 2012); second, three blogs and their comments on the online platform *Thoughtleader* (Gumede 9 July 2008; Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012); and third, postings on the day of the SoNA on the President's Facebook page (The Presidency 9 February 2012).

Democratisation and the New Media in South Africa

As the South Africa case proves, democratisation is not only the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society, but also implies its stability and sustainability. Democracy is sustained by a balance of offers of the rulers and demands of the ruled (Nisbet et al. 2012: 250). Citizens' demands are expressed through political participation, e.g., elections and public expressions in the press or other formats (ibid.). Campbell and Kwak argue that political debate is the 'fundamental building block of participatory democracy' because through talk people overcome uncertainty, establish coherence of their perceived reality and filter relevant information (2001: 1007).[14] The Habermasian model of Deliberations in the Public Sphere, whereby – simply put – political consensus is reached through exchange of ideas in a space between the people and the

[14] Also argued by Katz (1994); Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun (2006) (in Campbell & Kwak, 2011: 1007).

state, lends itself ideally as a metaphor for the Internet[15] (see e.g., Van Rensburg 2012: 99).

Scholars are of two minds when it comes to the Internet's positive effect on democratisation and political education.[16] Some suggest the Internet has 'a very limited role in promoting democratic citizenship' (Hardy and Scheufele, 2005: 73)[17]. An American based study by Hill and Hughes found that most chat room debates are concerned with events and personalities rather than with political issues and are dominated by 'normative statements that require little evidential backing' (1998: 118 in Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 75). Furthermore, Gergen (2008), Sunstein (2001) and Mutz (2002) reason that users tend to select content coherent with their world view and meet peers online who, in a type of 'echo chamber' (Sunstein 2001), resonate existing political opinions (in Campbell and Kwak 2001: 1010/1018). Others argue that a higher Internet penetration increases indices of democracy (Best and Wade 2009; Groshek 2009; Howard 2009 in Nisbet et al. 2012: 251).

Whether utilised or not, the Internet potentially provides features known to enhance the level of democratic citizenship like pluralism of opinion and political knowledge (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252). Especially the possibility for interactive exchange of ideologies, news, agendas and experiences can foster democratic awareness and political activation from 'the bottom up' (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252; see also Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 74 and Van Rensburg 2012: 94). Interpersonal discussion, either online or offline,[18] moderates the political input by the media, leads to differential learning and more strategic information gathering, and might result in individual action (Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 72/73/80). Hardy and Scheufele argue based on Habermas (1962) that political decision making is not

[15] For a detailed elaboration on the relation between Habermas' theory and the Internet, see Dalhberg (2001), Heng et al. (2003).

[16] For further studies on the effect of the Internet on democratisation see Groshek (2009); Howard (2009); Mozorov (2011); Shirky (2011) (cited by Nisbet et al. 2012: 249).

[17] Hardy & Scheufele argue that reliability of online information is more flawed compared to traditional media; exacerbated by the 'nonlinear nature of this medium' and its 'fuzzy layout' making differentiation between hard and soft news more difficult (2005: 74/80). Nisbet et al. point out that the relationship between Internet penetration and democratisation depends on contextual factors (2012: 253).

[18] Hardy & Scheufele found that in terms of the moderating effect through peer debate there is no difference between online and offline, i.e., to face-to-face discussion (2005: 72/73; 81).

merely a result of accumulating information but that 'the deliberative aspect is critical in this process because it allows citizens to weigh all different viewpoints and integrate them into their final decision'(2005: 80).[19]

Unlike most other available scholarship,[20] Nisbet et al. also looked at the effects of Internet use on political activity in developing countries and conclude that 'Internet use may play a more meaningful role in strengthening and enhancing young democracies through impacting citizen attitudes rather than promoting outright democratic transitions among autocratic regimes' (2012: 261).

One of the few studies examining the effect of the Internet on democratization in South Africa is provided by Van Rensburg (2012). She argues that the Internet holds great potential for Africans to strengthen their right of self-determination after decades of colonial and post-colonial suppression (2012: 94 based on Ott and Rosser 1999: 137). Many information services provided by the South African government in particular, e.g., Matric results, health information, reservation of bus tickets etc., are available online via mobile phones (Van Rensburg 2012: 105). This suggests that in South Africa, the Internet is highly important for sustaining democracy as long as a sufficient amount of people have access to it.

Internet use in South Africa

Internet access in sub-Saharan Africa is growing rapidly and was four times higher in 2009 than in 2005 (Nisbet et al. 2012: 254). The lion's share of access points is in South Africa, where in 2007, 15 per cent of adults had access to the Internet via computer (Gillwald and Storck 2008: 26 in Van Rensburg 2012: 95). By 2011, this number had already climbed to 17 per cent of the population (World Wide Worx in Samie 4 June 2012). Access hereby refers to ownership and proximity (Kreutzer 2009: 18). There are no current numbers for Internet access via mobile phone in South Africa but developments suggest that this number is even higher than access via PC[21] and rapidly growing especially among youths (van Rensburg 2012: 95).[22]

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[19] Kwak et al. (2005) found that people are more likely to participate in an online debate when they are in a small group with like-minded discussants (in Campbell & Kwak 2011: 1009).

[20] For instance, Bimber (2003); Norris (2000), Xenos & Moy (2007) (in Nisbet et al. 2012: 252).

[21] In his study of the Internet/mobile phone habits of 441 urban youths (grade 11 learners) from deprived areas of Cape Town, Kreutzer found that '68 per cent of respondents were found to use the Internet on a mobile phone on a typical day'; the most favoured website had been Google (2009: 53). The most frequently used media

The social media community in South Africa is currently growing about 300 per cent a year; whereby 80 per cent of the people with online access are active in social media (Shier *E News Channel* 9 February 2012). Despite this growth, over 80 per cent of South Africans are left with no access to the Internet. A study comparing 28 democratic and non-democratic countries from Africa and Asia found that the number of broadband users in South Africa, which was classified as a free country, was low in comparison (Nisbet et al. 2012: 262). This is due to the extremely high cost of Internet access and the monopoly of the service provider Telkom (Van Rensburg 2012: 104). Kreutzer, however, points out that access figures do not speak about the intensity and varieties of usage of New Media[23] and that 'ownership or access to a certain technology is a poor predictor' of socioeconomic development per se (Kreutzer 2009: 19). An increase in access points does not automatically lead to beneficial educational effects for the users or raise 'civic engagement and social capital' per se (2009: 20).

The individual's motivation for engagement is equally important, as Van Rensburg argues (2012: 99ff. based on Van Dijk 2005: 21). Motivation is determined by the resources available to the individual; i.e., material resources, software and hardware for instance, social resources, i.e., agents who support learning and using the Internet, and cognitive resources, i.e., a culturally and intellectually stimulating environment to make use of the Internet (Van Rensburg 2012: 100). Van Rensburg states that despite the economic hurdle, socio-cultural barriers also play an important role in preventing South Africans to engage with the Internet: 'Learners' and students' lack of inclination towards mathematics, science subjects and traditional cultural practices lead them away from using technology, a problem specific to South Africa (Levin, personal communication, 1 December 2010)' (2012: 108). She further argues that this distortion can only be rectified by government (Van Rensburg 2012: 108). The state

type of the sample group had been TV (81 per cent had watched TV 'yesterday'); whereas web access via mobile phone or PC scored 56 per cent (used 'yesterday') (Kreutzer 2009: 65). A surprisingly large group of the young people had read a newspaper the previous day (56 per cent) (Kreutzer 2009: 65). 13 per cent had read the news on the previous day on a mobile device, and 9 per cent on a PC (Kreutzer 2009: 67).

[22] For a study on the politically activating effects of mobile-based communication see Campbell & Kwak (2011).

[23]'One exception is the figures provided by the marketing research company Nielsen Online, some of which are regularly published by the South African Online Publishers Association (OPA)'(Kreutzer 2009: 15).

interventions proposed by the Developmental State might be a step in the right direction.

The Developmental State as a model for South Africa

The ever-increasing rift between rich and poor in South Africa since the dismantling of apartheid, has urged the government to redress their macro-economic outlook in finding a balance between economic growth and development needs of the poor (Reitzes 2009: 13). Marquis (2009) describes the simultaneous existence of three competing notions of development within South Africa in politics and the media (see also Banda 2008). The modernistic approach, which is centred on the 'metaphor of growth', sees development as a 'linear and irreversible process' whereby underdeveloped countries should imitate developed countries (Marquis 2009: 18). This approach foregrounds 'quantitative differences' and frames underdevelopment as a result of resisting reforms and new technologies (Marquis 2009: 18). In South Africa, the shift to the neo-liberal concept Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR; introduced in 1996) can be seen as an embodiment of a modernistic macroeconomic strategy (Marquis 2009: 18).

The second notion of development is the dependency paradigm which emerged in the 1960s (Marquis 2009: 20). This notion gave up on the idea that underdevelopment is self-inflicted but acknowledged the influence of external factors and the interdependence among developed and underdeveloped countries (Marquis 2009: 20). The proposed solution to underdevelopment was a delinking from the world economy (Marquis 2009: 20). In South Africa, this paradigm has been mostly reflected through the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP; introduced in 1994), which was a change from the modernistic economic policies of the apartheid regime (Marquis 2009: 21).

In the 1970s, a multidimensional approach emerged emphasising notions of endogenous and participatory self-development (Marquis 2009: 21). Marquis sees this approach manifested in South Africa, through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)[24] which were the basis for the policies of the Developmental State (2009: 17ff.). By the end of Mbeki's first tenure in 2004, it became clear that both post-apartheid macro-economic strategies, the RDP and GEAR, had not

[24] The targets were to be achieved by 2015 but remained unspecific; e.g. 'ensuring environmental sustainability' (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). For the only quantifiable goal of 'halving poverty', a definition of poverty was lacking in South Africa (see Reitzes 2009: 16; Oosthuizen 2008).

produced the desired results[25] (Thompson 2001: 281). The notion of the Developmental State as a third alternative became prolific but initially still remained vague and unspecified (Reitzes 2009: 12).

In May 2005, in a speech to the National Assembly President Thabo Mbeki pronounced the new outlook for the first time and called for a 'strong state' and more political intervention:

> On this occasion, he reflected upon the decline of the "Washington Consensus', the ideas which had set the stage for the reduction of the role of the state in the 'development thinking' of global bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since the 1980s' (Southall 2006: xx).

The shift, as Daniel et al. point out, was less a result of looking back at the ANC's socialist roots, but more active benchmarking with comparable countries such as the developmental capitalist Asian Tigers like Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore (2005: xxviii in Southall 2006: xvii). The Asian-style fostered state's protection and incentives for selected companies and trades; this protectionist policy met the scepticism of the World Trade Organisation (Nattras 2011: 2).

Compared to the Tiger States, South Africa had a few distinctly different parameters that would challenge the implementation of an 'Asian style' Developmental State: a deficiency in human resource capacity, tight-knit embedment in a globalist production system, a high level of democracy and public involvement, a low level of social coherence, as well as generally less 'favourable and historical industrial conditions' (Southall 2006: xvii/xxxii/xliff.).

In 2006, as a first step towards the new model, the Mbeki administration committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which were translated into measurable national targets on service delivery[26] (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). After the tide-turning Polokwane[27] conference in 2007, the governing party issued

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[25] In 2008, the government admitted in a review that economic growth does not trickle down to the poor or automatically results in an easily accessible labour market for unskilled workers (South African Presidency 2008: 103 in Reitzes 2009: 16/17).

[26] By 2007: eradication of the 'bucket system'; by 2008: potable water provision to 2.07 million households; by 2010: sanitation provision to 3.7 million households; by 2012: electricity provision to 3.4. million households (Levin 2008, 54-55 in Reitzes 2009: 13).

[27] At the ANC's 52th national conference in Polokwane in December 2007, Thabo Mbeki was publicly humiliated and eventually got unceremoniously unseated as the

a more precise definition on the Developmental State including the following features:

- **'(…) strategic orientation**: an approach premised on people-centred and people-driven change, and sustained development based on high growth rates, restructuring of the economy and socioeconomic inclusion.
- **(…) capacity to lead in the definition of a common national agenda** and in mobilising all of society to take part in its implementation. (…)
- **(…) organisational capacity:** ensuring that its [the state's] structures and systems facilitate realisation of a set agenda. (…)
- **(…) technical capacity**: the ability to translate broad objectives into programmes and projects (…). This depends among others on the proper training, (…), and on acquiring and retaining skilled 'personnel' (ANC July 2010. [bold in original]).

Along with this definition, the ANC set itself further targets at Polokwane; amongst the more specific ones were the implementation of a comprehensive social security system, reduction of certain illnesses and maternal deaths, reduction of violent crime and road accidents, intensifying education in mathematics and natural sciences, and expanding the nation's artisanship base (Reitzes 2009: 12ff.). Due to the fact that the concept of the Developmental State for South Africa seems vague, discourse and criticism on the notion is broad. Southall describes three critical views represented by the economic liberals, the Jacobins, and the developmentalists (2006: xxiiff.). The economic liberals[28] fear an ideologically driven 'developmentalism' that plays into the self-serving interests of the ANC elite and hence, they call for a reduction in state control in order to boost the economy (Southall 2006: xxiiff.).[29]

Economic liberals share their concern with the so-called Jacobins,[30] the second critical faction, namely that large-scale state intervention

party's president and consequently president of the country in favour of his rival Jacob Zuma (Tabane & Ludman 2009: 88).

[28] The most prominent proxy is opposition leader Tony Leon of the Democratic Alliance (Southall 2006: xxiiff.).

[29] Southall argues this stance results from 'neoclassical economic thinking which commends the minimal state as a prerequisite for growth' (Southall 2006: xxiiff.).

[30] The term Jacobins was coined by Itumeleng Mahabane in *Financial Mail* 'in echo of the most radical wing of the bourgeoisie revolutionaries in France after 1789' who

invites large scale corruption (Southall 2006: xxxiii). This group sees itself as the 'organic representation of the majority' and believes 'that individuals must submit their desires to the general will':

> In summary, the Jacobins espouse what is at heart a radical nationalist position which views African economic liberation as involving a radical transformation of ownership and control in favour of black capitalists and producers' (Southall 2006: xxivff.).

However, the creator of the Jacobins label, journalist Itumeleng Mahabane, doubts whether the ANC currently holds the necessary intellectual capacity and philosophical innovation to carry out such a social revolution (*Financial Mail* 25.02.05 in Southall 2006: xxivff.).

The third faction of critics, the so-called 'developmentalists',[31] agree with the Jacobins that there is a 'need for the state to promote a class of black capitalists' but call for state control of the free market and for raised action of meeting 'mass social needs' (Southall 2006: xxvii). Other than the 'need for a strong developmental state', there is little consensus within this group due to the broadness of the Developmental State concept (ibid.).

Southall argues that implementing the Developmental State in South Africa according to the authoritarian Asian model would inevitably result in tarnishing 'hard won' democratic freedoms and states that 'this problematic aspect of the Developmental State has been downplayed by its promoters' (2006: xxxviii). In 2010, South Africa realised the second step in implementing the Developmental State by introducing the vision of the New Growth Path (NGP). The programme aims at creating 5 million jobs by 2020 'through a mix of direct government job creation, social-democratic consensus building and macroeconomic, labour and industrial policies' (Nattras 2011: 1). The formulation of this vision remains a vague 'broad set of objectives' (ibid.).The NGP however formulates some aspects of the Developmental State that deviate distinctly from the Asian model, e.g., with regard to labour, as Nattras points out:

> Whereas wages and working conditions improved in East Asia only once the labour-market tightened after

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called for a radical social transformation (Southall 2006: xxivff.). According to journalist Ryan Coetzee, 'the entire ANC leadership' falls under the Jacobins label (*ThisDay* 29.07.04 in Southall 2006: xl).

[31] Southall names Neva Makgetla (e.g., *Business Day* 22 April 2005) and Jeremy Cronin as proxies (2006: xxvii).

> decades of strong growth, the NGP proposes to advance the South African trade union agenda of 'decent work' (…) which favours the employment of full-time skilled workers. (…). This is an even more daunting challenge than achieving a 6% annual real growth rate' (2011: 2ff.).

The author criticizes the NGP document for failing to address the 'clash between the objective of high-wage, high-productivity growth' and for missing the opportunity to identify the rigid labour market as South Africa's main challenge (Nattras 2011: 5). She further criticizes that NGP does not provide adequate details on how to increase government's efficiency or eliminate corruption (Nattras 2011: 3).

The Developmental State becomes tangible for the public in the restructuring of state-owned-enterprises (SOE) and infrastructure development as the drivers of jobs and growth described in the NGP (Government of South Africa 2010: 10; see also Southall 2006: xxxvii). In 2012, infrastructure development as envisaged in the NGP was the central theme of President Jacob Zuma's deliberations in his state-of-the-nation-address. As in the previous years, Zuma used the 2012 SoNA to promote himself as a highly accessible listening president; embedded by a massive media campaigning not least in the social media. Prior to the SoNA, Zuma had invited the public to make suggestions for the speech on Facebook, Twitter or by phoning in. He referred to this process in the speech: 'I received a lot of valuable correspondence in the run-up to this SONA. Such interaction enables us keep in touch with our people and their needs' (SoNA 2012). As a testimony, he mentioned Mr. Mzukisi Mali who had written an email to him regarding his problem with housing. Zuma responded directly to Mali in his mother tongue promising a new insurance scheme enabling banks to issue housing loans (SoNA 2012). The President thereby gave the impression that he was in direct dialog with the people and heeding to their concerns. He further emphasised this impression of 'working together'[32] with the public when he appealed that 'a pact will be required' between government and the population (SoNA 2012).

Zuma said that the South African Constitution, adopted sixteen years ago, served as a 'vision statement' for South Africa (SoNA 2012). His motto for 2012 was to address the 'triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment' (ibid.). He defined the objective of his SoNA as an undertaking of 'a mid-term review, looking at progress

[32] This motto, also in its Venda version 'Faranani', has been a consistent SoNA theme since the early Mbeki era.

from 2009 till now instead of the usual annual review' (SoNA 2012). This review pointed at the NGP's features 'tourism, agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the green economy' as core 'job drivers' (SoNA 2012). Building on his 2011 motto –'the year of job creation'– a 'massive infrastructure drive' was announced as the major step in the NGP for 2012 (ibid.). Zuma emphasized and redefined the new economic outlook and government's responsibility:

> As a developmental state that is located at the centre of a mixed economy, we see our role as being to lead and guide the economy and to intervene in the interest of the poor, given the history of our country' (SoNA 2012).

In well-known fashion there was no deviation from the ANC paradigm that economic growth of big business would eventually alleviate the plight of the poor: 'The solution for the country therefore, is higher growth and job creation to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty and inequality' (SoNA 2012). This confirms Marquis' observation (2009) of the simultaneousness of varying notions on development in the South African public sphere and a resilience of the 'modernistic' view.

Quantitative survey on online activity around the 2012 SoNA

The public online activity in social networks around the 2012 SoNA was examined by the media effects researchers Tim Shier (*Brandsyeye.com*) and Wadim Schreiner (*Media Tenor*) (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012).[33] They found that in 2012 the number of registered 'real time feedback' messages to the SoNA on social media, most of them in English, were more than four times higher than in 2011 (ibid.).[34] Shier found that in the anticipation phase before the speech, most contributions were assessing whether the 2011 SoNA promises had been delivered (ibid.).

In 2012, the declared 'year of infrastructure', the online responses to Zuma's central SoNA issue, namely that 'investment and infrastructure must generate skills and job creation' were meagre, according to Shier (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012). The topic did not feature prominently in the social media conversations, because it

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[33] TV show 'News night special edition: State of the Nation Address 2012: Social media Reaction' on E TV. Shier and Schreiner were interviewed by Jeremy Maggs (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012).

[34] Registered 'real time feedback' messages/conversations on social media in response to the SoNA: 6,000 in 2011 as opposed to 28,000 in 2012 (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012).

was 'not very tangible and immediate' (ibid.). In Shier's view, there has been mentioning of the keyword 'year of infrastructure', but to the people it was not 'really clear what it meant' and there were no 'cross-discussions' on the topic (ibid.). The reactions reflected a 'reporting on the state-of-the-nation-address, rather than a discussion about it' (ibid.). Schreiner added that the topic of infrastructure was complex and contained lots of figures and statistics and therefore it did not 'entice an immediate reaction'; he surmised that people would talk about it at a later stage, after they had processed the information for a while (ibid.).

The study compared traditional to social media in terms of frequency of topics and heterogeneity of opinions in the anticipation of the 2012 SoNA.[35] While for both the issue of job creation was on top of the agenda, the economy featured four times more often in the traditional media than in social media conversations[36] (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012). Traditional media also made reference to service delivery more often (250 references) than social media (80 references) (ibid.). In Shier's opinion, the range of opinions on social media was broader and more extreme than in the traditional media (ibid.). Schreiner said that 10 per cent of reporting in the traditional media has been negative and overall largely critical and confirmed Shier's observation of a gap between the social and traditional media in terms of content (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012). Although an increase in political online activity around the SoNA event is apparent, the following qualitative examples can complement the lacking depth regarding the quality and type of online responses to the 2012 SoNA in Shier's and Schreiner's quantitative study.

The online evolvement of public notions on the Developmental State

For the analysis of citizen's comments on the Developmental State, several examples have been selected from the *Mail & Guardian Online* and its blogging platform *ThoughtLeader.* The *Mail & Guardian* has been of interest to media scholars in South Africa for several studies (e.g., Marquis 2009; Steenveld 2007; McDonald & Jacobs 2005) due to its high quality investigative reporting drawing

[35] The validity and usefulness of the results of this media effect study is partly questionable, because it is commercially motivated and funded. Furthermore, in terms of traditional vs. social media it does not take into account that the platforms attract different user profiles.

[36] over 350 references to job creation in traditional and social media; less than 100 references to economy in social media as opposed to over 400 references in the traditional media (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012).

on comments and contributions from leading South African intellectuals and its reputation to report critically and independently. The newspaper is known to have a high-brow middle-class readership located on the left end of the political spectrum (Marquis 2009: 27). Due to the *Mail & Guardian's* long history of investigative journalism covering the issues of the labour movement and economic welfare (Marquis 2009: 27),[37] its little digital sister, the *Mail & Guardian Online,* is an ideal site for analysing public engagement on the Developmental State. Since the concept of the Developmental State is based on the Millennium Development Goals (see Reitzes 2009: 12ff.), their representation in the print media, offering interpreting frames of complex macroeconomic issues for the public, is a good starting point for understanding people's online responses on the issue.

In her study of the *Mail & Guardian's* coverage of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) between 2000 and 2007, Marquis found that while initially 'not frequently represented', the coverage 'only increased towards their midterm evaluation, when it became apparent that they would not be attained' (2009: 97). The author pointed out that the newspaper did not portray a coherent concept of development but that it depended on the personal view of the respective author (Marquis 2009: 97). Marquis also examined the way 'ordinary' citizens and 'non- bureaucratic' sources were cited as testimonies and found that they were 'numerically underrepresented' due to news room routines, whereby preference was given to reliable and easily accessible 'official' sources (Marquis 2009: 98). While Marquis' study seems to only have taken offline newspapers into consideration, a look into the *Mail & Guardian Online* also allows for capturing 'unofficial' voices of 'ordinary' citizens who used the comment function on the online report.

Example I: comments on an online newspaper article

Through the comment function, 'ordinary' citizens are able to challenge and complement accounts of the print media online and in doing so, they blur the lines between traditional and social media

[37] Founded in 1985 as *Weekly Mail*, the *Mail & Guardian* used to be part of South Africa's 'struggle' press with a focus on development and labour interests (Marquis 2009: 27). Although the paper had been critical towards the apartheid regime, it did not have partisan alliances; for instance, to the ANC (Marquis 2009: 27). In 1994, the *Mail & Guardian* merged with the *UK Guardian* and although it meanwhile had lost its 'alternative' appeal and was run commercially, the paper kept its critical no-lobby approach (Marquis 2009: 27). In 2002, Newtrust Company Botswana, owned by Trevor Ncube, bought the *Mail & Guardian's* majority shares and so provided financial independence for the paper (Marquis 2009: 27).

content.[38] The first example shows online reactions to the editorial article 'Dreams of China vs. local realities' (n.a. *Mail & Guardian Online* 9 February 2012). In advance of the SoNA, the article discussed the application potential of the Chinese economic model to South Africa:

> President Jacob Zuma dreams of China: of 10% growth and an elite bureaucracy (…). The president's State of the Nation address next week seems sure to paint a South African version of this dream (…). It is to be a year of infrastructure; of truly huge projects with the potential to put us on a Maglev train to growth and employment' (ibid.).

While the article lauded the prospect of infrastructure investment, it also pointed out that the idea is not new[39] (ibid.). The Chinese model would imply 'centralised co-ordination, ministerial arm-twisting and public money' as opposed to Mbeki's 'classical corporate governance model and market-based finance approach' (ibid.). Private companies would be asked to invest in exchange for government refraining from 'serious intervention' at a later stage (ibid.). However, the article argued that there are some great differences between China and South Africa and therefore the model cannot be applied one-to-one. The discrepancies according to the *Mail & Guardian Online* are the lack of a 'mandarin elite', an 'overstretched' public service system, and the lack of financial resources of South Africa's national bank (ibid.). Not least it is a matter of the political system: 'Finally, central control is simply harder in democracies, even – perhaps especially – ones with dominant ruling parties beset by factionalism' (ibid.).

The editorial triggered various online responses among readers. 'Dave Harris'[40]called the article 'shallow' and 'misleading' regarding the SA-China relations and coined the editorial symptomatic for the degeneration of the critical media in South Africa into 'ridicule of government and fear mongering' *(Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online* 9 February 2012). 'Harris' argued that China can be indeed a

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[38] New Media are not merely the new technologies that the introduction of the Internet in 1993 has provided, but rather they are hybrid formats that emerged from these new technologies and traditional media like online newspapers or e-books (Kreutzer 2009: 12).

[39] Initially, the infrastructure drive had been former President Mbeki's 'big push' during his second term of office (n.a. *MG Online* 9 February 2012).

[40] According to the blogger profile 'Dave Harris' is a male South African (Blogger 1999–2013).

role-model but the media chose to focus on the negative and ignored positive aspects (ibid.).

An equally critical stance terming the article 'hostile' towards government was taken by the poster 'Helene Passtoors'.[41] Like 'Harris', she expressed her disappointment in a newspaper 'that once was a champion for democracy' *(Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online* 9 February 2012). 'Passtoors' took issue with the positive representation of Mbeki's neo-liberal policies which exacerbated the gap between rich and poor in South Africa (ibid.). She further argued, Brazil rather than China will be the role model for South Africa when it comes to implementing the Developmental State and contested the 'preconceived idea' that this necessarily has to go hand in hand with 'an authoritarian regime to succeed'; naming Sweden and France as counter-examples (ibid.).

'Anton van Niekerk'[42] argued that South Africa was far from China's excellence with regard to education and therefore lacked the capacity to produce sophisticated manufacturing or recruit skilled people for civil service (*Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online* 9 February 2012). He refuted 'Eric Scott's' reproach[43] to be advocating a one-party dictatorship and romanticising China's version of repressive State Capitalism by agreeing that China was a dictatorship but reiterating his opinion that 'the urban education system in China is producing the best in the world' (ibid.). 'Van Niekerk' also defended his position against the criticism by 'David Harris', who named Apple's manual manufacturing in China as a counter-example against the exclusive application of robot technology (ibid.). He argued that logistics, design and management did indeed require a high level of know-how (ibid.).

This example showed that the *Mail & Guardian Online* editorial managed to elicit informed and well-reasoned response and debate from different angles. Some posters defended China while others said China was not an appropriate comparison for South Africa at all. The posters also engaged in direct contact with each other. While the commentators displayed sluggish spelling and were quick to use insulting language, especially when directly referring to each other, they appeared to be from an educated background politically situated

[41] Likely, this is the real person Helene Passtoors. She is a former anti-apartheid activist imprisoned during apartheid for her activity in *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (South African History Online n.d.).

[42] Likely, this is the real person Anton van Niekerk. He is Professor for Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch (van Niekerk n.d.).

[43] For this blogger, no identification could be found online.

on the left and therefore represented the typical readership profile of the *Mail & Guardian*.

Example II: comments on *ThoughtLeader* blogs

Three exemplary blogs and their commentary on the Internet platform *ThoughtLeader* (Gumede 9 July 2008; Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012) trace the evolvement of the public notion on the Developmental State on blogs. *ThoughtLeader* is a blogging space administered by the *Mail & Guardian Online* and promotes itself as an 'editorial group blog' with the objective to 'provide a platform' for debate among writers from 'various industries and political spectrums' and the opportunity for readers to comment (*Mail & Guardian Online* 2013a). Over 100 bloggers from academia, journalism, and business as well as Diaspora South Africans and some organisations like the *Archbishop Tutu Fellows* who are advised to 'try not to be simply a spokesperson for [their respective] organisation or company' are registered and presented with a photograph and short profile description (ibid.). The site is structured into categories of Business, Equality, Gender Violence, General, Lifestyle, Media and Marketing, News and Politics, Perspective, Sports, and Tech (ibid.). Writers are asked to write mainly in English (ibid.).

In 2008, Vusi Gumede[44] wrote on *ThoughtLeader* about his conference paper[45] that assessed the extent to which South Africa represents the Developmental State[46] (9 July 2008). The paper 'tentatively concluded that South Africa indeed encapsulates most of the key features' but found that South Africa's implementation, influenced by Amartya Sen's approach to development, was relatively weak and ineffective; despite the relative decline in poverty (Gumede 9 July 2008). According to Gumede, Evan's concept of 'embedded autonomy' (1995), i.e., the networking between bureaucrats and business, has not yet fully materialised in South Africa (ibid.). Responses to the blog were largely positive, although Gumede failed to go into details on key concepts of the policy (Gumede 9 July 2008 *Comment Section*).

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[44] Prof. Gumede has worked for the South African presidency for 12 years and is now working as an academic and writer (WhosWho n.d.).

[45] SA Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC): Conference on the potentialities for and challenges of constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa; 4 to 6 June 2008; Cradle of Humankind, Johannesburg.

[46] Robinson & White (1998), Edigheji (2005), Evans (1995). No reference list in blog format. (Gumede 9 July 2008).

Three years later, blogger Elnari Potgieter[47] still identified implementation backlogs (12 June 2012). Potgieter criticised that although the Developmental State was prominently framed in the government's agenda in Zuma's 2012 SoNA, it remained a label only (ibid.). She argued that the main feature of the Developmental State, as realised by Japan for example, was a 'strong, reliable, predictable and skilled bureaucracy', which South Africa lacked considerably (ibid.). Potgieter elaborated that efficient bureaucracy required 'a sense of mission' and 'vigorous standards' in the recruitment process (ibid.). She advocated for performance-based rewarding and long-term career development (ibid.). All of this would result in 'a sense of unity and 'corporate coherence' amongst bureaucrats' (ibid.).

In response to Potgieter, 'TumiM#' provided an expert's voice as a practitioner 'coming from the public sector' in the blog's comment section:

> (…) I can assure you that the problem of delivery is about more than just skills and capacity. (…) In the institution I work for, there have been COUNTLESS suggestions for implementation, most of which are shot down (…) because there is no political support (…). When there is political will, (…) I believe (…) there will be more room for independent decision making (…), and higher standards of delivery' (Potgieter 12 June 2012 *Comment Section*).

Vigorously defending government, 'Tofolux#' argued that implementation was lagging because business and the media were not realising their commitment to work together with the president on the Developmental State but 'operating in isolation of each other and holding onto old ideologies'(Potgieter 12 June 2012 *Comment Section*). He saw government's role as the planning force setting targets whereas business remained the responsible 'motive force' realising the plans (ibid.).

Blogger 'The Creator#' disagreed with 'Tofolux#' and argued the implementation of the Developmental State was foremost the responsibility and capability of government but the Zuma administration was not using its power because it was 'a tool of big business' who in turn were 'obsessed with fantasies of profit without investment' and therefore 'unresponsive to real developmental needs' (Potgieter 12 June 2012 *Comment Section*).

[47] MA Student for Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch (Potgieter 12 June 2012).

A blog by William Saunderson-Meyer[48] related directly to the 2012 SoNA (11 February 2012). The blogger gave a practical example for government's implementation of the Developmental State and argued this idea originally stemmed from the apartheid government:

> To commit R300-billion to infrastructural spending, the equivalent of two-and-a-half Soccer World Cups, is bold indeed. These are first steps to the developmental state that President Zuma admires and attributes to China, but which in SA can in fact be traced back to the massive and successful state corporatism of the early National Party years' (ibid.).

Saunderson-Meyer pointed out that Zuma, keeping the international investors in mind, carefully avoided certain sensitive aspects of the strategy: 'He spoke about the importance of mining but never spoke the word 'nationalisation', the mere prospect of which has cost billions in investment and scores of thousands of jobs' (ibid.). The blog invited 31 responses. 'jandr0#' disagreed with Saunderson-Meyer on calling Zuma's investments 'bold':

> 'Now please explain to me how Zuma was 'bold' in spending taxpayers' money? (…) I would argue on the contrary, that he was taking no risks – that everybody knows spending on infrastructure is generally perceived as a 'home run'.(…) In my opinion, a 'bold' Zuma would have tackled (say) corruption head on. Why is this bold? Well, because it may cost him some support from already corrupted ANC cadres, that's why' (*Comment section*. Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012).

Saunderson-Meyer argued in response that long-term infrastructure investment was 'bold' indeed as its benefits do not immediately 'show in the statistics' (ibid.).

Thoughtleader blogs attracted the same type of user profile like the comments on the *Mail & Guardian Online's* editorial. However, the blogs appear more like a chat-room inviting direct debate with the writer. Compared to the comments to the online article, the blogging format allows for a dynamic eye-level conversation and progressing cross-talk with multiple participants rather than stating an after-the-fact opinion to a static article already published by an anonymous detached editor.

[48] Saunderson-Meyer is a columnist writing also for *The Weekend Argus*, *The Citizen*, *Weekend Witness, and Sunday Times* (*Mail & Guardian Online* 2013b).

Example III: Facebook comments on the Presidency's page

The last example displays yet a different audience and format, viz. Facebook. The Government's Communication and Information Services (GCIS) has maintained a Facebook page since 23 January 2008, called *the presidency* in order to 'increase awareness of branding activities and mobilize South Africans and global ambassadors for the South African brand' (GCIS 2011: 50).[49] The presidency's Facebook page invited real-time direct responses; partly while Zuma was presenting his speech (The Presidency 9 February 2012). On 9 February 2012, the day of the SoNA, Zuma's PR staff issued two postings linking to a live streaming and a written version of the speech which invited 35 and 151 comments respectively (The Presidency 9 February 2012).[50]

Based on the profile photos and names, the majority of commentators seemed to be young (between 15 and 35 years) and black. Facebook seems to however, appeal more strongly to adult professionals who want to network and stay in touch with friends and family who might be living elsewhere rather than to youth aged 15-18 (see Kreutzer 2009). Most comments seemed to have been posted via smart phones, since they are often short and in typical text message lingo and coding.[51] This temporal and spatial confinement also had an effect on the quality and complexity of comments. English was the predominant language on the Facebook page. Most commentators – perhaps in the illusion of directly speaking to 'the president' on 'his' Facebook page – lauded the speech and commented positively (The Presidency 9 February 2012). A large part of the comments and also inter-posters conversations focused on the fact that president Zuma did not greet in Zulu and Venda at the opening of the speech (ibid.).

However, some criticism was also apparent. Jayd Naidoo broke the illusion of the 'people's president' by ironically posting: 'president must be sharp, updating his facebook status while giving his speech' (The Presidency 9 February 2012) and earned three 'likes' for pointing out that Facebook was used as a marketing device. Tshidi

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[49] In addition to its presence on Facebook, the South African government currently runs four further official social media accounts: on Twitter: @SAPresident and @PresidencZA; on YouTube: PresidencyZA; as well as on Flickr: presidencysa (The Presidency 5 June 2011). President Zuma does not have an individual personal account (The Presidency 5 June 2011).

[50] t has only been possible to differentiate between comments made from PCs or from mobile phones since 2013.

[51] Comments are quoted verbatim.

Moreane accused the president of lying and election campaigning by promising the housing loans:

> He is telling lies how is he going to give ppl earning 3500,00 a month a subsidy? (…) I dnt thnk it will be possi ble 4. Banks to finance those ppl earning 3500 like me. Pure lies mr prez, u only wnt to score political socrs 4 nxt term' (The Presidency 9 February 2012).

Tsholofelo Nkoane called the SoNA an uninspiring 'pavement speech' which was more about the party than about the nation (The Presidency 9 February 2012). He pointed out that Zuma did not mention 'rhino poaching, the secrecy bill nor the immigration' and criticised the costly campaign of renaming public places. Nkoane concluded that the content of the speech 'was how the ANC will benefit from government in 2012' (ibid.). The Facebook space did allow people to refer to specific issues. Bongani Wakwa-Maridili complained that government had discarded 'the concept of Local Economic Development & that of Small Town Regeneration' but instead concentrated on the cities resulting in a 'skewed' development reminiscent of apartheid structures (The Presidency 9 February 2012). However, Wakwa-Maridili expressed explicit appreciation for the investment in the region of Waterberg (The Presidency 9 February 2012).

People responded in real-time when issues were addressed that pertained to their life. Amanda Ndumndum reacted when Zuma spoke about a Housing Funding scheme that would allow people to take affordable loans: 'Mr President I'm in the police I hope u keep ur word abt the loans bcos I dnt qualify for RDP house' (The Presidency 9 February 2012). Although Facebook seems to be mostly accessed via mobile phone and therefore only allows for relatively short statements, it is used by a broad political public reflecting a great variety of opinion and does not have the elitist appeal of *Mail & Guardian Online* and *ThoughtLeader.* As a result, the debates on Facebook also lack the depth and complexity of the *Mail & Guardian's* blog and online newspaper format and give only superficial reference to the notion of the Developmental State. Nevertheless, Facebook also provides concrete accounts of the actual consequences of government's policies for citizens, while *ThoughtLeader* and *Mail & Guardian Online* tend to discuss the issue in abstract and theoretical terms.

Online opposing as a form of freedom of speech

This article has shown a range of online activity in response to the SoNA. Despite the drastic legal infringements of Freedom of Speech

South Africa is currently experiencing[52], the Internet seems a suitable and yet openly accessible outlet for public debate and critique of government. South Africans indeed use the Internet to express their political opinion and dare to challenge mainstream notions and act as a complementing force for the traditional media frames.

Activity on social media in South Africa is at an all-time high and conversation is also politically motivated. According to Schreiner, South Africans do not see social media merely as a lifestyle tool but are also 'ready to discuss policy issues' online (*E News Channel* 9 February 2012). However, for complex issues like the evolvement of the Developmental State, spatially restricted social media forums like Facebook are not a suitable platform. They merely allow for briefly sharing how policies affected personal experience or a 'like'/'dislike' kind of statement. However, this is not to discard the possibility of Facebook becoming a mass movement tool as seen in the Arab Spring should the need for a refuge platform become more pressing. The more sophisticated and complex platforms like *Thoughtleader* allow for detailed and informed comments with reasonable and differentiated arguments partly in favour, partly against government. The concept of the Developmental State seems still to be too vaguely defined by government to be challenged directly. Its evolvement is currently in progress.

Except through policies that keep the provision of broadband access unaffordable to most South Africans, the Internet in South Africa is not (yet) restricted by government and growing access to the Internet especially via smart phones suggests that an increase in online expression of political opinion can be expected in future. This, however, does not automatically improve the quality of information available to the public. Nevertheless, some state secrets might be harder to keep under the lid, the more people participate in online debates. Future research in that field should systematically examine user profiles and trace contentious political stories that have run 'viral' in order to further explore the power of the Internet for political activation in South Africa.

[52] Currently impeding progress is the "Protection of Information Bill", also called "Secrecy Bill", which among other freedom restrictions enables even provincial government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. *Mail & Guardian Online* 14 June 2012). One of the most contentious issues in this bill is the criminalisation and punishment of journalists and whistleblowers who reveal classified and information by pointing out corruption and dubious practices in government (Williams 11 March 2013; see also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013).

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Transcending dominant notions of environmental resource and its governance in Ghana

Peter Narh[53]

Abstract

Environmental sustainability today holds currency as a dominant paradigm of development. In Dormaa, the common notion on the natural environment amongst state agencies and some individuals is that of a degraded environment. Thus, to ensure a sustainable environment, everyone in Dormaa is expected to identify with the dominant notion of environmental degradation and its implications for socioeconomic development. On this basis, the Dormaa forest services division, a state agency responsible for forest protection, provides incentives for community people to plant teak trees to replenish degraded forest reserves as well as on private lands. Yet, community people place different social, political, economic, and cultural values in these incentives, which are different from the values the forest services division places in these incentives to shape human action on the environment. With empirical data collected in Dormaa, this paper seeks to point out that conceptions of the natural environment and how human action affects its protection are socially constructed and transcend notions brought to a people by external agents. Thus, the author suggests that environmental governance is beyond the scope of particular environmental regimes. No one regulatory regime, and for that matter no particular notion of the environment can work alone to ensure environmental protection. Environmental regulatory regimes always interact with other regimes and notions to provide peculiar incentives to different people. Therefore, effective environmental policy making and implementation require the identification of factors on which different environmental notions and regimes are formed.

Keywords: environmental protection, property rights, teak planting, transcending notions.

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Introduction

Ostensibly, everyday human use of the natural environmental in Dormaa is standard rural economy practice. Yet deeper analyses of these practices such as tree planting reveal that they are the results of how land users concurrently draw a combination of incentives as well as disincentives from the existing public environmental regulation regime and the Dormaa customary property rights regime. Eventually, these incentives and disincentives lead to human actions and inactions that do not form part of the dominant conceptions of how environmental behaviour should protect the environment. In certain instances, tree planting is at variance with public-promoted conceptions of environmental protection. In other words, how the natural environment constitutes a resource for community people and how this shapes their actions seem different from how public environmental agencies conceptualise the environment as a resource and ways to protect it.

To this end, from empirical research conducted in Ghana between February and April 2012, the author addresses different overlapping and sometimes conflicting notions of the environment and of environmental protection. Specifically, the author explores notions community people hold on the environment as a resource and on environmental protection, which transcend those notions held by public environmental agencies. With instances of public-supported planting of teak as an economic tree and to protect the environment, the author shows that community people, bounded by their customary property rights regime, hold notions of teak planting and of environmental protection that derive largely from their communal property rights regime. These notions largely overlap and sometimes come in conflict with those held by the public regulatory regimes. The aim of the paper is to point out that to protect the environment, it is necessary for environmental policymaking and implementation to recognise that no one environmental regime and notion alone can effectively provide complete incentives to achieve environmental protection. Therefore, regime interaction and how it leads to environmental behaviour should be the focus of environmental policymaking.

Following the introduction, the paper is organised in the following sequence: the methodology comes next, then a description of the teak tree and the state support programmes for teak cultivation. More empirical data and analysis follow in a section on environmental regimes and notions in overlap and conflict. Next is analysis of how environmental protection is rooted in societal epistemologies. After that are some general reflections on the discussions, drawing from

existing literature. The final section is the conclusion, with policy implications of the issues discussed.

Location and economy of Dormaa

The paper focuses on the Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district together as a case study of environmental governance and how different notions of the environment and its protection transcend each other. The two administrative areas (Fig. 1) are located in the midwestern part of Ghana, close to the border between Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district together lie within longitudes 2º 30´ and 3º 30´ west and latitude 6º 80´and 7º 30´ north. The municipal capital is Dormaa Ahenkro, located about 80 kilometres west of the regional capital, Sunyani, while Wamfie, the capital of the Dormaa east district lies to the east, about 55 kilometres from Sunyani. With over 500 settlements, the two districts together cover a total land area of 1,373 square Kilometres (917 square kilometres for Dormaa municipal, and 456 square kilometres for Dormaa east district). As at 2010, the Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east districts together has a total population of 210,660 (159,789 for Dormaa municipal and 50,871 for Dormaa east) (GSS 2012: 102). There are three electoral constituencies, that is, Dormaa east, Dormaa west, and Dormaa central.




Fig. 1: map of Ghana showing the study communities and location of Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district.
Source: Centre for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Services (CESGIS), Legon, Accra, Ghana (with data supplied from the author's field research, March 2012).

The two districts form part of the Dormaa traditional state, which is an Akan-speaking traditional kingdom in Ghana. The Dormaa state is a constitution of four chiefdoms: Abesim, Bormaa, Chraa, and Dormaa main (Dormaa Ahenkro and Wamfie area). Thus, in this paper, Dormaa stands for Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district. Nonetheless, since a part of the focus of the paper is the Dormaa customary property right regime, some of the themes treated transcend the two districts to the entire Dormaa traditional area.

Dormaa's economy is mainly rural, with crop cultivation, poultry, forestry, and sand winning constituting the main livelihood activities (Dormaa municipal assembly 2012). Due to extensive cultivation and rampant wild fires, large tracts of what was originally forestland have turned into extensive areas of elephant grass and bush. Dormaa abounds in a number of natural environmental goods, some of which are only recognised and exploited as resources. These include clay, gravel, and sand deposits, forests, and water bodies. Moreover, there are some gold deposits that remain unexploited (Dormaa municipal assembly 2012). Use of these resources is governed concurrently by a public environmental regulatory regime and a customary communal property rights regime. These two different regimes complement, conflict, and overlap each other in shaping human use of these resources.

Dormaa's degrading natural environment

The Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east districts have wet semi-equatorial climates with a double maxima rainfall regime, and a mean annual rainfall between 125 cm and 175 cm. The major vegetation types are the reserved and off-reserve forests, and bush, which are extensively cleared in some areas. Sjoerd and Voorhoeve (1990: 712) introducing the Dormaa in their book on Dormaa traditional herbal medicine note that the original Dormaa vegetation of tropical rain forest has been largely replaced by cocoa-farms and by food crop cultivation. The protected forests include Mpameso (197.67 square kilometres), Pamu-Berekum (116.80 square kilometres) and Tain II (297.6 square kilometres) (DMA and DEDA 2012). These forest reserves, as well as the off-reserves provide valuable timber, flora, and fauna to the state and community people as sources of revenue and food. Timber species include Teak (genus Tectona grandis), Wawa (Tripolichiton Scleroxylon), Odum (Milicia excelsa), Sapele (Guthagrophrama) and Mahogany (Khaya invernesses) (DMA 2012: 9; DEDA 2012: 28).

A large part of the off-reserve forests have been extensively cultivated leading to an invasion of grassland and sandy soils. As such the vegetation in the two districts in large parts is dominated by elephant grass and a few short scattered trees with heights ranging between 15 m and 28 m high. As a result of extensive farming activities in the communities, these vegetation types as well as soils are threatened and the forests, for instance, continually change to grassland. Associated with this change is increasing deficiency of soil nutrients for agriculture. The threat extensive cultivation and irregular logging pose to forests has been a major discourse promoting public environmental regulation in Dormaa to replenish lost forests (see

also Ghana environmental policy 1995). Key environmental concerns in the districts include *deforestation, indiscriminate sand/clay/gravel winning*,[54] pollution of water bodies (refuse dumps sited close to water bodies), persistent annual bush fires, illegal lumbering, indiscriminate disposal of poultry waste, and excessive use of agro-chemicals in farming (DMA 2012: 34; DEDA 2012: 33). There are indications that these environmental concerns feed the dominant discourse of environmental degradation in state policies, which recreate communities as primary causes of land degradation and forest lost (see the Ghana environmental policy 1995).

Methodology

Empirical dataset for this paper is drawn from twenty-six individual qualitative and five group discussions in Dormaa with migrant and indigenous farmers, landowners, officials of the Dormaa forest services division, officials at the Dormaa municipal assembly, and the Dormaa customary land secretariat. The discussions explored participants' perceptions, experiences, and knowledge of the natural environment and practices towards its protection. On the basis on a social constructionist perspective, participants were encouraged to show how their customs and social interactions could possibly contribute to these perceptions, experiences and knowledge they held. The whole set of data obtained from these discussions is however, part of the author's doctoral study programme. In various sections of the paper, these empirical dataset is presented in quotations to support the discussions. Largely, the unit of analysis is the incentive community people draw from the combination of the public environmental regulatory regime and the Dormaa customary property rights regime for their actions on their environment. The Atlas.ti computer assisted data analysis software was used to code and retrieve relevant data segments.

Social construction of the environment and its protection: a basis of the methodology

With the focus on notions of the environment and how incentives in property rights regime manifest in human environmental actions, the paper is framed within social constructionist perspectives. With this, notions of the natural environment and the incentives to shape behaviours on the environment are constructs people give to them. Such constructs are grounded on culture and social relations. This implies that to assure incentives that will enable use and protection of the natural environment, it is imperative to understand the culture

[54] Emphasis ours

and social processes of a society and how such culture and social processes influence the ways landowners and land users construct these incentives. This is the only way for public environmental policy to ensure synergy between regulation and human action.

In Dormaa, constructs of the environment and environmental incentives are socially bounded. In the context of this paper, the communal customary property rights regime constitutes the culture that directs social relations with regard to nature. Thus, the customary property rights regime influences incentives in the public environmental regulatory regimes to protect the environment. Community people's construction of the natural environment as a resource and the incentives that enable their use of such resources depend not only on state-imposed notions of what a resource is, and the incentives to encourage human actions on the environment in certain particular ways. Rather, community people's construction of a resource and environmental incentives are shaped largely also by the influences their customary property rights hold on their daily lives. What this means is that public environmental regulatory regimes, based on conventional notions, can impose incentives to shape human action on the environment. But such incentives will always be reinterpreted by people within their own notions. Trees and forests may be considered resources only to the extent that some sort of value is imputed to them by people themselves, bounded by their daily property rights regime.

The practice of tree cultivation

The teak tree

Teak (genus *Tectona grandis*) is a large deciduous tree of the family *Verbenaceae*. It is dominant in mixed hardwood forests, and one of the most valuable timbers. It has small fragrant white flowers and papery leaves that are often hairy on the lower surface (Fig. 2).



The teak tree has a straight but often buttressed stem (i.e., thickened at the base), a spreading crown, and four-sided branchlets with large quadrangular pith. The leaves are opposite or sometimes whorled in young specimens, about 0.5 m (1.5 feet) long and 23 cm (9 inches) wide. In shape they resemble those of the tobacco plant, but their substance is hard and the surface rough. The branches terminate in many small white flowers in large, erect, cross-branched panicles.

Fig. 2: the teak tree
Source: Peter Narh, field research, March 2012.

Teak timber is valued in warm countries principally for its extraordinary durability. Teakwood is used as electric poles, fine furniture, door and window frames, wharves, bridges, louvers, flooring, panelling, shipbuilding, among many other purposes. An important property of teak is its extremely good dimensional stability. It is strong, of medium weight, and of average hardness. Termites eat the sapwood but rarely attack the heartwood; it is not, however, completely resistant to marine borers.

The state belief in teak: statutory support for teak cultivation in Dormaa

The cultivation of teak trees is one of the instruments the forest services division promotes to reforest degraded areas in and off state protected forests. Reforestation is one of the programmes through which the state governs the environment in Dormaa, through the Dormaa forest services division. The reforestation programme with its associated planting of teak is supported by the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP). The NFPDP is a nation-wide programme that seeks to halt the alarming rate of forest degradation in Ghana by providing technical and logistic support to farmers to plant commercial trees within and outside state protected forest reserves.[55]

[55] <http://www.fcghana.com/>, accessed 20 April 2013.

In the protected forest reserves, farmers are allocated plots of degraded forests to intercrop trees with food crops, a cropping culture called the Modified Taungya System (MTS). Both in and outside the forest reserves, teak is cultivated by individuals and groups of people on small plots between one and ten acres, or on plantations of over one hectare of land. Outside the protected reserves, teak is grown on private plots of land and plantations. Teak farmers in the protected forests sell their trees to private contractors at government-controlled market prices. Those growers on private plots however sell their trees to private individuals at prices agreed between the farmer and the buyer.

For its valuable nature, teak provides financial income to growers when the trees are harvested after maturing between fifteen and twenty-five years. Depending on the age and size of the tree harvested, a teak tree could fetch about Gh₵04 (Ghana cedis, about 2 euro) and Gh₵20 (10 euro). An official of the Dormaa forest services division expresses the financial benefits from planting teak as:

> OA: Oh I think it is both. You cannot plant trees just for planting sake, no, I don't think it is wise to do that. You plant a plantation because you want to make some money. However, this also helps sustain the environment. It is the value of the trees for the environment. People have realised they can make a lot from teaks. A lot of people earn good money from the trees. We also educate them about the improvements that protecting the environment can bring to them. For the people in Koradaso, they are doing very well. They are hardworking. And now, with this modified Taungya system we have, you agreed with the people that if you farm this place, the paramount chief has got 15 per cent share of the proceeds, the community has got 5 per cent, I mean the community in which you are living, then the government has got 40 per cent, and you – the one planting the tree and taking care of it – have got 40 per cent..
> *<ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] by peter narh</ref>*[56]

[56] For anonymity, we only provide the initials of the discussion partner. The quotation reference at the end of each quote is interpreted with the following

The Dormaa forest services division is the decentralized agency of the Forestry commission of Ghana[57] for the Dormaa forest district. The division is located in Dormaa Ahenkro, the capital of the Dormaa municipal. Its task is to oversee the management and protection of forest and wildlife resources, as well as the management of concessions for off-reserve lumbering in its catchment area. The catchment area comprises four political administrative districts in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. These are Dormaa municipal, Dormaa east, Goaso, and Brekum districts.

Environmental regimes and notions in conflict

In the next sections are instances that reveal conflicting incentives to plant teak. In these instances, it can be seen that while the state forest services division supports teak planting to mainly reforest degraded forests and provide income through lumber, community people are constrained to plant the teak due to communal values of their customary property rights regime. If any of them plant teak at all, they indeed do so for its economic value, but this comes at a cost to the communality of land rights. Planting teak brings people into conflict due to communal ownership of land, where an individual cannot perpetuate his or her use of land. For this reason, planting teak has not been sustained in Dormaa outside private plots. Though extensive land areas under communal ownership are degraded through extensive cultivation and sand winning, only a few patches of land outside state-protected forests are planted with teak.

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example: *<ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] by peter narh</ref>.*
"*ref>*" stands for reference; "*P41*" means primary document 41, that is, discussion transcript document 41; "*D*" refers to Dormaa; "*FA*" stands for formal authority; "*ID*" stands for individual discussion; "*DA*" refers to Dormaa ahenkro; "*OA*" is discussion partner's initials; "*assistant forest officer_dormaa district*" is the official title of the discussion partner; "*01 mar 2012*" is the date on which the discussion was held; "*rtf*" is a computer file format; "*41: 32*" refers to 32th quotation in transcription document 41; "*[(66:66)]*" means quotation begins and ends in paragraph 66 of the document; "*peter narh*" is the name of the researcher.

[57] The Forestry Commission of Ghana was established by the Forestry Commission Act, 1999 (Act 571.) It is responsible for the regulation of utilization of forest and wildlife resources, the conservation and management of those resources and the coordination of policies related to them. It embodies the various public bodies and agencies that were individually implementing the functions of protection, management, the regulation of forest and wildlife resources. These agencies currently form the divisions of the Commission:

Teak planting and communality of land rights

Under the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP), the state grants loans and also provides seedlings free of charge to landowners to plant teak trees on their lands to reforest degraded lands. On the surface of it, it is laudable that the state provides such technical and logistics support to individuals and groups who may not have been able to secure this assistance themselves (Dragun 1999). The Dormaa forest services division sees the financial support under the NFPDP as a significant boost to tree planting:

> OA: No, no, not the Forestry commission but the Board chair of the forest plantation development fund. The fund is part of the commission and Nana is the Board chair of the fund. The fund has contributed a lot to forest plantations here, both on private lands and in reserved forests. Yes, the loan is accessible to everyone, insofar as you have land to plant on. But when you meet the Osagyefoe, he will tell you more about it. Even the migrant farmers at Koradaso have been asking for loans to cultivate their trees, and I have told them to send their application to Nana. So everyone can apply for it.
> *<ref>P41: D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:28 [(29:29)] by peter narh</ref>*
>
> OB: Ya, the loan is for private people who are...whether you plant in the off-reserve or inside the reserve. You can just apply. But normally they give to those in the reserve... the amount is maybe bigger as compared to those not in the reserve.
> *<ref>P43: D_FA_ID_Da_OB, dormaa forestry officer_06apr2012.rtf - 43:58 [(235:235)] by peter narh</ref>*

Such state support is in line with the main arguments of the public regulation paradigm in the environmental governance debate that state institutions are necessary to intervene and provide support to regulate human environmental actions because private property rights will fail to protect the environment due to private rational aims that may go contrary to values of society as a whole (Smith 1997).

However, in the Dormaa municipal the customary property rights regime conflicts with the teak planting programme of the state. It shows the divergence of notions about the incentives for teak planting to protect the environment between public environmental

governance regimes and community people. For the public regulatory regime, planting teak is based on the illusion of the state forest services division that individuals have absolute control over the decisions they take on their lands. In the property rights regime of Dormaa, this is true only to the extent that while alive, the current cultivator enjoys the usufruct. Inasmuch as the Dormaa customary property rights regime is communal, the usufructary right is indefeasible, inalienable (Da Rocha and Lodoh 1999: 5), and subject to the rights of the land user's family and the state of Dormaa. The customary communal property rights regime only grants usufructary rights to citizens of Dormaa by descent. Customarily, all lands in Dormaa belong to the people of Dormaa collectively; individuals hold only use rights, the usufruct.

To this end, support for planting teak to reforest so-called degraded areas is a normative obligation of land use imposed by the state not only on the individual, but also on the family to which the individual belongs, as well as on the Dormaa state. It is normative because it is at variance to the customary property rights regime of the Dormaa. It is external, based on ideas of the state about incentives to plant teak for people and for improving environmental condition. Such normative programmes of the state constitute a denial of the community of the choice to determine how they pursue their livelihoods. It is a denial because in view of the communal rights in land, when teak is planted on a piece of family land for instance, it constrains the rights of others to the use of that same piece of land for one generation or more. The next paragraph explains this further.

The normative obligation to plant teak may work to protect the environment. Aside the negative implications, planting teak certainly provides vegetative cover to replenish degraded land. Nonetheless, in view of the communal property rights regime, planting teak may disrupt the lives of future generations who have equal rights to the land as the current cultivator does. The disruption results if future generations wish to use the land for a different purpose other than a teak farm. The land on which one cultivates now belongs to the present cultivator as well as to other siblings, nephews, nieces, cousins, and so on, living, dead, or yet unborn. It is to say that a piece of land cultivated now belongs to an entire extended family. The current cultivator has a right over such land inasmuch as other members entitled to it have the same use rights. Upon the death of the current cultivator, family members can turn the existing farm into whatever they prefer, or they can develop it in an entirely different way. But this may not be easy in the case of a farm full of teak trees. Indeed, this comes close to what Anderson and Leal (1991) report on free market environmentalists' approach to environmental

governance. They note that state involvement in environmental regulation leads to disadvantages for private entrepreneurs; that is, state subsidies for certain environment-based activities to protect the environment may undermine the profitability of the environment for other people in the same activities. In Dormaa, the entrepreneurs are the other family members who have same use rights to the land as the current cultivator. These 'entrepreneurs' who lose out on their profits may turn to other economic activities that may not favour the environment and are less economic for them. For example, members of the family who may not desire to plant teak may turn to sand winning on already degraded land.

A usufructary right over a piece of land does not allow the user to take possession of the land in perpetuity. But this is what planting teak trees will mean. The teak trees take between 15 and 25 years to mature for harvest. For this period, the teak farm cannot be taken away from the possession of the current cultivator. In the face of this 'injunction by cultivation' placed on the land against other holders of rights in the land, a feature of the teak tree is that a few weeks after harvest, it will shoot from the trunk and grow into another tree. Therefore, generations of a teak tree can continue to grow continually on the same piece of land for several decades. If the teak tree effectively maintains the land in the possession of the current cultivator, it merely implies that when a teak tree is harvested, but shoots and grows into another generation of tree, the current cultivator only extends his or her user rights over the land. In effect, this only means denying other potential users the right to use the land the way they see fit.

Taking the communality of the Dormaa customary property rights regime into consideration then, it can be said that teak will be planted solely on private plots of land. Strictly private plots of land can be acquired through gift or lease. However, many usufructary land rights holders are planting the trees on communal lands. Most do this with the hope that their own children will inherit their rights in the land immediately after them. Yet, empirical evidence in Dormaa shows that this is not always the case. Other family members often lay claim to the land in the event of the death of the current cultivator. Where there is teak on the farm, the right to inherit the farm is not easily determined between the teak owner's immediate family and the extended family. Consequently, some informants report that planting teak results in family tensions in many instances.

Cultivation of teak to renew degraded lands by itself is not necessary unproductive. Instead, it is important to note that by the communality of property rights, teak cultivation do not accrue the same incentive

to all individuals or families over time. One cannot take decisions over land completely as an individual without due reference to the family, clan, or the community. The environmental actions of individuals are always judged by their influence on the family and the Dormaa state as a whole. In the customary property rights regime, the current cultivator only has use rights, while it is the family through the community that possesses the ownership rights. Thus, land cannot be treated as in individual complete perpetual ownership.

Competition between teak trees and food crops

Another instance of conflicting incentives between the state and community people in planting teak trees is the competition for arable land between teak trees and food crops. In Dormaa, land under teak cultivation implies reduced space for food crops cultivation. Findings of this study indicate that the competition is the result of land immobility in Dormaa. Land is immobile for two main reasons. One, there is land scarcity and virtually no land is uncultivated, lying idle currently and not planned for. Tracts of land can be seen uncultivated, but many apparently lie idle because owners consider them too degraded to cultivate, or owners have other plans for them other than food crop cultivation. Outside the state protected forests, land is scarce due to increasing population and increasing division of land within the family. Two, by some norm, Dormaa people rarely ever rent out agricultural land. Thus, agricultural land does not easily move between different users outside the landowning family. Perhaps land has not been vacant to a large extent like in the cocoa growing areas in the western part of Ghana, which have attracted migrants from other parts of the country and beyond since the mid-20th century to acquire large tracts of uncultivated yet fertile land (see Alhassan and Manuh 2005; Benneh 1987; Aidoo 1989; 1996; Hill 1963).

With land immobility, landowners have rights to a piece of land over their life time, and that of their progeny. On this same piece of land, food crops and cash crops may be grown. There is no competition between crops for space if different types of crops will grow well together. This is not the case with the teak tree. After between three and five years, food crops interplanted with the teak do not grow well. The canopy of the trees prevents sunlight from effectively reaching the crops underneath. Moreover, the land under teak over time loses its soil structure conducive for food crops cultivation. According to informants, loss of soil structure results from cultivating teak because the roots of the teak tree spread out shallowly just beneath the top soil, blocking out other crop roots. A community elder laments:

> NH: A number of women are planting the teak. But the problem is that the teak destroys the land and nothing else can be planted on the land when the teak grows. For us women, you know that we have to cultivate a lot of food stuff yearly to sell to take care of the home. So when one plants the teak and she does not have another farm elsewhere, within the time the teak takes to mature, there is lots of hardship for the woman.
> *<ref>P 7: D_TA_ID_Ms_NH_queenmother_25mar2012.rtf - 7:8 [(15:15)] by peter narh</ref>*

People usually plant teak trees on a part of their lands, leaving a part for food crops. But then they can no longer use the teak-planted area for crops after a few years, compelling them to remain fixed to the existing parts of the land for crops production. However, land immobility in Dormaa as explained above keeps people to cultivate a piece of land over a very long time until the land loses its fertility. Ironically, the degraded land cannot be left idle for a long while to fallow, because it will be taken over by another person in the family. Consequently, the communal property rights constrain land mobility and land fallowing which then leads to soil and vegetation degradation. Some discussion partners indicate the problem of land immobility, land scarcity and associated implications as follows:

> MA: You see this year there have not been any fire outbreaks. Everyone was farming, but no one thought we should leave a place for the forest to grow. If you did that, it meant that you have plenty of land and you cannot farm all so you left some. But this not the case; land is getting scarce as our population grows higher so no one will leave a piece of land just like that. Then other people in the family will quickly go and take it.
> *<ref>P16: D_IF_GD_Ms_MA_Women group_25mar2012.rtf - 16:28 [(75:79)] by peter narh</ref*

> AN: And for our own forest, because we farm the same forest all the time, all the animals have run away into the government forest.
> *<ref>P28: D_IF_ID_Tf_AN, community elder_18mar2012.rtf - 28:26 [(215:215)] by peter narh</ref>*

> KT: If the forest had not been there, we will never have gotten any wild animals by now even to show our children about them. For instance, my land, I have

> cultivated it so much that there is no wild animal in it anymore. My neighbour may also has cultivated his land so much that there is no wild animal anymore. *<ref>P24: D_IF_ID_Ms_KT, community elder_25mar2012.rtf - 24:34 [(215:215)] by peter narh</ref>*

But then, if land is planted with teak to replenish the vegetation, it still leads to soil structure loss as expressed by informants in this study. Thus, while constant cultivation of a piece of land degrades it, land under teak leads to the same degradation effect. This is double causation of environmental degradation as a result of state notions of incentives to plant teak brought to community people that do not necessarily align with their customary property rights regime. Indeed, institutions or regimes (for that matter dominant notions cannot be judged as being successful in conserving renewable resources if the resource is not maintained in the long run (Acheson 2006: 119). In Dormaa however, in the long run, land under teak leads to loss of soil structure and deprivation of arable land for food crop production.

The point here is that the notion that planting teak trees will protect the environment may not be a successful environmental protection approach in the long-run. It rather leads to soil degradation because of its misfits with the communal nature of land. To this end, tree planting can in itself be a cause of environmental degradation! Acheson (2006: 119) writes that the primary reason for conservation failure in many instances is that effective institutions often are not devised. In this respect, Acheson is right. The state in devising its reforestation programmes (with teak) is guided by the dominant notion that teak trees protect the environment. But the state seems oblivious to the fact that planting teak trees also causes environmental degradation due to constraints imposed on land use by the communal customary property rights regime.

Rootedness of environmental protection in societal epistemologies

For environmental protection that is legitimate, durable, and workable, it must be based on home grown epistemologies. External notions of incentives to plant teak do not fit the communal customary property rights regime. The discrepancy is because for community people, individual decisions of land users derive directly from the communality of the environment. In epistemological terms, the Dormaa customary property rights regime places high emphasis on intergenerational equity with respect to land rights and land use. This is how people know and impute meaning into their environment. Intergenerational equity in land rights and land use denote

communality of property rights. Communality of property rights ensures togetherness, and preserves the longevity of the commune; individuality is analogous to death of the roots of a tree, and therefore death of the tree (community). This is because the African knowing person is never an individual but a community. For community people, the environment per se is linked with present, future, and past generations. Such is the basis of the Dormaa communal property rights regime.

In the communal property rights regime, the natural environment is more than biological; it is also the spirit, power and force of the community of people. Thus, in terms of communal property rights, the natural environment is fundamentally multifunctional. Due consideration is given to how decisions on the environment affect its function as the embodiment of the community of people. Community people will not just grow trees to preserve the environment. Rather, they will consider also how growing trees affects the existence and preservation of the biological and spiritual force and power of the community of people. As Zambakari (2011) notes, environmental governance that sustainably maintains nature must prioritise the process of how regulation affects the environment, rather than the outcome of that regulation. The implication of Zambakari's view is that governing the environment is not about any human-imposed external rules, but about human-nature solidarity that exists in complex inter-nourishments. Therefore, environmental governance through externally-enforced rules is unsustainable, because it cannot meet the realities of other philosophies in their own contexts.

Contrary to state notions, the economic benefits from teak trees alone are often not what matters most to community people. Instead, people may plant teak based on other incentives. For instance, there is passive resistance to the power of the allodial rights holder (the Paramount chief) to allocate land, though people do not show or express this resistance publicly. The Paramount chief by virtue of holding the allodial rights in all Dormaa lands in trust of the people holds the authority to claim plots of land and allocate them for physical development. Many usufructary rights holders cultivate teak on pieces of land to attract high compensation value for their lands in the event their lands are allocated for physical development. Therefore, the value of teak trees in this situation for usufructary rights holders is not as much to reap economic rents or reforest a degraded area. Instead, it is more of value to protect one's property rights.

Some generation reflections

New development paradigms and agendas from the global arena are crafted and recrafted onto existing social contexts of people to suit emerging themes of development. This crafting encourages community people to follow patterns of behaviour that meet and fit the objectives of the state bureaucracy and other stakeholders, but in the process deprive communities of their customs and will to manage and benefit from their resources as they see fit (Li 2007: 280). Li expresses this author's field research finding that planting teak trees leads to loss of soil structure and therefore fertility. The state promotes teak plantations, primarily to halt forest degradation and also to provide for timber.[58] Ghana's timber is mainly exported for foreign exchange revenue. Thus, international demand for timber largely fuels government drive to encourage teak plantations.

In Dormaa, many people profess their trust in the state to better protect the environment. Such a recognition of the state suggests a state-reproduced image of community people as destructive agents and incapable of managing their own resources. The result of this state reproduction is that it creates a dependency of community people on and subservience to the state which furthers its (the state's) own objectives, one of which is to encourage teak plantations to yield timber for export. The global and the national connect in representing people and their relationships with environmental resources in particular ways; this informs present environmental interventions in Dormaa, which reproduce these constructed images of people and their environments (Fairhead and Leach 2000: 175).

To Fairhead and Leach (2000: 181), which is also the findings of this study in Dormaa, West African forest services agencies derive revenues from the sale of permits and licenses for timber and wildlife exploitation, and from fines for breaking state laws. They are able to do this only by removing control over the management of resources such as trees and areas of forested land from inhabitants, seeing inhabitants as inadequate resource custodians whose activities are destructive of forests and require repressive regulation. Revenues are thus ensured by a reading of the landscape as gravely deforested. The economic structures within which forest services operated can thus be seen to help frame the production of knowledge about forestry problems and to produce localities accordingly (Fairhead and Leach 2000: 181).

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[58] National Forest Plantation Development Report Annual Reports, <http://www.fcghana.org/library_info.php?doc=41&publication:National%20Forest%20Plantation%20Development%20Progamme%20Annual%20Reports%20&id=18, accessed 10 May 2013>, accessed 10 February 2013.

Indeed, in defining degradation, Nsiah-Gyabaah (1994: 26, citing Hotelling 1931; Fisher and Peterson 1977) agrees that it is a situation where there is "…a reduction in the environment or in its capability to fulfil its functions." Nsiah-Gyabaah notes that these functions include provision of food, energy and material inputs, purification, microclimatic conditioning and utility yielding services essential for human welfare. On the basis of Nsiah-Gyabaah's definition of degradation, what then is the relevance of public environmental governance, if planting teak eventually constrains the utility landowners derive from their lands.

Acheson (2006: 124) cites failures of science and engineering as the reason for government failure in environmental governance. Acheson gives an example such as failed irrigation schemes, importation of foreign trees to areas that are not conducive to growth (disease, inadequate soil or water, etc.) as one instance. The list can be extended by one more point: that there is importation of incentives for tree cultivation that does not conform to the customs of people. In this respect, it is correct for Underdal (2008: 61) to say that the search for effectiveness in environmental governance comes at the expense of the recognition that environmental governance has effects on societies in significant ways beyond just regulating human action on the environment.

Green ecologists call for a rethinking of the current focus on institutional, managerial, and economic issues of environmental governance, which alienates people from nature, to one that addresses fundamental beliefs, values, and structures that will bring people back to a true attached relationship with nature (Dobson 2007; Meadows et al. 2005). While this author does not necessarily align his views with the thesis of green ecologism, he shares in a call for profound changes in social and political behaviour in environmental governance that will recognise people have other incentives (in their communal property rights) beyond those of the state.

Robbins (2000) points to the need for a more synergistic approach to environmental governance. In a synergistic approach, different notions and regimes on the environment are responsive to each other, and recognize the mutual influences they have on each other. It is only through this synergistic approach that environmental policy can effectively combat environmental degradation. Sekhar (2004: 140) is also of the view that local knowledge and experts' knowledge should not be considered in opposition to each other but that it is necessary to interpret all knowledge as mediated by institutional as well as cultural contexts. In the context of this paper, environmental

governance at the community level indeed is mediated by the customary property rights regime. Instead of remaining oblivious to this mediation, state agencies and their environmental regimes will do better in protecting the environment if the influences of the customary property rights are acknowledged and taken seriously.

Conclusion

The paper calls for a recognition that environmental regulation entails different notions of incentives and of the natural environment that may conflict with each other. It thus becomes necessary to identify these different notions and ways in which they conflict in shaping human actions on the environment. In this regard, it is important in environmental governance to integrate different notions and incentives, both external and internal to a community, to achieve holistic environmental management and protection. In Dormaa, this means how to implement state-supported incentives to shape human action on the environment and at the same time keep the communal nature of society intact. It means a synergy between state and non-state notions and incentives that does not compromise on the management and protection of the environment. Like the green ecologists argue, the environment itself has an intrinsic value in keeping communities together. This is to say that the environment has both instrumental and social values that are connected and must remain protected simultaneously. The environment remains valued not only in connection with economic but also social roles. As Dobson (2007: 29) suggests, any definition of environmental management and protection for its sustainability must answer the fundamental question, 'what is to be sustained?' In Dormaa, what is to be sustained is both the environment and the communal values of Dormaa society. This question must guide environmental policy makers and implementers in designing and implementing state interventions in environmental governance.

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The politics of resources, vulnerability and pastoral practices in Upper Awash Valley, Ethiopia

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Abstract

In light of continuing environmental and social sources of changes, Karrayyu pastoralists are responding in various ways. Broadly speaking, these responses can be categorised into two areas: responses that combine different norms and rules of accessing scarce resources and diversification of livelihood activities. In this paper I present new forms of resource arrangements as adaptation strategies that have resulted out of the socio-ecological and demographic pressure on Karrayyu land. However, this article does not limit itself only to these factors, since the change in pastoral livelihood practices could not be attributed to one factor only. Comprehending the changing livelihood practices should take into account, parallel to the demographic pressure, other interrelated factors such as government policy interventions and their impact on pastoral land ownership. This is also in line with the political ecology theoretical framework that emphasizes the need for the recognition of the political, economic, historical, geographical and ecological determinants to understand the changing pastoral livelihood practices.

Keywords: new practices, pastoralists, political ecology, vulnerability.

Introduction

The structural factors and processes shaping vulnerability are largely a product of rapid social change, driven by distant processes. By social change, I mean the broad range of 'human' factors that affect local adaptation, as opposed to biophysical factors influencing

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exposure. Social change thus encompasses social, cultural, economic, and political factors and processes. Any endeavour to better understand the ways in which local actors adapt must start by exploring the dynamic social, political, and demographic context of vulnerability. These dynamics have, I argue, critical implications for understanding contemporary local adaptations in the face of climatic stress.

Accordingly, the major sources of vulnerability that have influenced, in one way or another, the decision making and adaptation processes of local actors in the semi-arid environment of Upper Awash Valley are explored. The data presented and analysed in this paper was generated using various sources. Secondary sources of information such as government documents concerning the major activities in the Upper Awash Valley were consulted. In addition, primary data were obtained through focus group discussions and key informant interviews with elders, while various PRA tools such as problem identification and ranking were utilised in focus group discussions.

The Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper Awash valley have been vulnerable to various socio-political and ecological forces over the past six to seven decades. Although groups, individuals, and communities may be vulnerable to climate change, vulnerability is indicative of broader social dynamics—thus vulnerability is processual. This process of vulnerability was in motion during my field research, and was manifested in the way the Karrayyu pastoralists deploy various strategies while interacting with the natural environment, particularly with respect to the recurrent drought and the various actors that are actively present in the locality.

In order to approach the problem, I apply a political ecology approach that takes into account general contexts within which both environmental problems and management issues arise (Forsyth 2003). Many authors (such as Bohle et al. 1994) have also defined political ecology as a combination of political economy and human ecology approaches to the interactions between nature and society. Political ecology varies from the political economy approach since it puts emphasis on the environment as an independent variable that structures social relations. In other words, the influence of the environment on societal change was recognised in the political ecology approach.

National development-local vulnerability nexus

Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, communities and social groups have available to them to minimise

the negative impacts of climate change and take advantage of the opportunities. The encroachment of large-scale commercial farms into Karrayyu territory has made pastoralists susceptible to recurrent drought and famine by disrupting their localised adaptation strategies that were tailored towards mobility of livestock and people. The political ecology approach accounts for the close connection between the expansion of development programmes in Awash Valley and the recurrence of drought and famine in the region. In other words, social and political sources of vulnerability relate to social developments such as changes in the political regime, including altered power relations at the regional and communal level. For instance, development policies may, at least temporarily, add to political uncertainties at various levels, since they may redistribute resources and powers between various actors. In a similar manner, multiple, simultaneous interventions by the state and other groups may cause confusion and generate unanticipated outcomes.

In this regard, entitlement theory shifts our attention away from climatic forces as an explanation of famine (Downing 2003). Rather than approaching famine and food insecurity as a product of drought and crop/livelihood failure, Sen (1981) framed famine as a result of 'entitlement failure'. The powerlessness of individuals or groups to access resources crucial to coping with extreme climatic conditions such as drought is at the centre of entitlement failure. From this perspective, resource availability and the ability of individuals to mobilise these resources are central to an understanding of vulnerability (Adger 2006).

This is important in the context of the Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper Awash Valley for it highlights the fact that local-scale vulnerability is created by processes which are beyond the capacity of the locals and with distant forces such as shifts in policy. In this regard, vulnerability to climate change can also be considered within the framework of entitlements (Watts and Bohle 1993; Bohle et al. 1994; Adger and Kelly 1999). According to Bohle et al. (1994), the concept of entitlements includes cultural and intra-familial entitlement to resources, as well as encompassing wider structures of empowerment by which these entitlements are secured and contested. Entitlements therefore extend beyond material and economic measures of well-being to encompass the multitude ways in which resources necessary for well-being are accessed, distributed, and contested over space and time (Kelly and Adger 2000). Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, households, communities and social groups have available to them to minimise the negative impacts of climate change and take advantage of the opportunities.


Commercial farms and the loss of pastoral spaces of adaptation

In the 1960s, charting out its path through five year development plans,[60] the modernist government preferred to see the Awash Valley in terms of one or two of its resources and disregarded the rest. This resulted in incalculable damage to the environment and the well-being of the many local communities in the valley. For instance, those interested in the 'agricultural development' of the valley only tended to see the Awash Valley as nothing but potential agricultural land that could generate foreign exchange and move the national economy. The well-being of local communities and their livestock were not taken into consideration. Because the Upper Awash valley is endowed with agricultural potential, both in terms of natural resources and through its proximity to local and international markets, the Karrayyu land has attracted the government and become a 'bone of contention' between the locals and the 'interventionist' government (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010).

The loss of access to critical 'spaces of adaptation' by the Karrayyu pastoralists started with the establishment of the Metahara Sugar Factory (MSF) under an agreement between the Imperial Ethiopian Government and Hendels-Vereeniging Amsterdam (HVA) in 1967. This agreement resulted in the gradual allocation of 10,000 ha of land for irrigation purposes on the other side of Awash River, taken from the prime dry season grazing area of the Karrayyu pastoral groups. The mill, with a crushing capacity of 17,000 quintals of sugarcane, became operational in 1969. The factory started to produce 1,700 quintals of sugar per day. This brought the number of sugar factories in the Awash Valley to three, namely, Wonji, Wonji-Shoa and Metahara, established in 1954, 1960 and 1969, respectively.

[60] It is to be recalled that the First Five Year Plan, from 1957 to 1961, gave priority to infrastructures, while the Second Five Year Plan, from 1962 to 1967, allotted pride of place to directly productive undertakings, particularly manufacturing industry, mining, electricity, etc. and the Third Five Year Plan, 1968-1973, introduced a substantial shift of emphasis from the preceding plans by placing high priority on agriculture.

Fig. 1: the proliferation of irrigated farms in the Awash Valley



With the establishment of MSF, the Karrayyu pastoralists lost their dry season grazing area and watering points along the Awash River. The particular ecological importance of the area on which the sugar plantation was established was that it was dominated by *Acacia Nilotica*, *Acacia Syal* and *Acacia Tortilis*, and tall grasses. Furthermore, it was the tall trees that grew along the river bank that used to give sufficient protection against the sun during the dry season. On top of this, according to my key informants, the area used to harbour more than ten spiritual sites along the river which were of great importance to the Karrayyu people.

In-migration of non-locals to Karrayyu land

Another important demographic factor is the movement of non-locals into Karrayyu territory, which has put a lot of stress on the limited resources that have been left after encroachment by the large-scale commercial farms and conservation measures. Particularly important here was the immigration of the Ittu, which increased in magnitude in the 1950s and continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s as a result of war with the Issa Somali over resource use and ownership in their ancestral land.

After the migration, some Ittu settled alone in villages like Benti, and others lived together with the Basso Karrayyu in Kobboo, Degha Hedhu, Galcha, and Moogassa. The first three are located in the foothills of Mount Fentalle, and the fourth near the sugar cane plantation and the park. The relations between the newcomers and the hosts were good from the very beginning, since the migration was conducted in agreement with the Karrayyu. The friendship and solidarity between the Ittu and Karrayyu that characterised the pre-migration period were further strengthened after the migration through marriage, reciprocal exchange of stocks and gifts, cooperation in the payment of blood compensation in particular and pastoral life in general. Drought triggered the migration of the Ittu only in 1984/85. Otherwise, what made the migration of the Ittu of this period different from the previous ones was that until 1984/85, it was only the pastoralists who migrated to Fentalle. But this time, the absence of rain for two consecutive years and the subsequent drought and famine in west Hararge also forced the agro-pastoralist Ittu to migrate to the Karrayyu territory in Fentalle Woreda.

Pastoral agency and new practices

Pastoralists actively employ their agency in order to deal with the structural sources of vulnerability. The 'duality' between structural forces of vulnerability and pastoral agency leads to the formation of emerging practices through active engagement by the actors. Consequently, rather than viewing actors as unintentionally responding to structural shifts in power relations emanating from above, this research takes seriously the notion that local resource users are agents in their own right. However, this 'requires a concept of human agency that is neither determined by social structure nor entirely voluntaristic' (Gezon 2006: 15). Actors, in this framework, are seen as socially positioned with systematic and patterned affinities and dispositions (Rocheleau 1995), while at the same time, seeking their own benefit, constantly engaged in negotiation and 'the work of social change' (Bailey 2001). Actors are also situated within differential, yet dynamic, power matrices, where identities such as gender and ethnicity and other collectivities frame strategies and shape social interaction. Giddens (1979) also takes the concept of agency and defines it as 'the capability of an actor to act otherwise'. In this section I explore how the Karrayyu pastoral groups have managed to actively balance their traditional livestock-based mechanisms of dealing with vulnerability with cultivation in the process of interacting with their broader environment.

Increase in farming practices and disruption of pastoral social relations

As stated in the previous section, for several decades the Karrayyu were exclusive pastoralists deriving their sustenance from rearing livestock. Nevertheless, within the last six to seven decades, due to a combination of broader social as well as climatic factors, the role of the pastoral way of life based on livestock production as a sole source of livelihood has gradually declined. The main reasons for this were the shrinkage of the resource base due to external interventions and consequent environmental degradation, and the recurrent drought.

Development interventions like those of the commercial farms were not favourable to pastoralists in the valley, since this resulted in the alienation of the dry season grazing lands of the Karrayyu pastoralists (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010). The Karrayyu case is further aggravated by the Ittu migration and the establishment of the Awash National Park and the expansion of Lake Beseka. These developments have led to increased vulnerability of the pastoral way of life by reduced access to resources that are crucial in supporting mobile strategies. The loss of pasture and the recurrent drought have resulted in a sharp decline in the size of the livestock population[61] and impoverishment of the Karrayyu.

All these processes of vulnerability have forced the once full-time pastoralists to adapt themselves flexibly to agro-pastoralism in which the herdsmen combine livestock raising with farming practices as an adaptive measure. Thus, a supplementary non-pastoral activity, namely farming, began to expand despite unsuitable climatic conditions. Farming is also dictated by the need to supply the increasing population with food, which the livestock sector alone cannot achieve.

In the context of the Karrayyu, cultivation is practised in two different ways, namely, rain-fed and irrigated (Ayalew 2001). Both mechanisms of crop production in Karrayyu land have been used for the past three decades. The Karrayyu themselves have not developed an agricultural tradition. Agriculture was introduced to the Karrayyu areas in the wake of the migration of the agro-pastoralist Ittu. According to the Karrayyu elders, it was introduced by the Ittu migrants, especially by those agro-pastoralists who came to Fentalle

[61] The mean number of livestock per household plummeted from 59.4 TLU (tropical livestock unit) in 1977 to 14.5 in 1997 (Tibebe 1997 cited in Ayalew 2001).

district for the first time during the 1984/85 drought due to the crop failure in West Hararghe.

Bringing new principles in: the practice of fencing communal pasture

Land in the Karrayyu area has been handled in the past by customary institutions. However, with the social sources of vulnerability, the role of these traditional institutions in the Karrayyu pastoral community has declined. For instance, an increased influx of non-local farmers from other areas, particularly the Ittu groups from West Hararegh, has brought about new world views and resulted in the expansion of small scale cultivation in Karrayyu territory through private enclosure. As a result, the handling of the natural resource base, mainly land, has also undergone changes. In other words, with the increased social sources of vulnerability, Karrayyu pastoralists have started to put in place mechanisms for handling the scarce resources, such as private enclosures, by using their 'pastoral agency'. This means the well-off Karrayyu herders with large numbers of livestock did not sit back and watch while the communal pasture lands were taken over for farming purposes. Rather, as individual agents they introduced the idea of enclosing the land for grazing purposes, either individually or in a group. Locally, land that is enclosed for private farming purposes is called *Qonna*, while land that is enclosed for grazing purposes is known as *Kalloo.* In other words, the engagement of the pastoralists in counterbalancing the enclosure of land for private farming has led to the introduction of new practices/strategies among the Karrayyu that restrict open access to communal pasture. These were introduced among the Karrayyu after the shrinkage of their resource base due to the various sources of vulnerability, and represent an attempt to actively create mechanisms for dealing with these vulnerabilities. As such, Kalloo is aimed at resolving the problem of shortage of pasture in the seasons of Birraa (autumn) and Bonna (winter). Restrictions were placed on a portion of grazing land in their permanent villages by agreements made by the pastoralists themselves through the village leader. This decision was announced to the Woreda administration so that it would not be violated by anyone.

The portion of grazing land on which restrictions are placed remains fallow until it becomes accessible to all members of the village in the dry season by another decision of the village leaders. But nowadays the severe shortage of land caused by the migration of the Ittu pastoralists from Western Hararghe to the Fentalle area, and the use of most of the wet season grazing zone (*onna ganna*) for settlement purposes and opportunistic farming have resulted in a failure to find

land that could be preserved for the dry season. Though during my field research I observed attempts to enclose and reserve land for communal grazing, the cattle go hungry even in the summer. So in some years, the pastoralists give up their decision by making another agreement, and what was left to be grazed for the dry season is used to satisfy immediate pasture needs in the rainy season. This makes the enclosure mechanism for using scarce resources difficult to operate smoothly. Here one may argue that even if the intent of introducing an enclosed pasture area is good, it has failed to fully meet its purpose. The increased competition for private farming land together with the lack of adequate rainfall even in the rainy season have forced the local Karrayyu pastoralists to cancel their agreements to maintain the enclosed pasture ahead of the dry season. This affirms the political ecology approach that acknowledges the role of the bio-physical environment in influencing human behaviour. According to this approach, the bio-physical environment also plays a role as agent by impacting human wills and behaviours (Latour 2004). Scholars contend that the political ecology approach needs to locate social interactions within the broader framework of ecological processes and should not be trapped in the futile debate of nature/culture duality (Gezon 2006; Latour 2004; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). In their emphasis of the decisive and influential role of the bio-physical environment in influencing human-environment relations, Zimmerer and Bassett further argue that 'the environment is not simply a stage or arena in which struggles over resource access and control take place.' (2003: 3)

Emergence of hybrid institutions: strategies of accessing scarce resources

Actors' ability to access and secure scarce resources affects not only their ability to increase returns but also to deal with vulnerability that arises from social and climate-related sources. In line with this argument, the Karrayyu pastoralists have started to organise essential resources in order to better handle social and climate-related sources of vulnerability. Accordingly, with the loss of spaces of adaptation that constrained the traditional mechanisms of vulnerability reduction, the locals are practising contemporary means of handling vulnerability such as farming.

Land transfer through sharecropping is on the increase among the Karrayyu community due to the arrival of the Ittu farmers from Hararghe and with the introduction of irrigation water in the villages. Before the introduction of the irrigation scheme it was also common in some villages where farming was widely practised. To explain such behaviour, the new institutional economists argue that strategic

actors, acting both collectively and in their own individual self-interest, negotiate institutional structures and rules over time in order to arrive at increasingly efficient outcomes. In this sense institutions are the 'by-product of (a) strategic conflict(s)' that, intentionally or not, coordinate(s) interests among disparate actors, arriving over time at equilibrium, or in other words 'commonly agreed upon norms' (Ensminger and Rutten 1990).

These are the ways through which the pastoralists attempt to utilise the limited spaces of adaptation that require different mechanisms than in the past. For instance, in the Karrayyu pastoral community of Upper Awash Valley, Ye-ekul (half share of the produce) is becoming part of the contemporary practice of handling vulnerability. Nevertheless, currently the most pressing problem among the Karrayyu pastoralists at the study sites such as Giddara is finding partners for sharecropping arrangements, since most of the community members want to rent out either part or all of their holdings. Fantale Jilo, who has no oxen to cultivate the land himself, expressed his situation thus:

> …a few years back, people from town were looking for land and it was good for me. I also had an opportunity of renting my plot, which helped me to share better harvests. Now, the land does not yield much like before, and we had crop failures during successive years. As a result, 0.5 ha of my land is given up as fallow because I could not find someone who is interested in it (2010).

However, the sharecropping arrangements are not always smooth for two main reasons. The first one is the problem of crop failure, which according to the Karrayyu pastoralists who practise farming is caused by excessive soil salinity and lack of farm inputs. The second factor is the gradual erosion of assets, particularly through sales of farm oxen by many people in order to meet their subsistence needs. Farmers dare to hire land only if they possess sufficient draft power.

I observed another type of land transaction being practised by farmers around Galcha and Giddarra villages. Under this arrangement a farmer who is sharecropping land passes it onto a third party without the consent of the owner. One of my informants, who asked me not to reveal his name in connection with this matter because of the legality problem and the risk of losing trust and value in the community, stated:

> I sharecropped one hectare of land on the 'ye-ekul' (equal) basis from a female-headed household in our

> community a few years ago, when I was able to use all necessary inputs on the farm. In the meantime, because of some constraints I encountered, I had to look to a close friend who could make up my shortfalls. This was how I managed the last two harvests. We provided half of the harvest to the landholder, and then shared the remaining produce equally between ourselves. I did not inform the individual from whom I initially got the land about the reality of the situation because of fear that she will snatch it back from me.

The commercial farming operations along the Awash River in the 1950s and the 1960s adversely affected local pastoral strategies. Pastoralists lost their entitlement to the ever expanding farms. These social problems aggravated the vulnerability of the locals to drought. In response to these multiple sources of vulnerability, the Karrayyu pastoral groups have started to use their agency and take up farming as a strategy in order to deal with these vulnerabilities. Initially they pursued farming as a strategy by locating their farms adjacent to the sugar cane and fruit plantations where water is used for irrigation. They have used peaceful and less peaceful mechanisms, ranging from simply benefiting from the extra water that they get from the plantation, to damaging the infrastructure overnight and diverting the water to their own fields. Thus, they use their power to manipulate the imposed structures that render them vulnerable. This is in line with what Scott labelled 'weapons of the weak' (1985). Recently the involvement of the Karrayyu pastoralists in farming activities has increased with the arrival of the new irrigation scheme by the Oromiya regional state.[62]

However, the taking up of farming as an active response to the changing socio-cultural situation is not uniform among all Karrayyu pastoralists. It is also necessary to ask who is actively participating in the farming enterprise in the pastoral villages as there are varied reactions to the new irrigation scheme. Not all pastoralists have reacted positively towards the intervention, depending on the number of livestock they possess and the meaning they attach to the resources on the land. In the words of one of my informants in a pastoral village in Illala, who owns more than thirty camels:

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[62] The Fentalle Irrigation Scheme was a pilot scheme for the development of later schemes and programmes. It is now held up by the government as a flagship of good development. The Fentale Irrigation Scheme has led to the resettlement of 4,500 Karrayyu pastoralist households out of an anticipated 22,000.

> I am praying to Waqqaa so that he breaks the 'legs' of the tractors…they are tilling the land on which the acacia trees used to grow….they are cutting out the trees on which our camels browse….They brought the water to our villages and now they want us to put all our livestock aside and start farming. This is impossible! (Field note in Illala Village, 2010).

For those pastoralists who own significant numbers of livestock and who wish to follow the traditional mechanisms of dealing with vulnerability, the increased push by officials[63] towards farming through distribution of land in the pastoral villages is a further annihilation of their pastoral spaces of adaptation.

Benefit-sharing arrangements

One of the new institutional arrangements for accessing resources that I observed in my study areas is an arrangement in which profits are shared equally between someone who rents out land for mutual purposes and an individual willing to commit himself to a sharecropping agreement. The Karrayyu with a parcel of land rents it to someone with money and oxen. The person who leases the land prepares the plot for farming by putting up resources in addition to the oxen and labour. In many cases, the person who rents the land prefers to produce cash crops such as onion, watermelon and tomatoes that can easily be marketed. Both parties share the benefits after all the costs incurred have been deducted as expenses. However, the Karrayyu pastoralists do not like such arrangements, as the second party may deliberately exaggerate their investment costs. Nevertheless, in the process of interaction with other farmers, the Karrayyu have developed a profit-sharing arrangement in which they hire a farmer who works on their land, rather than renting out the land completely. This arrangement saves the Karrayyu from the risk of not getting the proper profit from their land, as in the kind of arrangement where they rent out the land to someone who invests on the land. My informant in Giddarra village, Jillo Hawas, described the arrangement for me as follows:

[63] Here, it is important to note that not all government officials give full support to the conversion of range land to farming land by introducing the irrigation scheme in the Woreda. Informal personal communications by certain officials revealed that in view of the nature of the soil in the area and the skills of the Karrayyu, the irrigation scheme should have been based on a 'livestock major crop minor' principle. They also argue for the planting of fodder rather than cash crops in order to improve the soil in the area. In the current conditions, they argue that politics have been prioritised over sustainability of the project.

> There are people who are interested in farming on my land because I have farm land which is near to the irrigation canal and not far from the tarmac road. So, there is no need for me to be in a hurry and rent out my land to the clever urban dwellers. They always exaggerate their costs and expenses for fertiliser and many other things... I have learned from that and I am doing it the other way around. I came to know an Ittu farmer who knows what to grow when and is good at identifying the weeds that affect the crops. So, I provided him with what he needed and he works on the farm. Then, after the harvest is sold, I take out all my expenses and then we share equally what is left as profit. There is no chance to deceive because we know each other very well and farming is not only this year…I also need this very good farmer next year. We don't want to lose trust. (Interview with Jillo Hawas, March 2010).

However, one of the challenges that the Karrayyu land owners mention is the problem of initial capital to cover all the costs of farming so as to get a better result. Sometimes they may not be able to satisfy the demands that come from the knowledgeable farmers who ask them to provide them with specific inputs at a specific time. In the absence of sufficient capital they jeopardise the outcome of the harvest.

Conclusion

This article has explored the new forms of accessing scarce resources that came with the changes in structural forces in Karrayyu pastoral community of Upper Awash valley. In response to the changing social and environmental factors, the Karrayyu pastoralists actively experiment on and introduce new forms of managing the scarce resources and thereby exercising their agency that goes beyond the structural constraints that they have been confronted with. As has been explained above, this process has also prompted some pastoralists to fence land for a grazing purpose that is entirely new to the Karrayyu community. In a nutshell, in the face of structural sources of vulnerability, where the customary pastoral institutions become almost non-functional, Karrayyu individuals have been obliged to adjust their livelihood practices and take-up new strategies to secure access to critical resources. With the rapid re-orientation of livelihoods, an important aspect in which Karrayyu pastoralists have tried to increase the mechanisms of access to scarce resources is through the emergence of hybrid institutions.

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Ghanaian 'green-degree' graduates returning from Germany and their impact on environmental development in Ghana

Julia Boger[64]

Abstract

This paper deals with international student migration of Ghanaians and the notion that it has positive effects on the development of the source country. Ghanaians study in Germany and specialise in subjects related to the environment and resource protection. Usually, migration studies on highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans deal with out-migration. It is said that this out-migration causes a permanent loss, a 'brain-drain'. The cases presented in this paper show the contrary. They show that migrants who go abroad in order to pursue their studies are likely to return and to contribute to the sustainable development in emerging fields such as ecology. The premise for this positive notion on the migration-development nexus is that the home country's formal labour market offers employment for graduates who return. In this case, returning graduates can reinvest their enhanced knowledge in Ghana's labour market. This knowledge transfer helps returning graduates impact society at different levels: they implement environmental policies (micro-level); they build institutional capacities (meso-level) and influence policy-making processes that shape environmental governance (macro-level). By presenting empirical data from fieldwork in Ghana, this paper clearly demonstrates that returning graduates from Germany achieve the strongest impact at the meso-level in capacity building. The analysis of qualitative interviews shows that this kind of 'brain-circulation' creates positive effects and return migration becomes a 'brain-gain'.

Keywords: migration and development, return migration, green economy, Ghana.

Introduction

Policy-related research and debates argue that highly skilled migrants from economically undeveloped countries can foster sustainable development in their countries of origin if they are able to apply their knowledge. However, the circumstances under which they can contribute to their home countries' development are still not

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clear. The general question of how migration influences development processes has created a vast research field labelled as the "migration and development-nexus" (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Faist 2008; Nieswand 2011). Since the 1950s, one discussion thread led to controversial viewpoints: this controversy concerned the impact of return migration on development. Scholars advocating the positive notion of return migration perceived highly skilled migrants as potential "agents of change" who can contribute to development upon their voluntary return:[65]

> According to dominant views of the 1950s and 1960s in development theory, return migrants were seen as important agents of change and innovation. It was expected that migrants not only bring back money, but also new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial attitudes. In this way, migrants were expected to play positive role [sic!] in development and contribute to the accelerated spatial diffusion of modernization in developing countries (de Haas 2010: 5).

However, this optimistic view on return migration contributing to development seems not to apply equally to every region in the world. For instance, whereas return migration has become a success for many Asian countries, the opposite seems to be the case for Sub-Saharan African nations. Only a few of their highly skilled workforces who go overseas ever return, because the obstacles are too manifold[66] and the risk of suffering from 'brain-waste' is too high for them[67]. Their investment in higher education is wasted because they cannot fully apply what they have learned due to political restrictions in their home countries and because career prospects in most Sub-

[65] Today, European and United States (U.S.) governments are increasingly utilizing these estimated positive effects of voluntary return migration. The growing number of policy documents on this topic reflects this increase in interest (Black et al. 2004; BAMF 2006; EMN 2007; Schneider and Kreienbrink 2010; IOM 2010; Black et al. 2011; Kovács et al. 2012).

[66] Many Africans who have migrated abroad have a strong return-oriented rhetoric but ultimately are reluctant to return to their countries of origin. Tsagué (2009: 21) explains the reasons for this with the example of Cameroon. Most Cameroonians fear returning because they expect to have difficulties in the scarce formal labour market. They also know that the endemic corruption causes serious problems in everyday life and that they would lack the kind of infrastructure they enjoy abroad (permanent access to electricity and water supply, healthcare).

[67] In particular, highly skilled African migrants risk wasting their brains either abroad or in their home countries. If they remain abroad, they often only access low-paid employment (for the case of Kenyans abroad see Oyelere 2007). In addition, their potential remains unused if they return and have to work outside their fields of studies.

Saharan African countries are far from being attractive. Despite promising growth rates of many countries' GDPs and their extraordinary wealth of natural resources, governments have failed to transform this economic development into income generating decent employment creation. Today, formal labour markets in most Sub-Saharan African countries still are extremely narrow:

> Formal employment is limited to about 10 per cent of the labour force, with most workers eking out a living in survivalist-oriented activities in the smallholder or subsistence agricultural sector and in the urban informal economy, both characterized by low productivity, low incomes and low protection. Moreover, little progress has been made in shifting the reliance of African economic growth away from agriculture and resource extraction towards manufacturing and other more dynamic and knowledge-intensive activities in the service sector (ILO 2007: 31).

Thus, highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans rather see emigration as a way out of poverty and since the 1980s, many nations have lost their brightest heads permanently.[68] A 'brain-drain' occurs and the model of agent-related self-help within the migration-development model seems to have failed to meet the high expectations. Nevertheless, scholars such as Patterson (2007; 2008) have a vision that more "strategic" approaches could make return migration become a tool that stimulates a 'brain-circulation' in a very specific knowledge field by which Sub-Saharan African nations finally could become world leaders:

> (…) African governments can encourage and facilitate graduates of engineering and life science undergraduate programmes at home to seek graduate education in those fields in the United States and other Western countries throughout the next decade to be in a position to help pioneer and early adopt the ecological economy possibly just over the horizon. If Africans were to do this strategically and successfully, they would be establishing systematic brain circulation similar to what some Asian transnational groups have done around the digital knowledge economy (Patterson 2007: 146).

[68] For instance, in Ghana the large amount of out-migration of highly skilled workers has created large gaps of trained personnel in the health care sector (Nyonator and Dovlo 2005).

Though the aspect of knowledge-transfer as a tool for development is not new, Patterson mentions this knowledge-transfer within an important and innovative specific field: that of ecological protection. Today, especially the poorest countries in the global South suffer the most from the negative side effects of industrialisation in the global North. Therefore, a global agenda was started to at least limit these negative effects and at the same time continue with economic growth: this agenda is also known as 'green economy' (UNEP 2011). By applying this agenda of a green economy, Sub-Saharan African governments will also have to shift towards exploring the opportunities of renewable energies. This shift towards a technology-intensive economy will also increase the local labour market's demand for highly skilled workforces. This specific demand, argues Patterson (2011), could motivate highly skilled Africans in the diaspora to return and contribute to this specific development. Their transferred knowledge would lead to a similar rapid development as has been seen in many Asian countries, like India, China, Taiwan, and Korea. These nations have become front-runners in specific knowledge-based technologies, like information and communication technologies (ICTs), thanks to their students who first went abroad and then returned with enhanced knowledge, which they then transferred to their home countries' economies.[69]

In this paper, I argue that this positive vision of voluntary return migration based on a paradigm shift towards a more ecologically economic development is already underway. My argumentation is based on empirical data deriving from qualitative interviews with Ghanaians who graduated from environmental programmes in Germany and returned to Ghana to work as employees. The analysis shows that in the case of Ghana two important premises apply: first, the graduates have a professional profile focussing on environmental subjects and second, Ghana enforces environmental activities on a policy level. For a better understanding of the country case, the paper first introduces the debate on contemporary return migration to Ghana. Next, I outline Ghana's promotion of a green economy. Then, the current generation of Ghanaian students in Germany and their focus on ecological subjects, the 'green-degrees', is portrayed. Thereafter, I present case studies of returned Ghanaians and their knowledge transfer into the Ghanaian labour market. I show that Ghanaian graduates apply their environmental knowledge on three

[69] Saxenian (2005) presented the case of Indian and Chinese software developers who had previously worked in Silicon Valley and then returned to their home countries' economies. Similarly, for the case of China, Zweig (2006) showed how Chinese graduates returned successfully after their studies abroad. Recently, Pham (2010) investigated the country case Vietnam and its returning diaspora.

different levels: the micro, meso and macro-levels. Several factors that hinder their knowledge transfer are also presented. Finally, I reflect these empirical findings in light of the migration and development nexus. This summary leads to the conclusion that return migration in this specific knowledge field has positive effects. However, it can only unfold its full potential if governments and especially people working for the government welcome the returned migrants and also implement the urgently needed ecological paradigm shift.

Studies on return migration to Ghana in the context of development

Return migration to Ghana has increased during the last decade.[70] Especially Ghanaians living in the global North are returning more often.[71] This return trend primarily concerns the young generation of highly skilled (Anarfi et al. 2005: 206) who pursue their second degree outside Ghana. They are in contrast to those migrants in who went abroad during the phase of the large-scale exodus in the 1980s and who remained in their host countries (Arthur 2008; Nieswand 2011). Today's young Ghanaian migrants living abroad of working age tend to return due to the fact that conditions in their home country have improved and hence, they find economic opportunities and political freedom, which in general encourages return migration, state Anarfi and Jagare (2005: 6).[72] In brief, returning to Ghana has become an attractive opportunity especially for the highly skilled:

[70] IOM (Quartey 2009: 58) presents an overview on the different estimations that range between 1 million to 3 million Ghanaians living abroad (overseas and on the African continent).

[71] The proportion of Ghanaians among persons who arrived in Ghana steadily increased from 18.6 to 34.6 per cent during the period from 2000 to 2007 (Quartey 2009: 13).

[72] First, Ghana's economy and political stability has improved (Elischer 2009). Second, the recent start of off-shore oil and gas exploitation has raised high hopes for further economic growth (Breisinger et al. 2009; Egyir 2012). Third, the Ghanaian government explicitly offered incentives to the diaspora to return and to contribute to Ghana's development (Kleist 2011: 10). One of the main events was the Ghanaian Home Coming Summit launched by the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2001. It was the first conference for Ghanaians living abroad (Manuh and Asante 2005: 298). The summit appealed to those living abroad to return and to invest in their home country. They were promised adequate investment opportunities and that they could benefit from dual citizenship (Quartey 2009: 16; Adepoju 2008: 36). However, in the midst of the latest economic crises, late president Attah Mills was reluctant to encourage diasporas to return because this would have created high pressure on the formal labour market (CNN 2009).

> As these transnational migrants return home, it is argued that they can facilitate the transfer of the critical financial and human capital the developing world needs. Thus high skill migration is a vital part of that game, a joint venture from which both source and receiving countries and even the migrants themselves have the potential to gain, thus creating a 'triple win' situation to the benefit of everyone and for development and poverty reduction (Awumbila 2008: 57).

The increase of this return trend and the question how these transnational migration flows contribute to Ghana's development also attracted scientists' attention. One of the larger projects that was carried out to investigate this field of return migration to Ghana was the 'Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa' (Transrede)[73] project funded by the UK Department for International Development through its Globalisation and Poverty programmes. Thanks to this project, a number of studies investigated migration from and to Ghana. Many of these studies had a comparative design and compared the situation of Ghanaian return migrants to that of Côte d'Ivoirian (Black et al. 2003a; Tiemoko 2003a; Tiemoko 2003b; Tiemoko 2005; Black and Castaldo 2009, Ammassari 2009).

The majority of these studies identified entrepreneurs as prime agents of change having foremost an economic impact upon return. They contribute to the development of their countries by investing their savings in infrastructure and by starting their businesses, which in turn creates job opportunities for the population. Interestingly, only a minority of empirical studies have touched on the role of employees and their more intangible and social contributions to development upon return (Martin 2005; Taylor 2009; Bochmann et al. 2008; Olivier 2011). This is surprising, because the majority of returning migrants from Germany to Ghana ultimately become employees (cf. Tiemoko 2005: 193). They lack sufficient financial capital. Achieving this financial capital is often difficult, especially for foreign students in Germany. This has to do with the German language barrier; with the particular regulations of labour law and with the bureaucratic hurdles

[73] Transrede is a collaborative effort by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR) at the University of Sussex, the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquée (ENSEA), Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and the Institute for Social, Statistical and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana.

that students have to clear to obtain an official work permit after graduation.[74]

Due to these obstacles, student migrants lack unfettered access to their host country's formal labour market and often end up in low-paid jobs. In consequence, this leads to a devaluation of their education and degrees (Elwert and Elwert 2011). Thus, very few students in Germany accumulate enough savings to set up their business upon return. Therefore, it seems quite natural that most Ghanaians who return as graduates from Germany seek for employment opportunities at first.[75] Being employees instead of employers, these returned graduates can become drivers of change, too. For instance, Ammassari (2009) concludes in her empirical study 'the most important contributions reported by returnees were those in the workplace. This consisted of the introduction of new knowledge, skills and ideas and execution of some critical changes and reforms' (2009: 292). To underline her findings she presents practical examples of employees 'in the fields of research and teaching, administration and audit, marketing and human resources, banking and brokerage, environment and forestry, telecommunications and information technology' (2009: 263-264). Ammassari points out that "change initiatives in the workplace mostly hinge on whether returnees have enough responsibility, authority and power and enough time to get established in such top positions" (2009: 293).[76] In addition, Arthur (2008) specifies this impact-level approach. He finds that returned graduates have most impact on development

[74] Regarding student migration, initially foreign students in Germany could work 90 days annually. After graduation, they had to depart immediately (DAAD 2012: 2). The German government has eased this legal regulation since 2005. Today, graduates may apply for a visa after their studies that allows them to search for work for 18 months. Nevertheless, very few foreign graduates use this opportunity. The reasons for this are that they simply do not know of this regulation, cannot speak German fluently enough to secure qualified jobs, or have problems finding an adequate workplace (Sykes and Chaoimh 2012: 51).

[75] Evidence for this assumption is given by the fact that the interviews of the present study mentioned, that they would have preferred to start their business, but lacked capital. After having worked for some time and accumulated sufficient amounts of financial resources, some of the interviewed migrants had become self-employed.

[76] A very prominent example in the field of medical care is Ghana's 'heart man': Prof. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng, the founder of the Cardio Centre of the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra, who went to Germany in 1978 to study cardiothoracic surgery and who returned in 1992. In 2006, he went into politics. Recently, African students in Ohio, United States elected him as "African hero" (Tsikata 2012). Prof. Frimpong-Boateng promotes the use of 'green' friendly fuels in Ghana, producing bio-diesel on a small scale in the process to run vehicles (Sey 2010).

issues on the micro-level, whereas the positive effects on the national, the macro-level, are 'yet to be felt':

> 'Though they are utilizing their human capital skills (acquired abroad working in diverse capacities as engineers, pharmacists, doctors, and business entrepreneurs), the collective impact of these contributions at the national level has yet to have any significant measurable impact on the society at-large [sic]' (Arthur 2008: 155).

Both positions, Ammassari's and Arthur's, confirm that returning migrants can stimulate development processes as employees. As such, they can introduce innovations on different levels. However, one has to see if the graduates' profiles fit the particular labour market demand. Because, as Awumbila (2008: 58) correctly states, the returning migrants 'are unlikely to be the key factor in the development of their homeland, but they can play significant roles (…) and can be playing a complementary role rather than the key role in transforming an economies'. However, this kind of complementary development in is only possible if the graduates find work at all. In this regards, the recent generation of Ghanaians who studied in Germany and returned does quite well. Their educational profile matches the emerging 'green economy's' demand and hence they land jobs in the field of environmental protection and renewable energies. In addition, to facilitate their return financially, the German government even runs specific reintegration programmes, which in particular have the goal to contribute to development processes.[77]

[77] In Germany, the two major programmes are the Returning Expert Programme (REP) and the Reintegrationprogramme (RE). The REP already exists since the 1980ies. Today, it is run on behalf of the Centre of International Migration and Development (CIM). CIM is a cooperation between the German International Cooperation (GIZ) GmbH and the International Job Placement Service (ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA). Another long-term partner in the REP is the World University Service (WUS e.V.). WUS, an association working on the human right to education in Germany since 1950, designed the part of the workplace equipment subsidy in the 1990ies. WUS carries out this part on behalf of CIM (Laaser 2007: 345). See for more information about the programme and its combinable parts: www.returning-expert.de and www.wusgermany.de. The Protestant Association Church Development Service (EED) carries out the RE-Programme, which focuses on job-placing graduates in civil society organisations (see Sevegnani and Schuh 2010: 6). For more detail please read the homepage: www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de.

Towards sustainable development in Ghana

Since independence, Ghana's government has gradually integrated aspects of environmental protection into its development policies.[78] In 2012, shortly after Rio+20, Ghana mainstreamed the concept of a 'green economy' (UNEP 2011) into national development as an important tool to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (GNA 2012). This official step is an important signal. It shows that protection of the environment has become an urgent global task and that Ghana's government has accepted the challenge to fight for a better environment. However, it has taken a long time for this concept to reach this level of awareness. In 1972, the United Nations (UN) globally launched the concept of sustainable development.[79]

[78] Ghana's development agenda after independence in 1957 at first mainly targeted economic growth. The first governmental strategy was the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983. It was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whereas this programme stabilised economic growth, it soon created severe environmental problems caused by overexploitation of natural resources and pollution. In 1994 therefore, as a long-term approach, Ghana's Vision 2020 was promoted to target Ghana's development in the period from 1996-2000. This vision merely focussed economic stability and it underrepresented the environment. Moreover, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) was launched in 2001. This strategy targeted development projects during the period 2003-2005. It followed the concept of the Agenda 21 and was in line with National Strategies for Sustainable Development (NSSD). Whereas GPRS I focused mainly on poverty reduction, the following strategy, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), emphasised growth-inducing policies. This strategy was launched in 2006 and implemented in the period from 2006-2010. It integrated all three pillars of sustainable development in Ghana (economic, social, and environmental development) for the first time. Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) were involved and thus environmental components mainstreamed in sector strategies of the GPRS II (Rai 2008). Finally, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) succeeded the GPRS II in 2010.

[79] The global call for environmental protection started in 1972, when the UN organised the first conference on environment and development, the UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. In 1983, the UN set up the World Commission on Environment and Development, headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a former Prime Minister of Norway. Four years later, in 1987, the Commission published a report, 'Our common future', synonymously called the 'Brundtland Report'. This report recommended creating synergies between economy and ecology and called on governments to take responsibility for environmental damage and to monitor the policies that cause the damage. What followed was the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This conference was the Earth Summit or Rio 92. One of its main results was the final report, the AGENDA 21. This report was also described as a blueprint for sound development into the 21st Century. About ten years later, in 2002, a review conference was held in Johannesburg, South Africa to evaluate gains made since AGENDA 21, and in 2012 Rio+20 discussed current achievements. This latest conference strongly promoted the green economy concept (Awuku Apaw 2012).

The aim was to foster sustainable development to ensure that economic growth respects human rights and environmental protection; and that these measures become parts of the nations' agendas (Koessler 1998: 178). Recently, in 2008, the UN launched the concept of a green economy to strengthen synergies between economy and environmental protection. Whereas the economy previously considered environmental protection measures to be 'uneconomic,' this new concept highlights environmental protection as economically viable. This paradigm-shift (UNEM 2011: 153) targets three major goals. First, in order to prevent an increase in global warming, carbon emissions must be reduced. Second, natural resources should be used efficiently and renewable energies must be promoted to prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. Third, growth and employment should be socially inclusive (UNEP 2011: 16).

The reasons for Ghana adopting the concept of green economy are manifold. On the one hand, a rapidly growing population[80] demands better economic prospects and on the other hand, these economic activities increase the country's environmental problems. In 2011, Ghana's economy was booming[81] because its oil production was attracting many investors. Ghana even achieved an upgrade from a low-income to lower middle-income country, according to World Bank country classifications (WB 2011). Despite this upgrade, about 40 per cent of Ghanaians still do not have access to safe and potable water but have to rely on natural sources of water, including unprotected wells, lakes and rivers (NDPC 2010: 71), and only 14 per cent of Ghanaians have access to improved sanitation (Yirenya-Tawiah and Tweneboah Lawson 2012). Many open waters are polluted and unsafe due to illegal mining and the use of toxic chemicals like arsenic and cyanide to extract gold and other minerals from the soil. These chemicals are not disposed of in an environmentally friendly way, but simply drained to the rivers and lakes. In addition, a lack of modern sanitation and sewage systems is responsible for serious health problems in Ghana. Endemic illnesses like malaria, cholera, and the incidence of guinea worm are attributed directly to poor quality of water and insufficient sanitation (van Roosbroeck and Amlalo 2006: 22-23). In addition, the oil and gas exploitation itself

[80] According to the latest results of the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) population and housing census, Ghana's population increased from 18.9 million in 2000 to 24.6 million in 2010. This translates into a 30.4 per cent increase within the decade (Adeniran 2012).

[81] Ghana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011, with real GDP growth of 14.4 percent made Ghana one of the fastest growing economies in the world (GSS 2012: 7).

causes pollution and can severely damage the environment for rural populations as has happened in neighbouring countries like Nigeria (Egyir 2012: 2). These examples show that economic growth often goes hand in hand with environmental degradation. Still, as Egyir (2009) found in his empirical survey, Ghanaian society is not yet aware enough of the environmental issues that will cause challenges in the future, like soil erosion, climate change, and deforestation. Thus, concepts that integrate economic activities into environmentally friendly technologies, as promoted by the green economy, are long overdue. The implementation of this concept would create more awareness, foster economic activities in an environmentally friendly way and create new employment opportunities. Such 'green-jobs'[82] (UNEP et al. 2008) are likely to emerge in technology-intensive fields. These are, for instance, renewable energies (solar, wind and hydropower, and waste-to-energy), construction, transportation and industries, emissions and pollutions mitigation and recycling. According to the optimistic calculations of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC 2012: 9), Ghana has the potential to create 169,570 decent new jobs in the areas of energy, construction, water, and agriculture within the next five years.[83] Because these jobs are technology-intense, they require specific skills from the workforce. However, Ghana's institutions still lack workforces that are prepared to carry out these activities (Egyir 2009: 30). The country lacks in-country experts in these fields, because Ghanaian universities have only very recently started to integrate these emerging subjects into their curricula[84] and their scholars have not yet graduated. Thus, before the introduction of these new subjects, students who were interested in these topics had to study abroad, for instance in Germany.

[82] According to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), a 'green-job' "reduces the environmental impacts of enterprises and economic sectors to sustainable levels, while providing decent work and living conditions to all those involved in production, and ensures workers' rights are respected" (ITUC 2012: 3).

[83] ITUC's figures based on high results, suggesting 2 per cent investment of GDP into the identified sectors.

[84] Ghanaian universities offer subjects like environmental engineering and, for instance, the University of Ghana recently launched the Institute for Environmental and Sanitation studies (ESS). Additionally, the private African University Communication College (AUCC) in Accra offers degrees that target green technologies (GNA 2011).

Ghanaian students and 'green-degree' programmes in Germany

During the investigation period (2000-2010), 789 Ghanaians graduated from German universities (HIS 2012).[85] A large part of this group had studied subjects related to the environment (Kubitschek 2008: 16). Germany has offered such 'green-degree' (Mutz n.d.) programmes[86] that focus on environmental resource management, tropical hydrogeology, engineering geology, environmental management, tropical forestry, waste, and recycling management since the late 1990s. Being a frontrunner for ecological policies and a pioneer in renewable energies[87], Germany particularly designed these courses for international students in developing countries in order to compete for the best talents with other European and U.S. universities. This introduction of English language degrees, as bachelor and master programmes, was 'a small revolution' (Kuptsch 2006: 45) because Germany formerly only offered degrees in the German language which took far longer, especially for foreign students due to difficulties in catching up with the German language. By 1999, about 425 programmes on ecological topics and resource management existed. The curricula of these programmes are often interdisciplinary and combine engineering with managerial subjects (Hennen 2001: 129). However, what do graduates of these programmes finally do for their profession, and more importantly, where do they start their careers?

[85] The total of Ghanaian students in Germany is relatively stable at around 250, but low compared to students from other African nations such as Cameroon with more than 5,000 students. Nevertheless, the figures for enrolment of Ghanaians in Germany show continuity: in the academic year 2000/2001, about 310 Ghanaians studied at German universities. There was an increase and the number almost doubled within only two years. The peak of this increase was in the academic term of 2002/2003, with 656 Ghanaian registered students in Germany. Soon the number declined again, ostensibly due to the German embassy having to increase the bureaucratic hurdles for obtaining a student visa as a result of the growing demand (Klebs 2004, Nieswand 2011: 412). Following this, in the academic year 2006/2007, about 309 Ghanaians studied in Germany. Since then, this figure has remained constant and in the academic year 2010/2011, about 280 Ghanaians studied in Germany (HIS 2012).

[86] Interestingly, until now there has been only little research interest on the outcome of these programmes. An exception is the study of the Centre for Development Studies (ZEF) in Bonn. The evaluation investigated the professional status of 65 graduates from African countries (Schraven et al. 2011).

[87] Ecological industrial policy started in 1961 with the implementation of environmental policies. Thanks to these policies (e.g. feed-in tariffs for renewable energy or environmental taxation), Germany became a driver of innovation and developed 'pioneer markets' such as the high-tech intensive renewable energies (Schepelmann et al. 2012: 11).

Regarding the question of how many graduates finally return to Ghana, it must be said that it is still impossible to track the number of outgoing graduates on a large scale (Baraulina et al. 2008: 31). In Germany, the Federal Statistical Office *(Statistisches Bundesamt, StBA)* offers statistics from the Central Register of Foreigners *(Ausländerzentralregister)* that include the figures for outgoing Ghanaians in general. According to these statistics, 3,436 Ghanaians left Germany during the 2005-2010 (StBA 2005-2010). However, this statistic does not distinguish between the categories of migrants. Thus, it includes the short-term visitor who leaves Germany after being on vacation to see relatives abroad as well as those who leave Germany after their studies. In addition, this statistic does not reveal the country of destination. This means it also includes those Ghanaian migrants who leave for the United Kingdom or the United States or any other country apart from Ghana. As a means of determining approximately how many graduates might leave to return to Ghana, however, the internal statistics of the Programme for Returning Experts (PRE)[88] provides figures that serve as rough estimates for returning graduates from transition and less developed countries. According to these estimates, 323 Ghanaians (who registered themselves voluntarily) returned from Germany directly to Ghana within the investigation period (2000-2010). This means that *at least* about 41 per cent of the number of graduates (789) returned straight to Ghana within this time, not including a) unreported cases and b) those that left Germany for Ghana via the U.K. or another transit country.

The reasons for leaving Germany are various. Common push-factors are that Ghanaian students do not see realistic professional prospects forthcoming, are not well integrated in Germany,[89] experience racism, face language barriers, fear restrictive visa-regulations and lack employment opportunities (Kubitschek 2008: 54-55). Pull-factors why they explicitly return to their home country are emotional obligations in Ghana because they have family and kin (Tonah 2007) and, more interestingly, the urge to ‘develop’ the country. This aspect that Ghanaian graduates have a ‘strong notion

[88] Internal statistics retrieved via www.zav-reintegration.de. This figure represents all persons who registered themselves voluntarily as returning. Included are only those who left Germany and went directly to Ghana. This means that those who went via the UK to work or visit family members first are not captured in this statistic.

[89] Evidence for this finding is that Ghanaian students are underrepresented in Ghanaian diaspora associations: whereas in the 1980s Ghanaian students were very active and established various student, church and regional associations in almost all big cities in Germany (Tonah 2007: 12; Nieswand 2011: 415), today these associations lack students (Appiah 2011).

for the development of Ghana' (Kubitschek 2008: 17) has been highlighted in many studies about return migration to Ghana and it has been reported, that the interviewees repeated this statement almost like a 'mantra' (Bochmann et al. 2008: 40). Similarly, Ammassari (2009: 291) found that Ghanaians were very conscious of their role as potential agents for development. Even so, if they return, are they in a position to apply their knowledge on environmental protection? To answer this question, the next section introduces research findings about the professional whereabouts of Ghanaian graduates who have returned and started working in Ghana.

Returning Ghanaians and their professional profiles

This section reflects the findings from qualitative analysis[90] of interviews[91] with twenty-nine Ghanaians who graduated from German universities and returned to Ghana within the investigation period (2000-2010). The sample size of twenty-nine reflects roughly 9 per cent of the overall number of those Ghanaians who definitely returned (323). The prime selection criteria were a) the return period, for which I choose the past decade 2000-2010 and b) their educational profile. The overview of their demographic profile shows that they returned in their best working age (table 1). The majority of graduates (55 per cent) was between 30-34; most men returned at this age (70 per cent) whereas the majority of the women (67 per cent) was slightly younger (25-29).

Table 1:

Age profile of Ghanaian returned graduates	men	in per cent	women	in per cent	TOTAL	in per cent
25-29	2	10	6	67	8	30
30-34	14	70	2	22	16	55
35-40	4	20	1	11	5	17
TOTAL	20	100	9	100	29	100

Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010.

Regarding their degrees (table 2), most (69 per cent) completed a master's degree, 14 per cent obtained their MBA and 17 per cent

[90] Using a primarily qualitative approach is in contrast to most empirical studies on return migration that prefer quantitative surveys with larger sample sizes. The Transrede project used a sample size of 302 (Black et al. 2003) and the MIREM Project on return migration to the Maghreb used an even bigger sample size of 992 return migrants (Cassarino 2008).

[91] I conducted problem-centred interviews (PCI) based on Witzel (2000). These combine longer narrative sequences with guided, topic-specific questions.

their PhDs. Only slightly more women completed their MBAs (33 per cent) in comparison to the men (5 per cent) and fewer women obtained their PhDs (11 per cent / 20 per cent).

Table 2:

Degree in Germany	men	in per cent	women	in per cent	Total	in per cent
Master of Science (MSc.)	15	75	5	56	20	69
Master of Business Administration (MBA)	1	5	3	33	4	14
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)	4	20	1	11	5	17
	20	100	9	100	29	100

Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010.

These post-graduate degrees have an average study period of three years. However, the majority stayed in Germany (table 3) between three to four years (69 per cent). Women stayed slightly shorter, only one to two years (67 per cent) than their male fellows. Only two men studied longer than this time and one person stayed in Germany for 15, because he was able to find formal employment in his field of study (IT) following his graduation.[92]

Table 3:

Duration of stay in Germany	men	in per cent	women	in per cent	Total	in per cent
1-2	1	5	6	67	7	24
3-4	17	85	3	33	20	69
5-10	1	5	0	0	1	3
Over 10	1	5	0	0	1	3
	20	100	9	100	29	100

Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010.

Because the interviewees were pursuing post-graduate degrees, they had already completed their first degrees in subjects like geography, geological engineering, agricultural engineering, and

[92] This IT-graduate was a contrastive case. In every respect this profile differed to the others regarding duration of stay, subject and professional reintegration upon return. It showed that the long duration in Germany and even formal work experience were no assets to professional entry.

classic civic engineering. Both men and women had limited formal work experience. As first-degree graduates, they had already completed their National Service[93] in Ghana or had worked in temporary projects. Regarding their subjects in Germany, they concentrated (Fig. 1) on 'green-degree' programmes.




Fig. 1: subjects of studies of interviewed Ghanaian graduates

The subjects which Ghanaians in the sample preferred most were general resource management (31 per cent) and hydro engineering (28 per cent), followed by 14 per cent who concentrated on forestry in tropics and subtropics. Only 7 per cent enrolled for the classic domain of engineering, agriculture, and development management. One person (3 per cent) graduated from sciences (chemistry) and one (3 per cent) from information technology (IT). It is now of interest to find out how these graduates applied their expertise in their occupations upon their return to Ghana.

[93] A military decree (N. R. C. D 208) established the Ghana National Service Scheme in 1973. It had the mandate to mobilise and deploy Ghanaian citizens aged 18 years and above. Since 1982, the duration of service was extended from one to two years. The scheme, since its inception, has become the institutional option for Ghanaian youth, especially tertiary education graduates, to exercise their civic responsibility towards the state (GNSS 2011).

Environmental knowledge transfers

As indicated earlier, educational migrants can contribute to their countries' development if their profiles match the labour market demand in specific fields of expertise. As previously cited, Ammassari and Arthur argue that the impact of their knowledge transfer strongly depends on the level at which migrants transfer this knowledge. I will now investigate whether this argument also applies to the example of the interviewed migrants, who graduated and have returned from Germany. Regarding their occupation, all secured formal employment in the tertiary sector, the services.[94] Within the services sector they work in different industries (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2: employing industries of interviewed returning Ghanaians

The majority of 34 per cent finds employment in local consultancy firms (including non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). Two equal parts (28 per cent) work in higher education and in the public service. Only three (10 per cent) start their career in international

[94] In 2010, the contributions of the three economic sectors to the Ghanaian GDP were agriculture (25.6 per cent), industry (25.9 per cent), and services (48.5 per cent) (GSS 2012: 5).

organisations.[95] Now, I will show how the respondents transfer their environmental knowledge on three levels (Fig. 3).[96]




Fig. 3: levels of occupational knowledge transfer

The figure shows three levels and their impact spheres: first, at the micro-level, the interviewees implement their knowledge that positively affects life in rural communities. Second, at the meso-level, the graduates are building in-country capacities, thereby strengthening the country's institutions that will profit on a long term from this measure. Third and finally, graduates at the macro-level are directly involved in designing environmental policies and thus have an impact on society at large.

Implementing water and sanitation policies

Ghanaians who graduate from the fields of hydro engineering are experts on sanitation, water, and wastewater management. Their expertise precisely meets the demands of many local consultancies that carry out current governmental policies (GPRSII) to improve access to safe water and sanitation in rural and urban areas. Today, these local consultancies and NGOs are important players in the water and sanitation sector (Yirenya-Tawiah and Tweneboah Lawson 2012). In consequence, they offer employment for the returning graduates. A master's degree holder of Water Resources

[95] Consequently, I only chose examples from the first three employment categories: government, higher education, and consultancies.

[96] These levels of course may overlap: lecturers at universities also implement government curricula on environmental protection; workers in consultancies also create awareness in rural communities when they implement new technologies. Remembering the fact that the interviewed Ghanaians primarily studied the two subjects hydro and resource engineering (see fig. 1), the following examples concentrate on cases that show how their knowledge was applied in these two industries.

Engineering and Management (WAREM) from the University of Stuttgart, Mr. L., describes[97] his work in the communities:

> For one year we have to be with the community. We go there to check the facility whether it is the way we want it to run, we look at the test, also check the quality of the water; look at the facility whether it is stable and we do recommendation for one year. We call something defective liability that is if something goes wrong according to the construction, the contractor would have to do it at his own cost. I will also go there to record any facility which is not good, come back write a letter to him that this one is not good, go and change it and he will go and do it at his own cost. After one year when everything is okay he hands over everything and I also leave.

L's work in the communities is time-consuming and intense. He carries out many technical steps and acts directly at the implementation level. His tasks include feasibility studies ("check the facility"), water quality tests ('check the quality of the water') and monitoring of the construction ('look at the facility whether it is stable'). The results of L's work are very tangible. It makes live of local community population easier and healthier. They have less problems accessing clean potable water, which reduces improves their life quality:

> Like, where I went to from Monday, you pass through villages, and you see a lot of them [people] carrying water from streams. If money is available all this [these, J.B.] people should be given boreholes with water (…) but there is no money, so the people are left to fetch from those streams anything (…) when I design, we do construction, the first time you open the tap, they get water, they start shouting: 'eeehh'. At least you have solved some problem. Since I came I have done quite a lot, I have done about 10 designs and everybody is getting water out of it (…) Somebody helped us somewhere and we are also helping.

This quote shows how L's technical expertise enables him to "design" and to do "constructions" in the broad field of hydro engineering. Working in an employing structure that is empowered to implement

[97] All interviews are anonymous and extracts are from transcribed interviews. To facilitate reading, I have slightly modified the spelling of the spoken language.

governmental policies on sanitation, he finally is able to improve the living conditions for many community members. He thus has an impact on development processes on the micro-level.

Environmental awareness and capacity building

Today, Ghana's government is calling for more awareness in society concerning environmental issues and seeking to build in-country capacities. Graduates who studied 'green-degree' programmes in Germany and later multiply their knowledge in institutions of higher education, universities and polytechnics, contribute towards this demand. Their professional integration in this sector is likely because careers in the educational segment are attractive. 'A university position' as Neubert (2008: 100) outlines, 'has a good reputation and offers good chances for consultancy work to add to the salary' and might even become a 'stepping stone' for top jobs in the government or in international organisations. In addition, the demand for qualified lecturers in Ghana is high. The country faces an immense shortage of qualified academic staff, secondary school teachers and researchers due to the vast outmigration of the highly skilled (Manuh et al. 2005). Therefore, graduates with a degree from abroad can fill this gap perfectly well. Such is the case of Mr. U., a master's degree holder from the University of Stuttgart in the field of Waste Water Management. After his return, U. first starts to work in a governmental consultancy and after two years, he applies at a polytechnic. From scratch, he gains the position of Head of Department in a polytechnic. When I ask him during the interview what he thought was the most important qualification to do the job as a head of department, U. mentions the degree in the first place:

> Yeah the qualification I got from Stuttgart of course it has been very helpful because to be a lecturer in a tertiary institution the minimum is a master's level and if you have a BSc. in a polytechnic you can be an instructor but your conditions of service are not good. Getting the master's degree had positioned me in a better place. In fact, there were other people who had been in the department before I came. But because they didn't have their master's even though they had a lot of experience in terms of "on the job" training, they are now in the background and I just came and I was made the HEAD of Department (…) it is because of the qualification, yes.

Despite his lack of teaching experience, the degree itself positioned U. professionally 'in a better place'. As a head of department, he is

also involved in the establishment of a new master's degree programme on waste management:

> There are some of the courses you can't get them here (…) there is no institution in Ghana that handles waste management and K-Poly is now trying to work on it. We are developing a curriculum, our dean went to Holland with the rector, and they went to (…) the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (HH) who is into this waste management/from Stuttgart we have the waste management aspect (…) So for such a course like this we need to train people at the MSc level; there is not any fair degree; we don't have technology, we don't have it. MSc – we don't have it but each course is run in Germany, water resources (...) so for such courses if you don't travel outside then you can't have it and if you don't have it there is no chance there is no way Ghana will have any education in that line.

It shows that U. is supposed to build up a curriculum based on the raw model of the courses he took in Germany. Finally, the results of this knowledge transfer have an impact at an institutional (meso-) level. This is because as soon as the curricula are designed, many more students gain education up to master's level. This new study programme will definitely generate more in-country experts and prevent further outmigration of young students. What is more, if 'green-degree' graduates return and become lecturers in higher education, they become role models. They not only teach but also fulfil societal commitments at an institutional (meso-) level, which creates broader awareness of the environment. This is because the higher education institutes in most African countries are obliged to "prove [their, J.B.] usefulness through development activities even without a research component" (Neubert 2008: 98). Mr. B., a graduate from the BTU Cottbus Environmental Resource Management (ERM) programme, describes the impact of his additional societal commitment for environmental capacity building:

> When I came home, because of the experience in Germany, I realised that the situation was very bad (…) And that is why I established with some other colleagues/we started a clean-up service.[98] We

[98] Today, the scope of this formerly locally acting clean up service has become more global and professionalised. The members successfully registered as an NGO, developed further links to their former German professors and returned graduates in

> organised the students, went to the hospitals and market areas, and planted trees. We also made educational campaigns to educate people on how to clean the environment. We organised forums, made some presentations and because of my teaching roles we were not able to do it more frequently. This is one thing that I have done for this particular region [in the Upper West] I had to develop these brochures because I think we had to move forward and advertise in the schools so that people will come (…) And I think that is my social responsibility help the nation to move forwards.

What is interesting is that the actions towards awareness creation are not part of his lecturing duties. B. must carry them out in his spare time. Still, using his formal role as a lecturer enables him to reach a broad audience: his students, his colleagues, and people at the hospitals and the markets. This is definitely a more significant field of influence than in contrast to those who simply impart their knowledge to an individual (e.g. to their own children). These examples show that the knowledge transfer of returning graduates from Germany who work as lecturers in higher education builds capacities in Ghana's institutions. They act as multipliers in passing on their specific knowledge at the (meso-) level.

Influencing environmental policies

The interviewees working in the public service are ambivalent about their impact opportunities. A very high level of knowledge transfer describes a resources engineer from the University of Karlsruhe, Ms. A. A. who starts working as a research assistant at the Ministry of Environment. There she is responsible for a section that advises the minister on environmental cooperation:

> I will give you a typical example like a letter from the German government wanting to establish ECOWAS climatic change research desk. The letter came and then normally what they will do (…) the minister will write letters 'let us go straight to them' so I will write a minute to them (…) I wrote a memo to the deputy minister saying that OK, reading what they want to establish, I think the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) can host this because they have research scientists on climatic change. It has

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Uganda and Nigeria. The NGO "Clean Africa" is online at http://www.cleanafrica.org/clean/.

> thirteen institutes so they can give enough people to do these things so the project should be and he agrees. What happens is, if he agrees with my suggestion, I go ahead and write a letter to the German government. But I don't sign. He will sign but I write a letter.

In this example, A. explains how much influence she has in the background ('he will sign but I write a letter'), due to her expert knowledge. She is even in a position to actively shape international cooperation on climate change ('establish ECOWAS climatic change research desk'). Her career, she explains, is the result of a course she completed in Germany:

> And more also another thing why they chose me (…) is the course I did in Germany (…) It is for policy makers, you know. It is for decision makers (…) And when I came here, it was also where I have to be from here. I make decisions.

Another case that shows how graduates with green-degrees apply their knowledge at the macro-level is the case of another BTU Cottbus graduate, Mr. M. He studied Environmental Resource Management (ERM) and wrote his master's thesis on environmental taxation. This thesis provided a model for Ghanaian future taxation schemes at the Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service:

> And then it happened that I had to do my master's thesis and I contacted my boss at IRS [Internal Revenue Service, JB.] and he said (...) we have this problem in Ghana how to tax environmental resources. So when I say environmental resources minerals for instance gold, bauxite, manganese and diamond, timber and all that (…) look at the German tax system and then how I can apply it to Ghana (...). My supervisor helped me to study the tax system, especially in the area of environmental resources. So I did that and then I used that as a model. If you look at my thesis, Germany is a model to what I did, So I looked at what Germany has done and did a similar thing. I then brought it back to them and they were so excited because they have not had that thing done before.

The example of M. shows that his specialisation fits the demand in a niche. By transferring this expertise and adapting the German model of environmental taxation to fit Ghana's context, he even influences

the government's budget.[99] In both cases, the profiles of the interviewees match the concrete demand of the governmental institution and – which must not be taken for granted – their superiors welcome them both. Therefore, they both are in a position to influence the decision-making process on environmental policies. Their knowledge transfer will have an impact for society at the macro-level. However, as I mentioned earlier in this section, other graduates face constraints and challenges that hinder them advancing their environmental knowledge.

Constraints on environmental knowledge transfer

Whereas the previous examples of academics who studied in Germany and returned to Ghana suggest that everyone finds a job easily and can adopt what she or he learned abroad, undoubtedly, reality proofs different. Not all graduates who study in Germany are in a position to become 'agents of change'. This, because many have to face serious challenges upon their return, which complicate and sometimes even totally block their knowledge transfer. Regarding the interviews, as well as taking evidence from previous studies on the topic of return migration to Ghana, I identified four main obstacles: first, finding work in the formal sector; second, receiving adequate payment; third, having the right equipment to work and fourth, being welcomed by employees and superiors.

Searching for a job after graduation has become already a difficult transition process for academics who can search in familiar surroundings. However, it becomes even more difficult if one moves to another country first. Than it is a double transitional process and requires patience[100] as Ms. C. explains:

> It is not easy with the job search in Ghana (.) but if you have the patience because something I realise that most people after just a year of frustration they leave to the US. Some people even go back to Germany, UK. BUT that's one difference, if you have

[99] The design of this taxation model would create a new source of income for the Ghanaian government. It is an 'economic instrument' (EI). Economic instruments like this require entities that cause environmental damage to pay taxes. This concerns foreign-based mining companies. Launching this type of taxation model in Ghana generates budgetary income and at the same time encourages foreign companies to capitalise on resources using environmentally friendly technologies (Kombat 2009: 26).

[100] Especially those who started in state universities complained that the recruitment procedures were too time-consuming. The shortest time from first interview to being on the pay roll was six months. In another case, it even took almost two years until the interviewee received his first salary.

> the patience and wait. At least you find something in Ghana, no matter what. You will find something to do. And not only something. If you have the patience, you will really land yourself on a good job. But you know when we come the frustration is there. You wanna work you wanna work and within three four five months nothing comes. Because you had the opportunity to go outside getting a visa to another country is not difficult. But you will still come back and where are you going to start from? It is better you stay in and HOOK yourself somewhere.

As Mrs. C. who studied Forest Ecosystem Management at the University of Freising mentions, it sometimes is so frustrating to return and to search for work unsuccessful in Ghana, that some people are tempted to leave the country again. What makes it so difficult to access the local labour market is work experience? Most employers require three to five years of qualified experience. The expert Dr. Bih, who has insights on the topic from his former experience as a job counsellor for returning graduates[101] therefore suggests that to overcome the issue of work experience one must be prepared to take up lower positions/lower-paying jobs (2008: 12). The difficulties in finding a well-paid job have even increased since 2008 because of the financial crisis. Since then, finding well-paid employment in the formal segment of Ghana's labour market soon after return has become even more challenging even for those who have a matching profile, confirms Dr. V. who did complete her doctorate in chemistry in Bremen:

> As for the for the financial crisis it is not improving it is even getting worst, hmmm, things are not - you know the way they SHOULD be (…) you have to adjust yourself and combine everything that is it - that is what SCARES a lot of these young people. Either they do not come back or they come and they go BACK. That is the problem. Because if I look at myself I compare it and I try to change it you see that in Euro it is nothing - it is virtually nothing - if I would be working in Euro I would have been earning MORE than THIS (…) I really don't want to compare because it doesn't make

[101] Since 1994, job counsellors who also studied in Germany have assisted fresh returns in finding jobs in the formal segment. The first job counsellors worked in the context of a migrant self-organisation, the "Rückkehreroffice" (Martin, 2005: 240). The organisation renamed itself the Ghanaian German Alumni-Network (GGAN) (Boger 2010). Today, the counsellor works as part of the German International Cooperation office (GIZ) in Accra.

> sense. It really doesn't make sense because it will not help you if I make this comparison so I say economic situation is not getting better (…) if you really want to LIVE, you know, STANDARD, elite STANDARD. Of course, you can afford all basic things that you need in life (...).

Low-payment can deter graduates to return, tells Mrs. V. Hence, in order to facilitate the financial transition into the home countries' labour markets, the German government established reintegration programmes, tailored for highly skilled migrants who voluntarily return to developing countries. These programmes provide job placement assistance, financial incentives for transportation and finally a salary top-up, and workplace equipment. The latter is a crucial factor that the graduates are able to apply what they learned abroad (Martin 2006: 123). Mr. M. who works for the government knows how difficult it is to apply his computer skills, if the equipment simply lacks:

> Then the other thing is that until I was assisted with some equipment it is sometimes disheartening when you have the knowledge and you have all the stuff and you cannot get the equipment to work then. Because if I cannot prepare PowerPoint, I cannot prepare attachments because we do not have Internet; if there are so many things, you wish you could do, I could not do because I lacked the equipment. Sometimes that is the disadvantage when it comes to my country. You have the knowledge but you do not have the equipment to work with (…) you have to beg somebody to type for you. You have to go and print it elsewhere. It was discouraging, despite [the fact that, J.B] I had the knowledge and I was back home, that side, I wasn't too happy.

Finally, the worst-case scenario is when graduates who return find an adequate position, are sponsored by one of the reintegration programmes and are still 'blocked' by their bosses. Again, former counsellor Dr. Bih recalls from his personal experience:

> (…) they [graduates, J.B.] come back with a higher qualification and others come apart with their bosses or sometimes will be even having a higher qualification than their bosses. Than instead of letting you in a way that the organisation will gain from the knowledge that you have got, they try to BLOCK you. Because they think if they let you in you will bypass

> them [laughs] (...) it is the mind-set of people: they think if you are at a higher position maybe through manipulating things they are able to get some things extra kind of things. So those positions become very enviable positions and they see that if I lose that position it means I am going to lose some of these benefits. So they want to secure [ensure, J.B.] that nobody will actually take it from them and by so doing they also block people who will come in with innovations and new ideas.

Unfortunately, especially those who work for the government have this experience of being 'blocked' more often. This is because, in contrast, the local consultancies highly depend on good workers but do not have secure monetary budgets. Therefore, they welcome the well-trained graduates who are willing to work for a small salary (topped up by a reintegration subsidy).

In sum, returning graduates can overcome most obstacles that hinder the knowledge transfer (finding a job; getting adequate payment and having the right equipment to work with) with the assistance of governmental reintegration programmes. However, the crucial problem of being 'blocked' by a superior (or sometimes colleagues) remains problematic. This is because, in Dr. Bih's terms, it concerns the 'mind-set' of the people, which cannot be easily influenced by external factors like a reintegration programme. In those cases, the only possible way out is to start searching for another work opportunity immediately.

Conclusion and outlook

This article supports the notion that knowledge transfer fosters development. In this regard, educational return migrants in particular act as 'drivers of change'. A specific trend that fosters sustainable environmental development is already underway in the case of Ghana. Ghanaian graduates who studied 'green-degree' programmes at German universities and found employment upon return forward their knowledge in their workplaces. Notwithstanding the relatively small number of Ghanaian graduates who have returned from Germany, the results of their knowledge transfers are far-reaching. Working in 'green-jobs', they contribute significantly to the Ghanaian government's ambitions to promote the emerging field of 'green economy'. This finding proves on an empirical basis what Patterson (2007, 2008, 2011) suggested applying strategically in his vision on how Sub-Saharan African countries could become the front-runners in ecological industries. What is more, the article provides in-depth information about the workplaces and systemises

this information. The results of this analysis indicate that Ammassari's (2009) and Arthur's (2008) conclusions are not far-reaching enough. Even though Ammassari made an important contribution in emphasising the contributions of returning migrants employed in their spheres of work, her findings could not explain why returning migrants had more or less impact in different segments of the labour market. Therefore, this analysis goes further and examines the categories and their specific labour market demand in which the graduates worked. This in-depth analysis makes clear that returning graduates have the strongest impact at the meso-level. Even though the same number of graduates worked in the implementing structures (consultancies and NGOs) because they play a key role in implementing governmental policies, the highest demand was in the educational sector. This is a very crucial finding because graduates who work as lecturers in the fields of higher education and research finally act as multipliers in passing on their specific knowledge. They build tomorrow's in-country capacities to tackle impending environmental issues. The weakest impact was identified at the macro-level in the public services. Here, the support given by reintegration programmes of the German government could not compensate interpersonal problems between employee and superior, in case the latter envied the new employee's experience of having studied abroad.

This finding, however, also indicates that successful knowledge transfer does not solely depend on the migrant's educational background and their performance, but also on external factors. It even depends on national concepts. As mentioned earlier, the premise for a successful knowledge transfer is that governments adopt global economic reforms and mainstream them. The implementation of these reforms, however, is also a cost factor. The future will show whether Ghana's government will continue to invest in its green economy. This depends not least on the extent to which the country succeeds in countering the negative effects of the current global financial crisis. If this is achieved successfully, the formal labour market could absorb future generations of highly skilled environmentalists trained abroad.

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Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe/Sambia – viele Herausforderungen, kreative Lösungen

Felix Brinkmann[102]

Abstract

Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur. Immer wieder wird dabei auf die schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler Hinsicht verwiesen. Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe/Sambia. Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf Kupferabbau- und Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist. In kaum einem anderen Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines volatilen Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten niedriger Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der örtlichen Bevölkerung. Bei steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur eine teilweise Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Situation her. Hervorgerufen durch Arbeitslosigkeit, möchten viele Sambianer an dem wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche Marktstände, was zu einem Überangebot führt.[103] Der Chisokone-Markt ist der zweitgrößte seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als solcher registriert worden. Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss und Macht. Das gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City Coucil (KCC) ist seit Jahren nicht im Stande eine angemessene Verwaltung zu gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind Händlerorganisationen getreten, die quasi als Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie das KCC den Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle nutzen. Zwischen diesen Akteuren herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz oder Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht. Dieser Artikel zeigt, welche betrieblichen und personalen Strategien Kleinhändler

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[103] Die Anzahl der Händler auf dem Chisokone.Markt hat sich innherhalb von 3 Jahren von ca. 10.000 auf 15.000 Händler erhöht.

anwenden, um in diesem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen hinaus und widmet sich ebenso dem Normen- und Wertesystem der Kleinhändler, welches ein entscheidender Faktor im örtlichen Marktaublauf ist. Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine günstige ökonomische Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und thematisiert ebenso die Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im sambianischen Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität und informeller Kooperation einzugehen.

Stichwörter: die Kleinhändlern, Kupferabbau- und Export, betrieblichen und personalen Strategien, der Chisokone-Markt, Sambia.

Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur.[104] Immer wieder wird dabei auf die schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler Hinsicht verwiesen.[105] Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe, Sambia.

Dieser Artikel zeigt, welche Strategien und Netzwerke Kleinhändler anwenden, um in einem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen hinaus. Zudem erfolgen eine genaue Beschreibung und ein Blick auf das institutionelle Umfeld, in dem die Kleinhändler agieren müssen. Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine günstige ökonomische Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und thematisiert ebenso die Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im sambianischen Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität und informeller Kooperation einzugehen.

Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf Kupferabbau- und Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist.[106] In kaum einem anderen Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines volatilen Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten niedriger

[104] Vgl. bspw. Hartmann 1994/ Banda, C., Mutula, S., Grant, B. 2004.

[105] Vgl. Liedholm/Mead 1988, S. 13.

[106] Vgl. Siachoono 2003.

Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der örtlichen Bevölkerung. Dies war besonders während der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise in den Jahren 2008 bis 2009 zu beobachten. Bei steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur teilweise eine Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Situation ein. Von hoher Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen, möchten viele Sambianer am wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung seit 2010 teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche Marktstände, was zu einem Überangebot führt.[107] Der Chisokone-Markt ist der zweitgrößte seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als solcher registriert worden. Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss und Macht. Das gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City Council (KCC) ist seit Jahren nicht im Stande, eine angemessene Verwaltung zu gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind Händlerorganisationen getreten, die quasi als Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie das KCC den Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle nutzen. Zwischen diesen Akteuren herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz oder Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht.

Hauptgrund für das ungenügende wirtschaftliche Umfeld für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt ist die bis heute nicht vollständig geklärte Frage, wer letztendlich die Marktverwaltung innehat. Das angesprochene KCC kann bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt keine angemessene Verwaltung des Marktes gewährleisten, da es unter chronischem Personalmangel und Unterfinanzierung leidet. Dabei spielt auch die Entstehung des Marktes eine wesentliche Rolle. Der Chisokone-Markt entstand in Kitwe in den 1950er Jahren und war ursprünglich für den Handel mit Lebensmitteln bestimmt. Dabei sollte der Markt insbesondere der weißen Bevölkerung zu Gute kommen, da er von der örtlichen Kolonialverwaltung installiert wurde. Im Verlauf der Lossagung und der Unabhängigkeit Sambias im Jahr 1964 änderte sich auch die Struktur des Chisokone-Marktes, da er nun von allen Bevölkerungsschichten genutzt werden konnte. Durch seine zentrale Lage nahe dem Stadtzentrum erfreute sich der Markt zunehmender Beliebtheit, wurde aber nie als solcher offiziell registriert; trotz stetigen Wachstums. Im Zuge der Minenprivatisierung erfuhr der Chisokone-Markt eine Neu- und Umgestaltung. Hervorgerufen durch Massenentlassungen und hohe Arbeitslosigkeit wichen zunehmend vormalige Minenarbeiter in den informellen Sektor aus und betätigten sich als Händler. Auf dem Chisokone-Markt wuchs durch die zunehmende Händleranzahl das Warenagebot und dessen Vielfalt rasant. Dabei dehnte sich das

[107] Die Anzahl der Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt hat sich innherhalb von 3 Jahren von ca. 10.000 auf 15.000 Händler erhöht.

Marktgeschehen auch örtlich aus. Aus voranschreitendem Wachstum und dem nie geklärtem rechtlichen Status des Chisokone-Marktes entstanden die bis heute dem Markt immanenten Probleme. Durch den illegalen Status fühlte sich das KCC anfangs nicht für die Verwaltung zuständig und leitete damit der unkontrollierten Ausbreitung und den prekären Verhältnissen Vorschub. In diese Verwaltungslücke stießen Anfang der 1990er Jahre dann so genannte Market Boards, die den Markt in Eigenregie verwalten sollten. Relativ rasch zeigte sich, dass diese Organe aufgrund der zahlreichen divergierenden Interessen seiner Mitglieder nicht in der Lage war, im Sinne einer angemessenen Verwaltung des Chisokone-Marktes zu handeln. Folge hiervon war die Gründung der Marktorganisation ZANAMA (Zambia National Marketeers Association) im Jahr 1999,[108] die sich zur Aufgabe machte, die Interessen der Händler gegenüber staatlichen Institutionen sowie anderen Interessensgruppen zu vertreten. Ob seiner Größe und zentralen Lage wurde der Chisokone-Markt neben dem City Market in Lusaka sehr bald zu einem Hauptoperationszentrum der Organisation. Durch die unbefriedigenden Administrationsversuche des KCC stieg ZANAMA ab dem Jahr 2000 zu einer Quasi-Marktverwaltung auf und verdrängte das KCC als Hauptverwaltungsorgan. Allerdings hatte sich bis zur Gründung von ZANAMA bereits eine desolate Infrastruktur entwickelt. ZANAMA verwaltete also den Mangel, tatsächliche Verbesserungen der Marktstrukturen konnte die Handelsorganisation nie realisieren. Außerdem wurde der Chisokone-Markt zum Politikum. Entgegen ihrer Konstitution handelte ZANAMA keineswegs politisch neutral, sondern agierte als Interessenvertreter der damals herrschenden Partei MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy). Diese Einseitigkeit schlug sich im Marktgeschehen in Chisokone nieder. Durch die politische Rückendeckung gelang es ZANAMA in zunehmenden Maße, den Chisokone-Markt zu beherrschen und die Verwaltung fast komplett zu übernehmen. Allerdings profitieren von der Verwaltungsübernahme lediglich Händler, die politisch dem MMD nahestanden. Andere Händler, die der Opposition gewogen waren oder auch neutral agierten, wurden zum Teil systematisch unter Druck gesetzt und ihr Wirtschaften erschwert.

Es häuften sich Skandale und Kompetenzüberschreitungen, wie beispielsweise das erheben von illegalen Steuern auf „Großhandelsware“. Des Weiteren ging ZANAMA sogar so weit, in einigen Marktsektionen Zwangsabgaben einzufordern und bei Nichtentrichtung Waren der betroffenen Händler zu konfiszieren und

[108] Vgl. Moeller-Larsson 2009, S. 33 – S. 34.

so deren Geschäftsgrundlage zu ruinieren. Darüber hinaus führte ZANAMA bei Nichteinhaltung der von ihr aufgestellten Marktregeln sogar Arretierungen durch und sperrte Delinquenten in Zellen, die sich im Hauptquartier der Organisation befanden. Dabei kam es sogar zu Todesfällen, wie auch „The Post“ im Januar 2010 berichtet.[109] Daraufhin fand eine Erstürmung einer ZANAMA-Filiale durch aufgebrachte Händler statt und deren Mitarbeiter konnten sich nur knapp retten.

Unter den betroffenen Händlern regte sich zunehmend Unmut über das Gebaren von ZANAMA und die Inkompetenz des KCC. Der Chisokone-Markt bot Händlern zwar eine Plattform, um ihren Geschäften nachzugehen, die Umstände kann man allerdings nur als unzulänglich bezeichnen: Keine klare Verwaltungsstruktur, eine zunehmende Korruption und Dominanz seitens ZANAMA, eine schlechte Infrastruktur sowie eine steigendes Ungleichgewicht von zu vielen Händlern und zu wenigen Kunden. Dennoch erfuhr der Chisokone-Markt ein stetiges Wachstum, da es durch die lückenhafte Verwaltung keine Limitierung der Händleranzahl gab und viele Sambianer eine Tätigkeit als Händler der Arbeitslosigkeit vorziehen.
Das anarchische Marktgeschehen in Chisokone blieb nicht ohne Folgen. Frustriert durch die Kompetenzüberschreitungen von ZANAMA und die Unfähigkeit des KCC, gründete sich im Jahr 2004 ZATMA (Zambia Traders and Marketeers Association), eine weitere Handelsorganisation mit dem Ziel, die Rechte aller Händler tatsächlich zu vertreten. Die aus einer Abspaltungsbewegung von ZANAMA entstandene Handelsorganisation etablierte sich auf dem Chisokone-Markt als dritter institutioneller Akteur, wobei eine temporäre strategische Partnerschaft zwischen dem KCC und ZATMA stattfand. Im Gegensatz zu ZANAMA reklamiert ZATMA keine Ansprüche, die Marktverwaltung oder Teile der Verwaltungsaufgaben übernehmen zu wollen.

Die Wahlen im September 2011 haben die Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt noch einmal grundlegend verändert. Dabei können zwei Ebenen unterschieden werden: Institutionell wie auf Seiten der Händler. Da der Markt schon immer unter politischen Einfluss stand, waren die politischen Änderungen mit dem Sieg der PF (Patriotic Front) auch auf dem Chisokone-Markt bemerkbar. So verschob sich das gesamte, den Markt betreffende institutionelle Gefüge. Die neue politische Direktive hatte zur Folge, dass ausschließlich die örtlichen Councils die Marktverwaltungen in ganz Sambia übernehmen sollten und es erfolgte ein fast kompletter Entzug der Handlungs- und

[109] Vgl. <http://www.postzambia.com/Joomla/post-print_article.php?articleId=4171>, aufgerufen 20. Juli 2012.

Geschäftsgrundlage der Händlervereinigungen. Das KCC ist seither der alleinige Verwalter des Marktes. Freilich kann eine solche Aufgabe nicht ohne Anlaufschwierigkeiten vonstattengehen. Das KCC verfügt bis heute über kaum ausreichende Ressourcen, um eine befriedigende Administration zu gewährleisten. Ebenso ist es schwierig, mit über Jahre gewachsenen Strukturen und den Ambitionen der Händlerorganisationen zu brechen. Demzufolge ist die Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt zurzeit von Verunsicherung einerseits und Neustrukturierungsversuchen des KCC andererseits geprägt.

Der institutionelle Rahmen ist wichtig für ein Verständnis der Strategieentwicklung der Kleinhändler, die im doppelten Sinne mit Herausforderungen zu kämpfen haben, was ihre Situation außergewöhnlich schwierig macht. Die mehrfachen Herausforderungen bestehen aus dem unsicheren institutionellen Umfeld sowie den Auswirkungen des schwankenden Kupferpreises, der sich in Form volatiler Kaufkraft und hoher Konkurrenzsituation auf dem Markt selbst niederschlägt. Wer in solch einem Umfeld erfolgreich agieren will, braucht Strategien und ebenso ökonomische wie soziale Netzwerke, die es erlauben, auf die dargelegten Schwierigkeiten reagieren zu können. Im Zuge zweier Feldforschungen in Kitwe 2011 und 2012 konnten mit Hilfe zahlreicher halbstandardisierter Interviews (insgesamt 45) mit Kleinhändlern und Experten (u. a. der Vorsitzenden von ZATMA, dem Vorsitzenden der Handelskammer Kitwe, dem Leiter der Abteilung Marktadministration des KCC) ökonomische wie personale Strategien der Händler herausgearbeitet werden.

Ein ganz wesentlicher Erfolgsfaktor ist die Einkaufspraxis der Kleinhändler. Durch das Warenüberangebot ist das Preisniveau extrem niedrig, Kunden sind hochgradig preissensibel und die Einkaufs-/Verkaufsmarge der Händler beträgt teilweise nur fünf bis zehn Prozent. Kostendeckendes Wirtschaften oder gar Gewinnerzielung ist unter solchen Voraussetzungen kaum möglich. Erfolgreiche Händler überspringen in Sambia ansässige Großhändler, die mittlerweile häufig von Chinesen geführt werden und kaufen ihre Ware zumeist direkt in Daressalam (Tansania) ein. Dabei können Händler einen Aufschlag von bis zu 100 Prozent des Einkaufspreises als Verkaufspreis erzielen! Es verkehren täglich Busse zwischen Kitwe und Daressalam (mit Übernacht-Stopp am Grenzort Nakonde), die sich auf Handelsreisende spezialisiert haben und eigens Anhänger für die eingekauften Waren der Händler mit führen. Ebenfalls beliebt als Wareneinkaufsländer sind Südafrika und Botsuana. Wobei in diesen Ländern vor allem Unterhaltungselektronik und hochwertige Textilien erworben werden.

In Tansania kaufen Händler überwiegend günstige Textilien aus chinesischer Produktion ein. Um diese Warenbeschaffung zu realisieren, benötigt man allerdings ein gewisses Grundkapital, um die Reise finanzieren zu können und Waren in größeren Mengen zu erwerben. Hiermit haben die allermeisten Händler ein Problem: Drei Viertel der befragten Händler gaben an, über nicht genügend Kapital zu verfügen, und beschreiben ihr eigenes Geschäftsmodell als „hand to mouth“. Unabdingbar ist für die Warenbeschaffung im Ausland ist auch ein verlässliches Netzwerk. Um nicht jeden Monat persönlich eine Geschäftsreise antreten zu müssen, haben sich viele Händler in informellen Einkaufsverbünden organisiert. Diese bestehen aus zumeist vier bis fünf Händlern, die sich seit etlichen Jahren kennen, vertrauen und kooperieren. Im Rotationsprinzip fährt ein Händler des Netzwerkes in die erwähnten Länder und kauft für die anderen mit ein, wobei er das Geld hierfür im Vorhinein von seinen Netzwerkpartnern erhält.

Über ein derartiges Netzwerk verfügen allerdings nicht viele. Eher herrscht durch den enormen Konkurrenzdruck und das Händler- und Warenüberangebot eine ungesunde Konkurrenzsituation. Etwa die Hälfte der Befragten gab an, sich lieber auf den eigenen Geschäftsablauf konzentrieren zu wollen, da sie schon oft von anderen Händler persönlich wie geschäftlich enttäuscht wurden; häufige Aussage hierbei: „You better trust no one“. Ein funktionierendes Netzwerk ist also ein entscheidender Wettbewerbsvorteil, der nicht einfach durch Kapital oder ein gelungenes Geschäftsmodell hergestellt werden kann; vielmehr muss es in jahrelanger Arbeit aufgebaut werden: Verlässliche Partnerschaften entstehen nicht über Nacht. Interessant in diesem Zusammenhang ist die komplett fehlende ethnische Komponente in Sambia, die häufig in andern Ländern Afrikas vorzufinden ist. Henrik Egbert[110] beschreibt sie am Beispiel Tansanias und den dortigen Händlernetzwerken. Die befragten Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt wunderten sich über die Frage, ob sie die beschriebenen Netzwerke unter ethnischen Gesichtspunkten aufbauten. Alle gaben an, dass es völlig gleichgültig sei, welcher ethnischen Gruppe jemand angehöre. Vertrauen, Zuverlässigkeit und gegenseitige Unterstützung sind die entscheidenden Komponenten.

Ein weiterer bedeutender Aspekt ist das Sortiment. Grundsätzlich ist für jede Unternehmung eine fachgemäße, auf die Kundenwünsche ausgerichtete Sortimentspolitik zentral. Auf dem Chisokone-Markt kann sie unmittelbar über Erfolg und Misserfolg eines Geschäftes entscheiden. Es herrscht ein drastisches Überangebot an günstigen

[110] Vgl. Egbert 2001.

Textilien aus chinesischer Produktion. Grund hierfür ist, dass es relativ einfach ist, ein solches Geschäftsmodell ins Leben zu rufen, da es wenig kapitalintensiv ist und die Textilien im Einkauf relativ günstig sind. Durch das Überangebot und die Preissensibilität sind diese Artikel extrem margenschwach. Kaum ein Händler, der in diesem Segment handelt, ist erfolgreich. Ähnlich wie in vielen anderen Ländern Afrikas hat sich auch in Sambia eine auf Prestigekonsum ausgerichtete, kaufkräftige Mittelschicht gebildet. In Kitwe, obwohl zweitgrößte Stadt Sambias, existiert noch kein modernes Einkaufszentrum. In diese Lücke sind einige Händler getreten und verkaufen sehr erfolgreich Unterhaltungselektronik. Direkt neben dem Chisokone-Markt in der Kingston Road sind die meisten der Elektronikanbieter angesiedelt. Mittlerweile stuft das KCC die Kingston Road als eigenen Marktabschnitt ein.

Noch mehr als beim Textilerwerb im Ausland benötigt ein Händler ausreichend Grundkapital, um die Elektronikwaren zu beschaffen und sie nach Kitwe zu transportieren. Ein Transport der eingekauften Waren mit Reisebussen ist aufgrund der Sperrigkeit der Artikel nicht möglich. Händler, die ihre Ware – zumeist in Botsuana – kaufen, verfügen über ein eigenes Fahrzeug. Die Margen sind enorm: Bei Flachbildschirmfernsehern können Händler einen Aufschlag von bis zu 80 Prozent verlangen. So berichten ausnahmslos alle Händler, die im Bereich Unterhaltungselektronik operieren, von ausgezeichneten Geschäften. Manche geben an, kaum die Nachfrage stillen zu können.

Ein Weg, auch in schwierigen Zeiten bestehen zu können - wie etwa während der letzten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 2008/2009 - ist eine Diversifizierungsstrategie. Sobald genügend Kapital vorhanden ist, versuchen Händler, ein neues Geschäft auf dem Markt zu eröffnen, welches möglichst fern vom ursprünglichen Standort lokalisiert ist. Hierfür gibt es einen einfachen Grund: Durch die angesprochene institutionelle Unsicherheit ist es sinnvoll, das Geschäftsrisiko zu streuen. In manchen Bereichen wurden bis zur letzten Wahl teilweise doppelt Gebühren erhoben; von ZANAMA und vom KCC. Im Bereich Chisokone-Markt B allerdings erhob alleinig die ZANAMA Gebühren, was aber keinesfalls einen Vorteil bedeuten muss, da ZANAMA durch ihre rüde Verwaltungspraxis die Geschäftsgrundlage vieler Händler gefährdete. Die eigentliche Diversifizierung liegt aber in dem Warenangebot, welches sich vom Ursprungsgeschäft unterscheidet. So ist es Händlern auf zwei Ebenen möglich, ihr Risiko abzusichern: Zum einen ändern sich Moden und Nachfrageverhalten sehr schnell, zum zweiten kann ein Geschäft im ungünstigen Fall den Misserfolg des anderen ausgleichen. Ebenfalls ist es somit möglich, auf die mangelhafte und

unberechenbare Verwaltung zu reagieren. Gebühren können, wie beschrieben, je nach Marktlage eines Geschäftes unterschiedlich hoch ausfallen. Inwieweit durch die Übernahme des KCC eine transparente Vereinheitlichung der Gebühreneinzugspraxis geschieht, bleibt abzuwarten. Diejenigen Händler, die es sich nicht erlauben können, ein weiteres Geschäft zu eröffnen, versuchen häufig innerhalb ihres Geschäftes zu diversifizieren. Häufig führt das zu einer Mischung aus so genannten Schnelldrehern (Artikel mit geringer Marge, die sich rasch und in großen Mengen abverkaufen) und Artikeln mit höherer Gewinnmarge, dafür aber längerer Lagerdauer.

Ein anderer Weg ist die Spezialisierung. Um diese erfolgreich zu gestalten, muss eine Marktlücke entdeckt werden. Es gelingt allerdings nur sehr wenigen Händlern, mit einer Spezialisierungsstrategie erfolgreich zu sein. Ein Beispiel ist die „Baby Boy Company“,[111] deren Besitzer sich auf hochwertige, den allerneusten Moden entsprechende Herrenbekleidung aus Südafrika spezialisiert hat. Kunden sind die so genannten „Hipster“, die aus der kaufkräftigen Mittel- und Oberschicht kommen. Wer im Bereich der Spezialisierung erfolgreich sein möchte, muss sein Geschäft auch optisch entsprechend gestalten.

Eine weitere Strategie ist es, sich gleichzeitig als „Großhändler“ und Kleinhändler zu betätigen. Zwar sind laut Gesetz Großhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt nicht gestattet, doch hat sich aufgrund des dargelegten wirtschaftlichen Rahmens eine Situation ergeben, die es Händlern erlaubt, als solche zu wirtschaften. Die Händler, die sich im Bereich des Großhandels bewegen, versorgen vor allem die so genannten „fliegenden Händler“, die ihre Ware am Körper tragen und feilbieten. Ähnlich wie bei der Diversifikation ist eine solche Doppelstrategie erfolgsversprechend, da das Risiko verteilt werden kann. Zwar sind die Margen beim Verkauf an „fliegende Händler“ sehr niedrig, durch die ständige Abnahme und die hohe Anzahl an „fliegenden Händlern“ ist ein solches Geschäftsmodell dennoch einträglich.

Sofern ein Händler nicht selbst im Geschäft zugegen ist (z.B. weil er auf Geschäftsreise ist) oder mehrere Geschäfte betrieben werden, ist es notwendig, Angestellte zu engagieren. Die Kriterien für die Auswahl geeigneter Mitarbeiter sind meist nicht rein ökonomischer Natur. Viele Händler fühlen sich von ihrem familiären Umfeld unter Druck gesetzt und sehen sich genötigt, enge Verwandte einzustellen. Eine solche Praxis hat sowohl Vor- als auch Nachteile: Befragte

[111] Siehe Anhang 1.

Händler beschwerten häufig sich über die schlechte Arbeitsmoral der Verwandten. Diese wüssten, dass sie ohnehin aufgrund ihres verwandtschaftlichen Verhältnisses bezahlt würden und fielen durch Abstinenz, Unmotiviertheit sowie Passivität im Kundenumgang auf. Gleichwohl erfüllt ein Händler so familiäre Verpflichtungen. Ein unschätzbarer Vorteil eines verwandtschaftlich verbundenen Angestellten ist dessen Ehrlichkeit. Es gilt das Prinzip: Bestehlen innerhalb eines (erweiterten) Familienverbundes ist tabu. Die soziale Observation im Bereich des Geschäftes und ebenso innerhalb des Familienverbundes trägt hierzu bei. So ist das Verhältnis der Händler zu ihren Angestellten aus dem familiären Umkreis häufig ambivalent.
Diebstahl durch eigene Angestellte ist generell ein schwerwiegendes Problem, das kaum in den Griff zu bekommen ist. Zu verhindern ist dies durch eine ständige Inventur, eine genau Katalogisierung der Waren und einer exakten Buchführung, welche Waren zu welchem Preis verkauft wurden. Aber auch diese Maßnahmen schützen nur bis zu einem gewissen Grad vor unredlichem Verhalten mancher Angestellter. Insbesondere fielen dabei männliche Angestellte negativ auf. Fast alle Kleinhändler gaben an, sofern sie keine Verwandten anstellten, schlechte Erfahrungen mit männlichem Personal gemacht zu haben. In den durchgeführten Interviews traten dabei immer wieder die Schlüsselwörter „absenteeism“,“ alcoholism“ und „abuse“ auf. Besitzer beklagten sich über unentschuldigtes Fehlen, welches sich häufig durch übermäßigen Alkoholkonsum erklären lässt, oder aber durch Unzuverlässigkeit und/oder einer geringen Identifikation mit dem eigenen Arbeitsplatz. Diese Faktoren decken sich mit sozialen Phänomenen in Sambia. Der Alkoholkonsum, insbesondere unter der männlichen Bevölkerung, ist in Sambia ein großes Problem, wie die WHO in einem Bericht 2004 feststellen musste.[112] Dabei werden fast alle sozialen, familiären und eben wirtschaftliche Ebenen tangiert. Die Händler des Chisokone-Marktes haben darauf eine relativ einfache Antwort: es werden überwiegend Frauen eingestellt. Diese gelten als zuverlässiger, aufrichtiger und weniger alkoholaffin. Drei Zitate aus unterschiedlichen Interviews mit Kleinhändlern bringen den letzten Abschnitt zur Einstellungspraxis etwas überspitzt auf den Punkt:

> men are crooks
> woman are more afraid to steal
> family members or close relatives are also acceptable,
> but somehow lazy[113]

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[112] Vgl. <http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/en/zambia.pdf>, aufgerufen 10. März 2012.

[113] Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Kitwe, Maxwell Sinkala am 16. April 2012, Irene Chiwera am 01. April 2012 und Felix Kabwe am 17. April 2012.

Ein Problem für die Kleinhändler ist, dass sowohl die Trennung von betrieblichem und privatem Kapital als auch die Trennung zwischen familiären und geschäftlichen Verhältnissen schwer fällt. Oft können betrieblich sinnvolle und rationale Strategien aufgrund des sozialen Erwartungen nicht umgesetzt werden. Erfolgreichere Händler versuchen, dem mit der Gründung einer offiziellen Firma entgegen zu wirken. Diese hat ihren Sitz dann zwar auf einem illegalen Markt, wird aber dennoch von der PACRA (Patents and Companies Registration Agency) akzeptiert und vom sambianischen Steuerregister erfasst. Dieser Schritt ist aber nur sehr wenigen vorbehalten. Er hat aber ganz entscheidende Vorteile. Ohne ein Firmenkonto ist es nahezu unmöglich, an einen Kredit zu marktüblichen Zinsen zu gelangen. Grundsätzlich sind Banken nur bereit, einen Kredit zu gewähren, wenn der Bewerber sich im formellen Sektor bewegt und seine finanzielle Situation transparent darlegt. Händler, die im informellen Sektor agieren (wie es die ganz überwiegende Zahl an Kleinhändlern auf dem Chisokone-Markt tut), müssen sich an eine der vielen Mikrokredit-Banken in Kitwe wenden. Allerdings sind deren Zinsen enorm, da das Ausfallrisiko durch die unsichere rechtliche wie institutionelle Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt sehr hoch ist. Wer es allerdings schafft, eine Firma zu gründen und an marktübliche Kredite zu gelangen, ist in der Lage, sein Geschäft zügig auszubauen und den hoch lukrativen Wareneinkauf im benachbarten Ausland zu tätigen.

Immer mehr kommt es auf dem Chisokone-Markt zu einer Spaltung der Händler. Circa 20 Prozent der Händler können die beschriebenen Faktoren umsetzen und so erfolgreich auf dem Markt operieren. Durch ihre Finanzkraft, Kreditwürdigkeit und nachgefragtes Warenangebot entfernen sie sich zusehends von der Mehrzahl der Kleinhändler, deren Geschäftsmodell am Rande des Existenzminimums rangiert. Gleichwohl ist ein großer Kapitalstock kein Garant für eine erfolgreiche Unternehmung. Diese Erfahrung mussten etliche im Zuge der globalen Finanzkrise entlassene Minenarbeiter machen, die sich ab 2008/2009 als Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt versuchten. Ohne Erfahrung im Bereich des Handels ist es schwierig, gerade die kritische Anfangsphase einer Unternehmung zu überstehen. Hauptgrund für das vielfache Scheitern war eine verfehlte Preispolitik. Die ehemaligen Minenarbeiter versuchten, mit Kampfpreisen konkurrenzfähig zu werden, ihre Unternehmung missglückte aber dann rasch aufgrund einer rasant schmelzenden Kapitaldecke und einer verfehlten Sortimentspolitik.

Aber auch das Geschäftsmodell der bis heute erfolgreichen Händler ist risikobehaftet. Dabei droht Gefahr von außerhalb. Durch die

lasche Regulierung kann im Grunde jeder ein Geschäft auf dem Chisokone-Markt eröffnen – auch ausländische Händler. Die hohen Gewinnspannen haben sich bis nach Tansania herumgesprochen; immer mehr Händler aus Tansania eröffnen nun Geschäfte und machen den alteingesessenen Händlern aus Kitwe Konkurrenz. Der Ärger unter den Händlern darüber ist groß und protektionistische Stimmen, die eine Verbannung ausländischer Händler fordern, werden immer lauter. Ebenfalls für Schwierigkeiten könnte die zu lässig gehandhabte Praxis der fehlenden Trennung zwischen Groß- und Kleinhandel auf dem Chisokone-Markt sein. Zwar machen sich Händler eine solche Zwitterstellung ökonomisch zu Nutzen, sie birgt aber auch Risiken. Diese kommen von Seiten der chinesischen Großhändler, die bis vor kurzem ausschließlich als Beschaffungsoption der sambianischen Händler wahrgenommen wurden. Mittlerweile greifen die chinesischen Händler ganz direkt in den Endverbrauchermarkt ein und eröffnen Geschäfte auf dem Chisokone-Markt. Aufgrund ihres Beschaffungsvorteils können sie Waren konkurrenzlos günstig veräußern. Das Image der Chinesen in Sambia und insbesondere im Kupfergürtel kann allerdings nur als ausgesprochen negativ bezeichnet werden. Hierzu haben etliche Skandale in chinesischen Firmen und Bergbauunternehmen beigetragen.[114] Mr. Mofya, der Vorsitzende der Händlervereinigung ZATMA, sagte in einem Interview, angesprochen auf die chinesische Präsenz in Kitwe: „the worst investors we ever had".[115] Diese Imageproblem versuchen chinesische Händler durch die Anstellung von Sambianern zu umgehen, die dem Geschäft auf dem Chisokone-Markt einen lokalen Anstrich geben sollen. Klar ist, dass sich eine derartige Praxis schnell herumspricht und allgemein bekannt ist, welches Geschäft von Chinesen geführt wird. Es bleibt also abzuwarten, wie sich der Einfluss der ausländischen Händler aus Tansania und China auswirken wird. Viel wird auch davon abhängen, in wie weit es das KCC schaffen wird, in den nächsten Jahren eine funktionierende Administration aufzubauen und den Marktablauf in geregelte Bahnen zu lenken.

Ein ganz anderer Faktor wird sein, wann das erste Shopping-Center in Kitwe eröffnet. Dann werden die bis heute erfolgreichen Händler ernsthafte Konkurrenz erhalten. Kaum jemand wird freiwillig den Chisokone-Markt mit seiner kundenunfreundlichen Infrastruktur, den Unbequemlichkeiten und den chaotischen Warendarbietungen einem geordneten, sauberen und dem Zeitgeist entsprechenden Konsumort vorziehen. Sollte es so weit kommen, können sich Händler fast

[114] Vgl. Raine 2009, S. 138 – S. 139.

[115] Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Kitwe, Mr. Mofya am 23. Mai 2012.

ausschließlich über den Preis positionieren und es besteht die Gefahr, dass sich der schon jetzt statt findende, zum Teil ruinöse, Preiswettbewerb fortsetzt. Es ist nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis das besagte Einkaufszentrum errichtet wird. Unmittelbar neben dem Freedom Park ist bereits eine Fläche hierfür ausgewiesen, die nur knapp einen Kilometer vom Chisokone-Markt entfernt liegt.

Nicht ohne Grund haben sich die ganz überwiegend sehr erfolgreichen Elektronikhändler am Rand des Marktes platziert, um so auch klar sichtbar eine Abgrenzung zum restlichen Marktgeschehen zu schaffen. Dieser Bereich wird bereits als eine separate Marktsektion vom KCC verwaltet. Auch in diesem Falle hat das KCC nicht proaktiv gehandelt, sondern seine Verwaltungsstruktur den reellen Entwicklungen anpassen müssen. Mittlerweile ist der zweitgrößte Markt Sambias in einem derart schlechten Zustand, dass Händler wie Kunden die momentane Situation als nicht mehr tragbar ansehen. Dabei ist das Grundproblem, dass alle verwaltenden Institutionen den Markt nicht als Handelsplattform verstehen und etablieren wollen, sondern als Einnahmequelle. Der jahrelange Machtkampf auf dem Markt und die Dominanz von ZANAMA haben Strukturen geschaffen, die immer noch nachwirken. Bis heute versucht ZATMA, wieder an Einfluss zu gewinnen und ist in zähen Verhandlungen mit dem KCC, wie die „Rollenverteilung“ in den nächsten Jahren aussehen soll. Über Restrukturierungen oder gar Reformen lassen beide Akteure wenig verlautbaren. Es drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass beide daran interessiert sind, sich für die nächste Zeit in eine Position zu manövrieren, die es erlaubt, weiterhin finanziell von den strukturellen wie administrativen Unzulänglichkeiten des Chisokone-Marktes zu profitieren.

Dabei sollten allen Akteuren neuere Entwicklungen eine Warnung sein. Seit der letzten Wahl 2011 ist es „Street Vendors“ erlaubt, im ganzen Stadtgebiet Handel zu treiben, wovon auch ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht wird. Seitdem klagen fast alle Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt über massive Umsatzeinbußen, wie meine Befragungen der letzten Feldforschung im Frühjahr 2012 ergeben haben. Sobald eine Alternative vorhanden ist, vermeiden es Kunden, sich in das kundenunfreundliche Marktgeschehen zu begeben. Sobald die angesprochene Shopping Mall errichtet ist, kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass der Markt weiter an Kunden und damit auch an Bedeutung verliert. So kursieren seit einigen Jahren Gerüchte und Halbwahrheiten um eine Neugestaltung des Chisokone-Marktes in Kitwe. Allen Beteiligten ist klar, dass diese schnellstmöglich umgesetzt werden müsste. Wenn aber bis heute kaum ausgemacht ist, dass das KCC endgültig die Verwaltung

übernimmt und sogar die verbannte ZANAMA wieder versucht, im Dunstkreis des Chisokone-Marktes Fuß zu fassen, ist es schwer vorstellbar, dass in absehbarer Zeit eine Neugestaltung des Marktes vonstatten geht. Eine sinnvolle Lösung bietet der Vorsitzende der Handelskammer in Kitwe, Herr Banda, an. Da die Händler die Rochaden und Machtspiele der institutionellen Akteure und die damit verbundene Lähmung leid sind, schlägt er einen privaten Investor vor.[116] Dieser übernähme die Verwaltung des Marktes, gestaltete ihn um und nähme dringend notwendige Renovierungsarbeiten vor. Ein privater Investor könnte aus Sicht des Vorsitzenden das Marktgelände von der Stadt für beispielsweise 20 Jahre anmieten und die Marktgebühren selbst einnehmen, wobei Obergrenzen festgesetzt werden müssten. Herr Banda betont bei diesem Verfahren im Besonderen die Neutralität. Bei einer Neugestaltung seitens des KCC befürchtet er, dass Geschäfte in günstiger Lage nicht transparent vergeben werden, sondern im klientelistischen bzw. patrimonialem Stil an Günstlinge verteilt werden.

Bis es zu einer Verbesserung der Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt kommt, bleibt die Situation für die Händler prekär. Weiterhin besteht die große Unsicherheit, wer eigentlich den Markt letztendlich verwalten wird und ob dieser in seiner jetzigen Form Bestand haben kann. Ein solches Umfeld schafft kein investitionsfreundliches Klima und bremst damit die Anstrengungen der Händler aus. Selbst diejenigen, die erfolgreich Handel treiben, halten sich mit Expansionsplänen zurück. Viel wird davon abhängen, ob es in Kitwe gelingt, eine funktionierende Verwaltung zu installieren, die auch als solche von allen an dem Markt beteiligten Akteuren anerkannt wird. Das KCC als alleinige Verwaltung zu benennen und die Macht der Händlerorganisationen zu kappen, war ein erster richtiger Schritt.

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[116] Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Handelskammer-Kitwe, Mr. Banda am 20. Mai 2012.

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Anhang 1: eine filiale der Baby Boy Company auf dem Chisokone-Markt

